Gordon R. Munro
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Gordon R. Munro has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Trond Bjørndal
Portsmouth Business School University of Portsmouth Portsmouth United Kingdom
7 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 173-225
The Economic Management of Capture Fisheries at the International Level
Straddling fish stocks (broadly defined) present us with the most difficult capture fisheries management problem that we have encountered in our examination of the management of world capture fisheries. In this chapter, we turn our attention to the study of one straddling stock (narrowly defined), Norwegian spring spawning herring, and one highly migratory stock, East Atlantic bluefin tuna. For each stock, multi agent bioeconomic models are developed and analysed under different management scenarios. Both cases involve fishery resources that had been heavily overexploited in the past, and in which a major resource investment programme was seen to be very much in order. While herring provides an example of a striking resource management success, tuna is an example of quite the reverse. The reasons behind this marked difference in the success of the two resource investment programmes are analysed.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 173-225
The Economic Management of Capture Fisheries at the International Level
Straddling fish stocks (broadly defined) present us with the most difficult capture fisheries management problem that we have encountered in our examination of the management of world capture fisheries. In this chapter, we turn our attention to the study of one straddling stock (narrowly defined), Norwegian spring spawning herring, and one highly migratory stock, East Atlantic bluefin tuna. For each stock, multi agent bioeconomic models are developed and analysed under different management scenarios. Both cases involve fishery resources that had been heavily overexploited in the past, and in which a major resource investment programme was seen to be very much in order. While herring provides an example of a striking resource management success, tuna is an example of quite the reverse. The reasons behind this marked difference in the success of the two resource investment programmes are analysed.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 120-168
The Economic Management of Capture Fisheries at the National/Regional Level
In this chapter, the international ramifications of capture fisheries management are examined, with the major focus being on the management internationally shared fish stocks, particularly those fish stocks crossing the boundary of the coastal state EEZ. The theory of games is found to be an essential tool of analysis, with the consequence that the economics of the management of these internationally shared resources is seen to be a blend of the economics of fisheries management examined up to this point and game theory. The policy implications of the forgoing economics are then discussed in detail. The chapter then goes on to examine a second aspect of the economics international fisheries management, namely that of the relations between coastal states and so called distant water fishing states. The chapter concludes by discussing the key links between the management of capture fishery resources at the national/regional level and at the international level.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 120-168
The Economic Management of Capture Fisheries at the National/Regional Level
In this chapter, the international ramifications of capture fisheries management are examined, with the major focus being on the management internationally shared fish stocks, particularly those fish stocks crossing the boundary of the coastal state EEZ. The theory of games is found to be an essential tool of analysis, with the consequence that the economics of the management of these internationally shared resources is seen to be a blend of the economics of fisheries management examined up to this point and game theory. The policy implications of the forgoing economics are then discussed in detail. The chapter then goes on to examine a second aspect of the economics international fisheries management, namely that of the relations between coastal states and so called distant water fishing states. The chapter concludes by discussing the key links between the management of capture fishery resources at the national/regional level and at the international level.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 96-118
Extensions to the Basic Dynamic Economic Model of the Fishery
This chapter turns to the management of capture fishery resources at the national/regional level. The starting point is the perverse incentives confronting fishermen in open access (common pool) conditions — pure or regulated — and the essential need for fisheries management to confront these destructive incentives. Two broad approaches to fisheries management are considered: incentive blocking and incentive adjusting. The discussion of incentive blocking approaches to management does, inter alia, raise the question of the efficacy of vessel decommissioning schemes. The discussion of incentive adjusting approaches to fisheries management gives particular attention to taxes and to harvesting rights schemes. The chapter then examines the ancillary role of marine protected areas, and goes on to discuss the consequences of massive government subsidies for effective fisheries management. The chapter concludes by considering means of mitigating the effects of irreducible uncertainty in fisheries management.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 96-118
Extensions to the Basic Dynamic Economic Model of the Fishery
