Bernardo Gonçalves
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Bernardo Gonçalves has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fabio Gagliardi Cozman
Universidade de São Paulo
3 shared publications - Hosagrahar Visvesvaraya Jagadish
University of Michigan Ann Arbor MI USA
2 shared publications - José Gonçalves Pereira Filho
Federal University of Espírito Santo
2 shared publications - Anarosa Alves Franco Brandao
Universidade de São Paulo
1 shared publication - Andre Paulino de Lima
Universidade de São Paulo
1 shared publication Carla Leitão
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 October 2026
- Published by FapUNIFESP (SciELO) in SciELO Preprints
O Ensino de Inteligˆencia Artificial: Potencialidades e Limitações de Diferentes Abordagens
A área de Inteligência Artificial sempre teve fronteiras fluidas e caráter multi-disciplinar, congregando domínios de conhecimento diversos e exigindo diferentes perspectivas. Examinamos aqui, à luz dessas características da área, algumas estratégias que podem ser adotadas em cursos introdutórios sobre Inteligência Artificial. Analisamos as possíveis estratégias considerando alguns aspectos (caráter teórico e conceitual, foco histórico, ênfase prática, ênfase em temais mais modernos), e discutimos potencialidades e limitações de diferentes abordagens posicionadas em um mapa conceitual. Utilizamos como referência para esta discussão o livro-texto Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (1995), que ocupa posição de destaque no ensino universitário de IA há várias décadas. Além disso, enfatizaremos as potencialidades, talvez menos evidentes, de uma das abordagens, que valoriza a evolução conceitual e histórica da área.
- 16 October 2026
- Published by FapUNIFESP (SciELO) in SciELO Preprints
Open AccessO Ensino de Inteligˆencia Artificial: Potencialidades e Limitações de Diferentes Abordagens
A área de Inteligência Artificial sempre teve fronteiras fluidas e caráter multi-disciplinar, congregando domínios de conhecimento diversos e exigindo diferentes perspectivas. Examinamos aqui, à luz dessas características da área, algumas estratégias que podem ser adotadas em cursos introdutórios sobre Inteligência Artificial. Analisamos as possíveis estratégias considerando alguns aspectos (caráter teórico e conceitual, foco histórico, ênfase prática, ênfase em temais mais modernos), e discutimos potencialidades e limitações de diferentes abordagens posicionadas em um mapa conceitual. Utilizamos como referência para esta discussão o livro-texto Artificial Intelligence: A Modern Approach (1995), que ocupa posição de destaque no ensino universitário de IA há várias décadas. Além disso, enfatizaremos as potencialidades, talvez menos evidentes, de uma das abordagens, que valoriza a evolução conceitual e histórica da área.
- Open Access
- 29 September 2025
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Computação
- p. 459-467
Gypscie-KG: Building a Logic-Based Approach for Knowledge Graph Data Integration View in ML Systems
This paper presents Gypscie-KG, a system that integrates heterogeneous machine learning (ML) data into a knowledge graph (KG) using logicbased rules to enable semantic queries and reasoning. It also explores the use of ChatGPT to support relational-to-graph schema mapping, demonstrating AI’s potential in declarative data integration for complex ML systems.
- 29 September 2025
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Computação
- p. 459-467
Open AccessGypscie-KG: Building a Logic-Based Approach for Knowledge Graph Data Integration View in ML Systems
This paper presents Gypscie-KG, a system that integrates heterogeneous machine learning (ML) data into a knowledge graph (KG) using logicbased rules to enable semantic queries and reasoning. It also explores the use of ChatGPT to support relational-to-graph schema mapping, demonstrating AI’s potential in declarative data integration for complex ML systems.
- Open Access
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Computação in Journal of the Brazilian Computer Society
- Vol. 31 (1) , 808-827
The Cocoruta Hub: Open and Curated Corpora, Datasets and Language Models on Brazilian Ocean Law
This paper describes Cocoruta, an open-source hub for computational linguistics resources and language models related to the Brazilian legal context, with a focus on ocean law. The Cocoruta hub consists of open-access, curated corpora and datasets, and fine-tuned language models. Cocoruta includes two sets of resources. The first set is associated with a training dataset for question-answering tasks, whereas the second set features a dataset prepared to support model training for dialogue tasks, in addition to having refined curation procedures. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of Cocoruta's contributions, including information to ensure transparency and reproducibility of Cocoruta's construction process, fine-tuning of language models, and quantitative and qualitative evaluations of models. Quantitative evaluations are based on various performance metrics, while qualitative evaluations are conducted using human assessment procedures. This work contributes by advancing fundamental resources in specialized language domains and by fostering research and development in Brazilian legal natural language processing, serving as a hub to bring together efforts in this field.
