Marlene A. Plumlee
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Marlene A. Plumlee has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christine A. Botosan
Financial Accounting Standards Board
6 shared publications Teri Lombardi Yohn
Indiana University - Kelley School of Business - Department of Accounting
6 shared publicationsDavid Plumlee
University of Utah - David Eccles School of Business
3 shared publications- Jing He
University of Delaware - Accounting & MIS
2 shared publications Rachel M. Hayes
The University of Utah
2 shared publications- Stephen R. Stubben
The University of Utah
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 May 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Do Chief Accounting Officers Influence Corporate Disclosure?
This study explores aspects of chief accounting officers (CAOs), a relatively new corporate executive title that firms add to C-suites. We provide descriptive data on CAO attributes and examine the determinants of CAO appointment and their role in corporate disclosure. Our results suggest that firms’ decisions to appoint a CAO are positively associated with investor sophistication and reporting environment. We find that CAO presence is positively associated with the quality of firms’ voluntary and mandatory disclosures, as measured by the amount of information disclosed in 8-K filings. Further investigation of voluntary disclosures via specific channels reveals that the presence of a CAO is positively associated with both the frequency of management guidance and non-GAAP disclosures. We also find that firms with CAOs take more time to issue earnings announcements, especially for larger firms. Additional analysis indicates that having a CAO in the executive team is not merely a title change. Instead, CAOs bring expertise and monitoring to corporate disclosure.
- 22 May 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDo Chief Accounting Officers Influence Corporate Disclosure?
This study explores aspects of chief accounting officers (CAOs), a relatively new corporate executive title that firms add to C-suites. We provide descriptive data on CAO attributes and examine the determinants of CAO appointment and their role in corporate disclosure. Our results suggest that firms’ decisions to appoint a CAO are positively associated with investor sophistication and reporting environment. We find that CAO presence is positively associated with the quality of firms’ voluntary and mandatory disclosures, as measured by the amount of information disclosed in 8-K filings. Further investigation of voluntary disclosures via specific channels reveals that the presence of a CAO is positively associated with both the frequency of management guidance and non-GAAP disclosures. We also find that firms with CAOs take more time to issue earnings announcements, especially for larger firms. Additional analysis indicates that having a CAO in the executive team is not merely a title change. Instead, CAOs bring expertise and monitoring to corporate disclosure.
- Open Access
- 9 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Does More Effective Director Monitoring Make Management Guidance More Credible?
Evidence of the impact of governance on disclosure credibility is inconclusive. Based on a large, post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg-FD) sample, we find that increased director monitoring – through increased director independence and director attention – is associated with more credible management guidance, as evidenced by stronger analyst reactions to the news in management guidance. We document additional cross-sectional differences in the monitoring/credibility link, consistent with monitoring being particularly impactful when the role of external verification is largest (good news forecasts, low analyst following). We are able to identify causal effects through exogenous shocks to monitoring associated with (1) director deaths, (2) mandated independence required by Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), and (3) changes in director attention due to M&A activities that eliminate board positions at other firms. This finding does not appear to be due to a link between effective monitoring and more accurate guidance, as the stronger analyst reactions occur only when guidance is less accurate. Overall, our findings provide strong support for director monitoring influencing the perceived credibility of management forecasts, especially in settings where external validation is needed.
- 9 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessDoes More Effective Director Monitoring Make Management Guidance More Credible?
Evidence of the impact of governance on disclosure credibility is inconclusive. Based on a large, post-Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg-FD) sample, we find that increased director monitoring – through increased director independence and director attention – is associated with more credible management guidance, as evidenced by stronger analyst reactions to the news in management guidance. We document additional cross-sectional differences in the monitoring/credibility link, consistent with monitoring being particularly impactful when the role of external verification is largest (good news forecasts, low analyst following). We are able to identify causal effects through exogenous shocks to monitoring associated with (1) director deaths, (2) mandated independence required by Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX), and (3) changes in director attention due to M&A activities that eliminate board positions at other firms. This finding does not appear to be due to a link between effective monitoring and more accurate guidance, as the stronger analyst reactions occur only when guidance is less accurate. Overall, our findings provide strong support for director monitoring influencing the perceived credibility of management forecasts, especially in settings where external validation is needed.
- 1 September 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 36 (3) , 127-148
Overview of U.S. State and Local Government Financial Reporting: A Reference for Academic Research
SYNOPSIS: The purpose of this paper is to encourage and support academic research related to U.S. state and local government financial reporting. We provide an overview of U.S. state and local governments and their financial reporting, discuss sources of government data available to researchers, review key streams of academic research on governmental financial reporting, and suggest opportunities for future research in this area. JEL Classifications: H50; H70; H71; H72; H83; M41; M48.
