Joseph E. Stiglitz

Award Ceremony of the Title of Doctor Honoris Causato Professor Joseph Stiglitz, PhD.

This paper presents a model that studies the impact of credit expansions arising from increases in collateral values or lower interest rate policies on long-run productivity and economic growth in a two-sector endogenous growth economy, with the driver of growth lying in one sector (manufacturing) but not in the other (real estate). We show that it is not so much aggregate credit expansion that matters for long-run productivity and economic growth but sectoral credit expansions. Credit expansions associated mainly with relaxation of real estate financing (capital investment financing) will be productivity-and growth-retarding (enhancing). Without financial regulations, low interest rates and more expansionary monetary policy may so encourage land speculation using leverage that productive capital investment and economic growth are decreased. Unlike in standard macroeconomic models, in ours, the equilibrium price of land will be finite even if the safe rate of interest is less than the rate of output growth.

Over the last couple years, the world has experienced the highest levels of inflation in more than four decades. This paper provides a framework for analyzing the causes and the appropriate responses. We show that it is not caused by an excess of aggregate demand, and in particular, not caused by any excess consumption arising from excessive pandemic spending, but by supply-side shocks, largely induced by the pandemic (e.g., chips), and also by the war in Ukraine, combined with sectoral demand shifts. We analyze the role played by market power and the lack of resilience. Increases in interest rates, beyond normalizing levels, will do little to address the underlying problems and may exacerbate them, impeding effective responses to supply shortages. The paper describes alternative fiscal and other measures that, while addressing current inflation, have further long-term welfare benefits.

Contrary to much of the conventional wisdom, taking stronger actions on climate change may enhance economic growth, even as conventionally measured, but even more so, in terms of societal well-being. We identify the flaws in the models and analyses which contend that there must be a trade-off and explain the mechanisms and dynamic forces which have the potential to enhance growth. Critically, there are numerous market failures that result in suboptimal economic performance. We explain how addressing climate change reduces the bite of these failures and enhances the incentives and political will to address them. We identify packages of policies that alleviate market failures, enhance growth, and reduce carbon emissions. Finally, we argue that the green transition is coming at a time when, both because of persistent deficiencies of aggregate demand and advances in technology, including artificial intelligence and robotization, the macroeconomic opportunity costs of strong climate actions may be especially low and the benefits particularly high.

This Policy Brief argues that embracing the deep uncertainty about interest rates and other key parameters determining a country’s fiscal position requires a new approach in fiscal policy. It proposes retaining fiscal discretion exercised after making the budget adjust more automatically and rapidly in areas where there is broad consensus that doing so is consistent with achieving broader societal goals. For such a semiautonomous discretionary fiscal architecture five elements are emphasized: stronger automatic stabilizers, a new infrastructure program, extension of debt maturities, indexation of long-term fiscal programs to their underlying drivers, and more emphasis on residual fiscal discretion. The goal is to provide a framework better adapted than our current budgetary structures to deep uncertainty, thus freeing up a discretionary fiscal policy to focus more on adjusting to the unanticipated.

What can explain the large changes in aggregate demand that occur in the absence of any seemingly corresponding shock to the underlying state variables of the economy? We show that macroeconomic volatility can arise from dispersions of beliefs among agents. Such dispersion gives rise to bets and other trades in speculative assets. Such trades give rise to pseudo-wealth, wealth that individuals believe they have on the basis of expectations of returns on these gambles. In the aggregate, when there are enough opportunities for trade and large enough dispersions in beliefs, this perceived wealth may be dangerously untethered to either market wealth or the real wealth of the economy. Given the increased dispersion in beliefs that naturally arises from unprecedented shocks, the theory of pseudo-wealth provides new understandings of both the origins of unanticipated fluctuations and their magnitude, markedly different from prevailing theories grounded in common knowledge and beliefs among individuals. This paper explores the empirical and theoretical underpinnings of pseudo-wealth, links the concept to observed macroeconomic fluctuations, and lays out a research agenda that might help us better understand the role of pseudo-wealth and the circumstances in which it is pronounced.

This article has been withdrawn due to an error that caused the article to be duplicated. The definitive version of this article is published under https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtab012.

The Covid-19 epidemic has unveiled inequalities and instabilities in national and global economic and social systems of many countries, even rich and powerful ones such as the United States. The major economic and social crises that have followed signal that it is now time to reflect on their causes, namely poorly managed globalization and lack of global cooperation before the pandemic. Looking to the ILO as a model, the article calls for an imperative to construct a post-pandemic world marked by more global cooperation, with better social governance.

This paper provides an explanation for situations in which the fundamental state variables describing the economy do not change, but aggregate consumption experiences significant changes. We present a theory of pseudo-wealth—individuals’ perceived wealth that is derived from expectations of gains in bets arising from heterogeneous expectations. This wealth is divorced from society's real assets. The creation of a market for bets necessarily generates positive pseudo-wealth. Changes in the magnitude of differences of prior beliefs will lead to changes in expected wealth and hence to changes in consumption, implying instability in aggregate and individual consumption and ex post intertemporal consumption misallocations. Moreover, ‘completing markets’ through the creation of a new market for bets can increase individual and aggregate risk. With a utilitarian social welfare function, completing markets leads to lower welfare ex post, but the first theorem of welfare economics (evaluating each individual's well-being on the basis of her ex ante beliefs) still holds, raising unsettling questions for welfare analysis. We also show that if the planner uses beliefs that are consistent, then the betting equilibrium would be Pareto inferior.