Prajak Kongkirati
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Prajak Kongkirati has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jemma Purdey
1 shared publication- Veerayooth Kanchoochat
National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies (GRIPS), Japan
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 3 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Pacific Affairs
- Vol. 99 (3) , 487-498
Neither Democratic Breakthrough nor Conservative Consolidation: Thailand’s 2026 General Election in a Contested Political Order
On February 8, 2026, Thailand held its third general election since the 2014 military coup. The election conditions were simultaneously comparable to and distinct from previous elections. The struc...
- 3 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Pacific Affairs
- Vol. 99 (3) , 487-498
Neither Democratic Breakthrough nor Conservative Consolidation: Thailand’s 2026 General Election in a Contested Political Order
On February 8, 2026, Thailand held its third general election since the 2014 military coup. The election conditions were simultaneously comparable to and distinct from previous elections. The struc...
- 20 December 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
- Vol. 681 (1) , 24-40
From Illiberal Democracy to Military Authoritarianism: Intra-Elite Struggle and Mass-Based Conflict in Deeply Polarized Thailand
Thailand fits the pattern of pernicious polarized politics identified in this volume, where a previously excluded group successfully gains political power through the ballot box, governs unilaterally to pursue radical reforms, and produces a backlash from the traditional power elites. In Thailand, elite conflict has been a major part of the story, but this article argues that political polarization there cannot be merely understood as “elite-driven”: conflict among the elites and the masses, and the interaction between them, produced polarized and unstable politics. Violent struggle is caused by class structure and regional, urban-rural disparities; elite struggle activates the existing social cleavages; and ideological framing deepens the polarization. While the Yellow Shirts and traditional elites want to restore and uphold the “Thai-style democracy” with royal nationalism, the Red Shirts espouse the “populist democracy” of strong elected government with popular nationalism and egalitarian social order.
- 20 December 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science
- Vol. 681 (1) , 24-40
From Illiberal Democracy to Military Authoritarianism: Intra-Elite Struggle and Mass-Based Conflict in Deeply Polarized Thailand
Thailand fits the pattern of pernicious polarized politics identified in this volume, where a previously excluded group successfully gains political power through the ballot box, governs unilaterally to pursue radical reforms, and produces a backlash from the traditional power elites. In Thailand, elite conflict has been a major part of the story, but this article argues that political polarization there cannot be merely understood as “elite-driven”: conflict among the elites and the masses, and the interaction between them, produced polarized and unstable politics. Violent struggle is caused by class structure and regional, urban-rural disparities; elite struggle activates the existing social cleavages; and ideological framing deepens the polarization. While the Yellow Shirts and traditional elites want to restore and uphold the “Thai-style democracy” with royal nationalism, the Red Shirts espouse the “populist democracy” of strong elected government with popular nationalism and egalitarian social order.
- Open Access
- 30 July 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia
- Vol. 6 (2) , 279-305
The Prayuth Regime: Embedded Military and Hierarchical Capitalism in Thailand
This paper explores the Prayuth regime, which began with a military coup in May 2014. Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance as in the Prem and Surayud governments, but tries to militarise the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new constitution is designed to institutionalise the power of the military and the traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. Ironically, however, the junta's rule by military decree and discretionary power have weakened the bureaucratic polity, rather than strengthening it. Economically, the Prayuth regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish the Pracharath scheme, with an aim to differentiate its grass-roots development policy from Thaksin's populism (Prachaniyom). Nonetheless, it has become a platform through which the giant firms perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their sectors. Pracharath therefore reflects the collective endeavours of the conglomerates to replace competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to catch-up with them.
- 30 July 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in TRaNS: Trans-Regional and -National Studies of Southeast Asia
- Vol. 6 (2) , 279-305
Open AccessThe Prayuth Regime: Embedded Military and Hierarchical Capitalism in Thailand
This paper explores the Prayuth regime, which began with a military coup in May 2014. Politically, we indicate how the junta has embedded its power in ways different from the past. It does not pursue a power-sharing governance as in the Prem and Surayud governments, but tries to militarise the cabinet, parliament, and even state-owned enterprises. The new constitution is designed to institutionalise the power of the military and the traditional elite vis-à-vis the electoral forces. Ironically, however, the junta's rule by military decree and discretionary power have weakened the bureaucratic polity, rather than strengthening it. Economically, the Prayuth regime forms a partnership with a group of Sino-Thai conglomerates to establish the Pracharath scheme, with an aim to differentiate its grass-roots development policy from Thaksin's populism (Prachaniyom). Nonetheless, it has become a platform through which the giant firms perform the leading role of ‘Big Brother’ in supervising small businesses in their sectors. Pracharath therefore reflects the collective endeavours of the conglomerates to replace competitive markets with hierarchy, rather than encouraging local firms to catch-up with them.