- 1 September 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 36 (3) , 127-148
Overview of U.S. State and Local Government Financial Reporting: A Reference for Academic Research
SYNOPSIS: The purpose of this paper is to encourage and support academic research related to U.S. state and local government financial reporting. We provide an overview of U.S. state and local governments and their financial reporting, discuss sources of government data available to researchers, review key streams of academic research on governmental financial reporting, and suggest opportunities for future research in this area. JEL Classifications: H50; H70; H71; H72; H83; M41; M48.
- 27 August 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 97 (4) , 259-286
Growth Matters: Disclosure and Risk Premium
Theoretical work generally predicts a negative association between disclosure and risk premium, where additional disclosure reduces estimation risk or information asymmetry. However, empirical studies frequently report mixed results. Recent theoretical studies suggest that the association between disclosure and risk premium is not necessarily always negative, and could be positive (or less negative). For example, Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) show that disclosure can be associated with higher risk premium when conditioned on a firm's growth rates. Similarly, Johnstone (2016) shows that higher signal quality can lead to higher risk premium. Motivated by these studies, we re-examine the association between disclosure and risk premium, conditional on growth. Using various proxies for risk premium, disclosure, and growth, we provide robust evidence that while the unconditional association between disclosure and risk premium is ambiguous, the conditional association is negative for lower growth firms but is less negative (or positive) for higher growth firms. Data Availability: Additional analyses are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: M41; G12.
- 27 August 2021
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 97 (4) , 259-286
Growth Matters: Disclosure and Risk Premium
Theoretical work generally predicts a negative association between disclosure and risk premium, where additional disclosure reduces estimation risk or information asymmetry. However, empirical studies frequently report mixed results. Recent theoretical studies suggest that the association between disclosure and risk premium is not necessarily always negative, and could be positive (or less negative). For example, Dutta and Nezlobin (2017) show that disclosure can be associated with higher risk premium when conditioned on a firm's growth rates. Similarly, Johnstone (2016) shows that higher signal quality can lead to higher risk premium. Motivated by these studies, we re-examine the association between disclosure and risk premium, conditional on growth. Using various proxies for risk premium, disclosure, and growth, we provide robust evidence that while the unconditional association between disclosure and risk premium is ambiguous, the conditional association is negative for lower growth firms but is less negative (or positive) for higher growth firms. Data Availability: Additional analyses are available from the authors upon request. JEL Classifications: M41; G12.
- Open Access
- 19 March 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Disaggregation of, and Asymmetry in, CEO Pay-for-Luck
Early work documents a sensitivity of CEO compensation contracts to economic factors beyond the control of the CEO, where CEO incentive payouts are increasing in performance attributable to good luck and decreasing in bad luck (referred to as “pay-for-luck”). Using established measures of luck, we confirm findings in more recent studies that finds no evidence of asymmetry in CEO pay-for-luck, where rewards for good luck are larger in magnitude than penalties for bad luck. When we employ an innovative method of disaggregating profitability drawn from the forecasting literature to disaggregate luck into orthogonal market and industry components, however, we find strong evidence of an asymmetry in CEO pay-for-luck, specifically related to luck around industry profitability. We investigate settings in which firms are more likely to try to retain incumbent CEOs and document pay-for-luck asymmetry only in profit-making firms. We also document pronounced pay-for-luck asymmetry in settings of (1) declining market and industry components of profitability, and growth rates, and (2) an increasing skill component of profitability, and growth in skill. Taken together, the cross-sectional findings support the prediction that evidence of CEO pay-for-luck asymmetry is motivated by CEO retention rather than CEO rent extraction.
- 19 March 2021
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Disaggregation of, and Asymmetry in, CEO Pay-for-Luck
Early work documents a sensitivity of CEO compensation contracts to economic factors beyond the control of the CEO, where CEO incentive payouts are increasing in performance attributable to good luck and decreasing in bad luck (referred to as “pay-for-luck”). Using established measures of luck, we confirm findings in more recent studies that finds no evidence of asymmetry in CEO pay-for-luck, where rewards for good luck are larger in magnitude than penalties for bad luck. When we employ an innovative method of disaggregating profitability drawn from the forecasting literature to disaggregate luck into orthogonal market and industry components, however, we find strong evidence of an asymmetry in CEO pay-for-luck, specifically related to luck around industry profitability. We investigate settings in which firms are more likely to try to retain incumbent CEOs and document pay-for-luck asymmetry only in profit-making firms. We also document pronounced pay-for-luck asymmetry in settings of (1) declining market and industry components of profitability, and growth rates, and (2) an increasing skill component of profitability, and growth in skill. Taken together, the cross-sectional findings support the prediction that evidence of CEO pay-for-luck asymmetry is motivated by CEO retention rather than CEO rent extraction.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 25 (3) , 903-962
Measuring disclosure using 8-K filings
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 25 (3) , 903-962
Measuring disclosure using 8-K filings
- 13 October 2019
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 37 (3) , 1687-1719
Measuring News in Management Range Forecasts
Management earnings forecasts expressed as a range have become the most common form of quantitative management guidance. Traditionally, the proxy for the sign and the magnitude of the information conveyed by these forecasts—the forecast news—is calculated as the difference between a pre‐forecast earnings expectation and the midpoint of the forecasted range. We provide strong evidence that this traditional measure understates the amount of information conveyed by range forecasts. More importantly, we demonstrate that information conveyed by the upper and lower bounds of the forecasts can be used to improve the classification of forecasts as conveying good or bad news and for calculating the magnitude of that news. We rely on these findings to suggest alternative methods of classifying management range forecasts as conveying good versus bad news and to refine the calculation of forecast news to include the broader information set. Our analysis also suggests that the information conveyed by the range when the forecasts are bundled (issued concurrent with an earnings announcement) is significantly different than when forecasts are not bundled. Overall, our study documents the importance of incorporating range‐related information when assessing the sign and the magnitude of the information conveyed by management range forecasts.