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Computação in Journal of the Brazilian Computer Society
- Vol. 31 (1) , 808-827
Open AccessThe Cocoruta Hub: Open and Curated Corpora, Datasets and Language Models on Brazilian Ocean Law
This paper describes Cocoruta, an open-source hub for computational linguistics resources and language models related to the Brazilian legal context, with a focus on ocean law. The Cocoruta hub consists of open-access, curated corpora and datasets, and fine-tuned language models. Cocoruta includes two sets of resources. The first set is associated with a training dataset for question-answering tasks, whereas the second set features a dataset prepared to support model training for dialogue tasks, in addition to having refined curation procedures. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of Cocoruta's contributions, including information to ensure transparency and reproducibility of Cocoruta's construction process, fine-tuning of language models, and quantitative and qualitative evaluations of models. Quantitative evaluations are based on various performance metrics, while qualitative evaluations are conducted using human assessment procedures. This work contributes by advancing fundamental resources in specialized language domains and by fostering research and development in Brazilian legal natural language processing, serving as a hub to bring together efforts in this field.
- Open Access
- 30 July 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
- Vol. 46 (3) , 36-49
Turing’s Test, a Beautiful Thought Experiment
In the wake of the latest trends of artificial intelligence (AI), there has been a resurgence of claims and questions about the Turing test and its value, which are reminiscent of decades of practical “Turing” tests. If AI were quantum physics, by now several “Schrödinger’s” cats would have been killed. It is time for a historical reconstruction of Turing’s beautiful thought experiment. This paper presents a wealth of evidence, including new archival sources, and gives original answers to several open questions about Turing’s 1950 paper, including its relation with early AI.
- 30 July 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
- Vol. 46 (3) , 36-49
Open AccessTuring’s Test, a Beautiful Thought Experiment
In the wake of the latest trends of artificial intelligence (AI), there has been a resurgence of claims and questions about the Turing test and its value, which are reminiscent of decades of practical “Turing” tests. If AI were quantum physics, by now several “Schrödinger’s” cats would have been killed. It is time for a historical reconstruction of Turing’s beautiful thought experiment. This paper presents a wealth of evidence, including new archival sources, and gives original answers to several open questions about Turing’s 1950 paper, including its relation with early AI.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Intelligent Computing
- Vol. 3
Passed the Turing Test: Living in Turing Futures
- 1 January 2024
- Published by American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Intelligent Computing
- Vol. 3
Passed the Turing Test: Living in Turing Futures
- 19 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 624 (7992) , 523
What was the Turing test actually about?
- 19 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature
- Vol. 624 (7992) , 523
What was the Turing test actually about?
- Top Cited Papers
- 23 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
- Vol. 46 (1) , 6-18
Lady Lovelace’s Objection: The Turing–Hartree Disputes Over the Meaning of Digital Computers, 1946–1951
Can machines think? Or can they do “whatever we know how to order” them to perform? Should machines be liberated from slavery and given “fair play” to “compete with men in all purely intellectual fields”? Or should this be associated with a fashion that decries “human reason” and a path that “leads straight to Nazism”? In the postwar years, these questions were debated by Alan Turing and Douglas Hartree, who differed in their interpretations of the digital computer as a new piece of science and technology. Hartree emphasized its unprecedented calculation speed and envisioned applications in physics, logistics, energy, and warfare. Turing, who envisioned applications in biology and cognition, emphasized its potential to outperform humans intellectually, including capabilities considered distinctly human, which Hartree downplayed by mobilizing the notes of Ada Lovelace. This paper examines the Turing-Hartree disputes and draws a parallel between their positions and their perspectives on postwar Britain.