This chapter turns to the management of capture fishery resources at the national/regional level. The starting point is the perverse incentives confronting fishermen in open access (common pool) conditions — pure or regulated — and the essential need for fisheries management to confront these destructive incentives. Two broad approaches to fisheries management are considered: incentive blocking and incentive adjusting. The discussion of incentive blocking approaches to management does, inter alia, raise the question of the efficacy of vessel decommissioning schemes. The discussion of incentive adjusting approaches to fisheries management gives particular attention to taxes and to harvesting rights schemes. The chapter then examines the ancillary role of marine protected areas, and goes on to discuss the consequences of massive government subsidies for effective fisheries management. The chapter concludes by considering means of mitigating the effects of irreducible uncertainty in fisheries management.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 74-94
Empirical Applications of the Dynamic Economic Model
This chapter introduces several extensions to the basic capital theoretic economic model of the fishery discussed in chapter 3. Specifically, the extensions involve the incorporating the processing sector in the model, moving from single species to multiple species fisheries, introducing non-malleable produced and human capital into the model, and giving explicit recognition to the role uncertainty. While all of the extensions are important, the most important, and analytically demanding, is that of relaxing the restrictive assumption that both produced capital and human capital in the fishery are perfectly malleable. The extension has profound consequences for the question of the optimal rate of investment in natural capital in the form of capture fishery resources. This question ,in turn, now has major policy implications, given the rapidly expanding interest in the rebuilding of, i.e. investing in, hitherto overexploited world capture fishery resources.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 74-94
Empirical Applications of the Dynamic Economic Model
This chapter introduces several extensions to the basic capital theoretic economic model of the fishery discussed in chapter 3. Specifically, the extensions involve the incorporating the processing sector in the model, moving from single species to multiple species fisheries, introducing non-malleable produced and human capital into the model, and giving explicit recognition to the role uncertainty. While all of the extensions are important, the most important, and analytically demanding, is that of relaxing the restrictive assumption that both produced capital and human capital in the fishery are perfectly malleable. The extension has profound consequences for the question of the optimal rate of investment in natural capital in the form of capture fishery resources. This question ,in turn, now has major policy implications, given the rapidly expanding interest in the rebuilding of, i.e. investing in, hitherto overexploited world capture fishery resources.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 21-37
The Static Economic Model of the Fishery
This chapter commences with the most basic dynamic, or capital theoretic, economic model of the fishery, one that is essentially a dynamic version of the Gordon-Schaefer model examined in chapter 2. This model, although elementary, introduces us to a fundamental investment rule for determining the optimal stock of this form of natural capital. The fundamental investment rule will be encountered many times in the chapters to follow. The chapter then proceeds to develop the basic model, by relaxing a few of the initial highly restrictive assumptions. Non-linear and non-autonomous versions of the basic model are examined. The chapter concludes by demonstrating that, while the economic model of the fishery explored in the chapter is no more than basic, it can be used to analyse complex real world policy problems.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 21-37
The Static Economic Model of the Fishery
This chapter commences with the most basic dynamic, or capital theoretic, economic model of the fishery, one that is essentially a dynamic version of the Gordon-Schaefer model examined in chapter 2. This model, although elementary, introduces us to a fundamental investment rule for determining the optimal stock of this form of natural capital. The fundamental investment rule will be encountered many times in the chapters to follow. The chapter then proceeds to develop the basic model, by relaxing a few of the initial highly restrictive assumptions. Non-linear and non-autonomous versions of the basic model are examined. The chapter concludes by demonstrating that, while the economic model of the fishery explored in the chapter is no more than basic, it can be used to analyse complex real world policy problems.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 1-18
Introduction: Overview of World Capture Fisheries and the Foundations of Fisheries Economics
This chapter reviews the Gordon-Schaefer static economic model of the fishery, the model marking the beginning of modern fisheries economics. The model is examined in the context of two cases – Pure Open Access, in which property rights and government regulations are completely absent; and Regulated Open Access, in which there is government regulation of the fishery that is confined strictly to season by season harvest limits. The static model demonstrates that overexploitation of the resource will occur under Pure Open Access, along with dissipation of resource rent, and that, as a minimum, resource rent dissipation, driven by excess fleet capacity, will occur under Regulated Open Access. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the static economic model of the fishery, pointing both to the conclusions of the model that continue to be valid, and to the shortcomings of the model arising from its static nature.
