DBDavid B. Bryan

David B. Bryan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


David B. Bryan has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Independent director reputation incentives, accruals quality and audit fees

    by David B. Bryan, Terry W. Mason

    While prior research provides abundant evidence that independent directors are associated with favorable outcomes, researchers have only recently started to investigate the impact of independent director reputation incentives. This study examines whether the reputation incentives of independent directors are associated with accruals quality and audit fees. The results reveal a negative relationship between the proportion of independent directors with relatively low reputation incentives and accruals quality. Further, the proportion of independent directors with relatively low reputation incentives is positively associated with audit fees, suggesting that auditors view lower reputation incentives as increasing risk. We also find that Big 4/5 auditor office size moderates the relationship between independent director reputation incentives and audit fees. Specifically, our results indicate that audit fees increase less in response to lower reputation incentives as office size increases, suggesting that larger offices respond to the risks associated with lower reputation incentives more efficiently than smaller offices.


  • Auditor Size and the Cost of Equity Capital over Auditor Tenure

    by David B. Bryan, J. Kenneth Reynolds

    This study examines whether the difference in the cost of equity capital between clients of large and small auditors (‘the cost of equity capital disparity’) varies with auditor tenure. We find that the cost of equity capital disparity increases over auditor tenure, suggesting a decline in the perceived audit quality of small auditors relative to large auditors as tenure lengthens. The results suggest that this occurs because there is a deterioration in perceived audit quality over tenure for small auditors combined with no change in perceived audit quality over tenure for large auditors. Furthermore, we find that the cost of equity capital disparity does not increase over auditor tenure for industry specialist auditors, implying that auditor specialization may act as a substitute for auditor size in reducing investor concerns about audit quality declining over tenure for small auditors.