- 23 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Annals of the History of Computing
- Vol. 46 (1) , 6-18
Top Cited PapersLady Lovelace’s Objection: The Turing–Hartree Disputes Over the Meaning of Digital Computers, 1946–1951
Can machines think? Or can they do “whatever we know how to order” them to perform? Should machines be liberated from slavery and given “fair play” to “compete with men in all purely intellectual fields”? Or should this be associated with a fashion that decries “human reason” and a path that “leads straight to Nazism”? In the postwar years, these questions were debated by Alan Turing and Douglas Hartree, who differed in their interpretations of the digital computer as a new piece of science and technology. Hartree emphasized its unprecedented calculation speed and envisioned applications in physics, logistics, energy, and warfare. Turing, who envisioned applications in biology and cognition, emphasized its potential to outperform humans intellectually, including capabilities considered distinctly human, which Hartree downplayed by mobilizing the notes of Ada Lovelace. This paper examines the Turing-Hartree disputes and draws a parallel between their positions and their perspectives on postwar Britain.
- Open Access
- 19 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 36 (3) , 1-31
Irony with a Point: Alan Turing and His Intelligent Machine Utopia
Turing made strong statements about the future of machines in society. This article asks how they can be interpreted to advance our understanding of Turing’s philosophy. His irony has been largely caricatured or minimized by historians, philosophers, scientists, and others. Turing is often portrayed as an irresponsible scientist, or associated with childlike manners and polite humor. While these representations of Turing have been widely disseminated, another image suggested by one of his contemporaries, that of a nonconformist, utopian, and radically progressive thinker reminiscent of the English Romantic poet Percy B. Shelley, has remained largely underexplored. Following this image, I will reconstruct the argument underlying what Turing called (but denied being guilty of) his “Promethean irreverence” (1947–1951) as a utopian satire directed against chauvinists of all kinds, especially intellectuals who might sacrifice independent thought to maintain their power. These, Turing hoped, would eventually be rivaled and surpassed by intelligent machines and transformed into ordinary people, as work once considered “intellectual” would be transformed into non-intellectual, “mechanical” work. I study Turing’s irony in its historical context and follow the internal logic of his arguments to their limit. I suggest that Turing genuinely believed that the possibilities of the machines he envisioned were not utopian dreams, and yet he conceived them from a utopian frame of mind, aspiring to a different society. His ever-learning child machines, whose intelligence would grow out of their own individual experiences, would help distribute power.
- 19 July 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy & Technology
- Vol. 36 (3) , 1-31
Open AccessIrony with a Point: Alan Turing and His Intelligent Machine Utopia
Turing made strong statements about the future of machines in society. This article asks how they can be interpreted to advance our understanding of Turing’s philosophy. His irony has been largely caricatured or minimized by historians, philosophers, scientists, and others. Turing is often portrayed as an irresponsible scientist, or associated with childlike manners and polite humor. While these representations of Turing have been widely disseminated, another image suggested by one of his contemporaries, that of a nonconformist, utopian, and radically progressive thinker reminiscent of the English Romantic poet Percy B. Shelley, has remained largely underexplored. Following this image, I will reconstruct the argument underlying what Turing called (but denied being guilty of) his “Promethean irreverence” (1947–1951) as a utopian satire directed against chauvinists of all kinds, especially intellectuals who might sacrifice independent thought to maintain their power. These, Turing hoped, would eventually be rivaled and surpassed by intelligent machines and transformed into ordinary people, as work once considered “intellectual” would be transformed into non-intellectual, “mechanical” work. I study Turing’s irony in its historical context and follow the internal logic of his arguments to their limit. I suggest that Turing genuinely believed that the possibilities of the machines he envisioned were not utopian dreams, and yet he conceived them from a utopian frame of mind, aspiring to a different society. His ever-learning child machines, whose intelligence would grow out of their own individual experiences, would help distribute power.
- Open Access
- 2 July 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Annals of Science
- Vol. 81 (3) , 359-389
Galilean resonances: the role of experiment in Turing’s construction of machine intelligence
In 1950, Alan Turing proposed his iconic imitation game, calling it a 'test', an 'experiment', and the 'the only really satisfactory support' for his view that machines can think. Following Turing's rhetoric, the 'Turing test' has been widely received as a kind of crucial experiment to determine machine intelligence. In later sources, however, Turing showed a milder attitude towards what he called his 'imitation tests'. In 1948, Turing referred to the persuasive power of 'the actual production of machines' rather than that of a controlled experiment. Observing this, I propose to distinguish the logical structure from the rhetoric of Turing's argument. I argue that Turing's proposal of a crucial experiment may have been a concession to meet the standards of his interlocutors more than his own, while his construction of machine intelligence rather reveals a method of successive idealizations and exploratory experiments. I will draw a parallel with Galileo's construction of idealized fall in a void and the historiographical controversies over the role of experiment in Galilean science. I suggest that Turing, like Galileo, relied on certain kinds of experiment, but also on rhetoric and propaganda to inspire further research that could lead to convincing scientific and technological progress.