- 13 October 2019
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 37 (3) , 1687-1719
Measuring News in Management Range Forecasts
Management earnings forecasts expressed as a range have become the most common form of quantitative management guidance. Traditionally, the proxy for the sign and the magnitude of the information conveyed by these forecasts—the forecast news—is calculated as the difference between a pre‐forecast earnings expectation and the midpoint of the forecasted range. We provide strong evidence that this traditional measure understates the amount of information conveyed by range forecasts. More importantly, we demonstrate that information conveyed by the upper and lower bounds of the forecasts can be used to improve the classification of forecasts as conveying good or bad news and for calculating the magnitude of that news. We rely on these findings to suggest alternative methods of classifying management range forecasts as conveying good versus bad news and to refine the calculation of forecast news to include the broader information set. Our analysis also suggests that the information conveyed by the range when the forecasts are bundled (issued concurrent with an earnings announcement) is significantly different than when forecasts are not bundled. Overall, our study documents the importance of incorporating range‐related information when assessing the sign and the magnitude of the information conveyed by management range forecasts.
- Open Access
- 18 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Overview of U.S. Governments and Governmental Accounting: A Reference for Academic Research
The purpose of this paper is to encourage and support academic research by (1) providing an overview of U.S. governments and governmental accounting, (2) reviewing prior academic research and identifying unanswered research questions in this literature, and (3) discussing sources of government data available to researchers.
- 18 November 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOverview of U.S. Governments and Governmental Accounting: A Reference for Academic Research
The purpose of this paper is to encourage and support academic research by (1) providing an overview of U.S. governments and governmental accounting, (2) reviewing prior academic research and identifying unanswered research questions in this literature, and (3) discussing sources of government data available to researchers.
- Open Access
- 25 November 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Impact of Earnings Announcements on a Firm's Information Environment
Numerous accounting research studies suggest earnings announcements reduce information asymmetry among investors. In contrast, some studies find that a construct for consensus – the proportion of a firm’s information set that is shared by market participants – decreases around earnings announcements. We revisit these inconsistent findings. First, we demonstrate that a firm’s pre-existing information environment is an important determinant of how earnings announcements affect consensus. As the pre-earnings announcement level of consensus increases, earnings announcements have a more negative effect on consensus. Second, voluntary disclosures can moderate or increase this negative impact on consensus. Bundled management forecasts increase consensus, whereas non-GAAP disclosures decrease consensus. Finally, we examine whether these effects differ across revenues and expenses and find that earnings announcements decrease consensus for expenses significantly more than for revenues. We also document that both voluntary disclosures increase consensus for revenue expectations, but have differing effects on expense expectations. Our study reconciles disparate results from prior research and extends our understanding of how earnings announcements affect firms’ information environments.
- 25 November 2016
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Impact of Earnings Announcements on a Firm's Information Environment
Numerous accounting research studies suggest earnings announcements reduce information asymmetry among investors. In contrast, some studies find that a construct for consensus – the proportion of a firm’s information set that is shared by market participants – decreases around earnings announcements. We revisit these inconsistent findings. First, we demonstrate that a firm’s pre-existing information environment is an important determinant of how earnings announcements affect consensus. As the pre-earnings announcement level of consensus increases, earnings announcements have a more negative effect on consensus. Second, voluntary disclosures can moderate or increase this negative impact on consensus. Bundled management forecasts increase consensus, whereas non-GAAP disclosures decrease consensus. Finally, we examine whether these effects differ across revenues and expenses and find that earnings announcements decrease consensus for expenses significantly more than for revenues. We also document that both voluntary disclosures increase consensus for revenue expectations, but have differing effects on expense expectations. Our study reconciles disparate results from prior research and extends our understanding of how earnings announcements affect firms’ information environments.
- 13 April 2016
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 33 (2) , 775-782
Discussion of “The Effect of Information on Uncertainty and the Cost of Capital”
- 13 April 2016
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 33 (2) , 775-782
Discussion of “The Effect of Information on Uncertainty and the Cost of Capital”