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in South East Asia Research
- Vol. 24 (3) , 386-406
Evolving power of provincial political families in Thailand
The relative newness of political dynasties in Thai society is often forgotten by scholars and observers. The majority of Thai political clans entered politics only after the 1973 student uprising. Their time in politics is also relatively short – only half of them managed to stay in power for more than two legislative terms. Historically, their instability was caused by frequent military coups, which interrupted the parliamentary institutions and electoral process. By the time they had succeeded in climbing to the top in the late 1990s, the political and economic landscape had been transformed in a way that seriously reduced their power. Tumultuous ideological conflict and the rise of mass movement after the 2006 military coup have further diminished the status and power of old political clans. This article traces the historical developments and the patterns of accumulation of the wealth and power of Thai political dynasties and explains how some families have been able to maintain their power while many others have failed.
- 1 September 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in South East Asia Research
- Vol. 24 (3) , 386-406
Evolving power of provincial political families in Thailand
The relative newness of political dynasties in Thai society is often forgotten by scholars and observers. The majority of Thai political clans entered politics only after the 1973 student uprising. Their time in politics is also relatively short – only half of them managed to stay in power for more than two legislative terms. Historically, their instability was caused by frequent military coups, which interrupted the parliamentary institutions and electoral process. By the time they had succeeded in climbing to the top in the late 1990s, the political and economic landscape had been transformed in a way that seriously reduced their power. Tumultuous ideological conflict and the rise of mass movement after the 2006 military coup have further diminished the status and power of old political clans. This article traces the historical developments and the patterns of accumulation of the wealth and power of Thai political dynasties and explains how some families have been able to maintain their power while many others have failed.
- 21 March 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary Asia
- Vol. 46 (3) , 467-485
Thailand’s Failed 2014 Election: The Anti-Election Movement, Violence and Democratic Breakdown
Thailand’s politics is in a fragile state. A lack of consensus around basic “rules of the game” among elites and civil societal groups renders the country highly volatile and unstable. Violence has been all too evident in recent political disputes. The February 2, 2014 elections witnessed a significant change in the pattern of electoral violence. It changed from targeted killings among rival candidates to mob violence aimed at disrupting the electoral processes and institutions. The degree of violence was the highest in the country’s electoral history. Urban middle class protesters, mobilised as the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) employed violent tactics to disrupt electoral voter registration, voting and vote counting activities. Six million registered voters were affected by the closure of polling stations. The PDRC’s animosity towards the election marked an unprecedented development. By disrupting the election, it rejected the peaceful and democratic way for the public to decide who should govern. The case of the PDRC movement demonstrated that activities of confrontational civil society can sometimes cause deadly conflicts and the breakdown of democracy.
- 21 March 2016
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Contemporary Asia
- Vol. 46 (3) , 467-485
Thailand’s Failed 2014 Election: The Anti-Election Movement, Violence and Democratic Breakdown
Thailand’s politics is in a fragile state. A lack of consensus around basic “rules of the game” among elites and civil societal groups renders the country highly volatile and unstable. Violence has been all too evident in recent political disputes. The February 2, 2014 elections witnessed a significant change in the pattern of electoral violence. It changed from targeted killings among rival candidates to mob violence aimed at disrupting the electoral processes and institutions. The degree of violence was the highest in the country’s electoral history. Urban middle class protesters, mobilised as the People’s Democratic Reform Committee (PDRC) employed violent tactics to disrupt electoral voter registration, voting and vote counting activities. Six million registered voters were affected by the closure of polling stations. The PDRC’s animosity towards the election marked an unprecedented development. By disrupting the election, it rejected the peaceful and democratic way for the public to decide who should govern. The case of the PDRC movement demonstrated that activities of confrontational civil society can sometimes cause deadly conflicts and the breakdown of democracy.