- 2 July 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Annals of Science
- Vol. 81 (3) , 359-389
Open AccessGalilean resonances: the role of experiment in Turing’s construction of machine intelligence
In 1950, Alan Turing proposed his iconic imitation game, calling it a 'test', an 'experiment', and the 'the only really satisfactory support' for his view that machines can think. Following Turing's rhetoric, the 'Turing test' has been widely received as a kind of crucial experiment to determine machine intelligence. In later sources, however, Turing showed a milder attitude towards what he called his 'imitation tests'. In 1948, Turing referred to the persuasive power of 'the actual production of machines' rather than that of a controlled experiment. Observing this, I propose to distinguish the logical structure from the rhetoric of Turing's argument. I argue that Turing's proposal of a crucial experiment may have been a concession to meet the standards of his interlocutors more than his own, while his construction of machine intelligence rather reveals a method of successive idealizations and exploratory experiments. I will draw a parallel with Galileo's construction of idealized fall in a void and the historiographical controversies over the role of experiment in Galilean science. I suggest that Turing, like Galileo, relied on certain kinds of experiment, but also on rhetoric and propaganda to inspire further research that could lead to convincing scientific and technological progress.
- Open Access
- 12 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Galilean Resonances: The Role of Experiment in Turing's Construction of Machine Intelligence
In 1950, Alan Turing proposed his iconic imitation game, calling it a `test,' an `experiment,' and the `the only really satisfactory support' for his view that machines can think. Following Turing's rhetoric, the `Turing test' has been widely received as a kind of crucial experiment to determine the existence of an intelligent machine. In later sources, however, Turing showed a milder attitude towards what he called his `imitation tests.' Moreover, in 1948 Turing had referred to the persuasive power of scientific and technological progress (`the actual production of machines') rather than that of a controlled experiment. Observing that a close reading of the primary sources may reveal a more complex role for experiment in Turing's philosophy of science, this article proposes to distinguish the logical structure of the Turing test argument from its rhetoric. I argue that Turing's proposal of a crucial experiment was probably a concession to meet the standards of his interlocutors more than his own. Instead, it can be seen in Turing's construction of machine intelligence, a method of successive idealizations and exploratory experiments. I will draw a parallel with Galileo's construction of idealized fall in a void and the historiographical controversies over the role of experiment in Galilean science. I suggest that Turing, comparably with Galileo, relied on certain kinds of experiment, but also on rhetoric and propaganda, apparently recognizing the need to inspire further research that could lead to convincing scientific and technological progress.
- 12 April 2023
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessGalilean Resonances: The Role of Experiment in Turing's Construction of Machine Intelligence
In 1950, Alan Turing proposed his iconic imitation game, calling it a `test,' an `experiment,' and the `the only really satisfactory support' for his view that machines can think. Following Turing's rhetoric, the `Turing test' has been widely received as a kind of crucial experiment to determine the existence of an intelligent machine. In later sources, however, Turing showed a milder attitude towards what he called his `imitation tests.' Moreover, in 1948 Turing had referred to the persuasive power of scientific and technological progress (`the actual production of machines') rather than that of a controlled experiment. Observing that a close reading of the primary sources may reveal a more complex role for experiment in Turing's philosophy of science, this article proposes to distinguish the logical structure of the Turing test argument from its rhetoric. I argue that Turing's proposal of a crucial experiment was probably a concession to meet the standards of his interlocutors more than his own. Instead, it can be seen in Turing's construction of machine intelligence, a method of successive idealizations and exploratory experiments. I will draw a parallel with Galileo's construction of idealized fall in a void and the historiographical controversies over the role of experiment in Galilean science. I suggest that Turing, comparably with Galileo, relied on certain kinds of experiment, but also on rhetoric and propaganda, apparently recognizing the need to inspire further research that could lead to convincing scientific and technological progress.