- 25 October 2012
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP)
- p. 1-18
Introduction: Overview of World Capture Fisheries and the Foundations of Fisheries Economics
This chapter reviews the Gordon-Schaefer static economic model of the fishery, the model marking the beginning of modern fisheries economics. The model is examined in the context of two cases – Pure Open Access, in which property rights and government regulations are completely absent; and Regulated Open Access, in which there is government regulation of the fishery that is confined strictly to season by season harvest limits. The static model demonstrates that overexploitation of the resource will occur under Pure Open Access, along with dissipation of resource rent, and that, as a minimum, resource rent dissipation, driven by excess fleet capacity, will occur under Regulated Open Access. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the static economic model of the fishery, pointing both to the conclusions of the model that continue to be valid, and to the shortcomings of the model arising from its static nature.
- 1 February 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Environment and Development Economics
- Vol. 14 (1) , 7-27
Game theory and the development of resource management policy: the case of international fisheries
This paper is not concerned with advances in game theory. Rather, the paper is concerned with the relevance, if any, of game theory to a major resource management issue, namely the management of internationally shared fishery resources. It is argued that the economics of the management of such resources cannot, in fact, be understood, other than through the lens of game theory. The paper discusses several elementary game theory concepts that are of utmost policy relevance, but which are, as of yet, poorly understood by most policy makers. The paper does, in addition, discuss a key policy problem in the management of shared fishery resources that demands a game-theoretic analysis. The required analysis, however, has yet to be developed.
- 1 February 2009
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Environment and Development Economics
- Vol. 14 (1) , 7-27
Game theory and the development of resource management policy: the case of international fisheries
This paper is not concerned with advances in game theory. Rather, the paper is concerned with the relevance, if any, of game theory to a major resource management issue, namely the management of internationally shared fishery resources. It is argued that the economics of the management of such resources cannot, in fact, be understood, other than through the lens of game theory. The paper discusses several elementary game theory concepts that are of utmost policy relevance, but which are, as of yet, poorly understood by most policy makers. The paper does, in addition, discuss a key policy problem in the management of shared fishery resources that demands a game-theoretic analysis. The required analysis, however, has yet to be developed.
- 28 May 2003
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
The management of high seas fisheries resources and the implementation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995
From 1993 to 1995, the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, addressed a worldwide fisheries management crisis, focussed on straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The Conference brought forth the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, which became available for signing in December, 1995. At the end of 2001, the Agreement achieved the status of international treaty law. During the intervening six years, the Agreement had already come to serve as a framework for an increasing number of regimes. Examples, which are explored in this paper, are provided by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), Norwegian spring spawning herring resource, and Atlantic bluefin tuna. The fact that the Agreement has come into force, and the fact that the Agreement, had been serving as a framework for an increasing number of cooperative resource management regimes, does not ensure the Agreement's viability over the long run. This paper will, after reviewing the history underlying the U.N. Fish Stocks Conference, 1993-1995, and the resource management crisis, which provided the raison d'être of the Conference, attempt to assess, from an economist's standpoint, the long-term viability of the Agreement
- 28 May 2003
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
The management of high seas fisheries resources and the implementation of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement of 1995
From 1993 to 1995, the United Nations Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, addressed a worldwide fisheries management crisis, focussed on straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. The Conference brought forth the U.N. Fish Stocks Agreement, which became available for signing in December, 1995. At the end of 2001, the Agreement achieved the status of international treaty law. During the intervening six years, the Agreement had already come to serve as a framework for an increasing number of regimes. Examples, which are explored in this paper, are provided by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO), Norwegian spring spawning herring resource, and Atlantic bluefin tuna. The fact that the Agreement has come into force, and the fact that the Agreement, had been serving as a framework for an increasing number of cooperative resource management regimes, does not ensure the Agreement's viability over the long run. This paper will, after reviewing the history underlying the U.N. Fish Stocks Conference, 1993-1995, and the resource management crisis, which provided the raison d'être of the Conference, attempt to assess, from an economist's standpoint, the long-term viability of the Agreement