Nicola Chelotti

This article intends to investigate to what extent, how, and when individuals who are below the leader’s level affect the processes and outputs of international politics. It does so by analyzing one group of below-leader actors—diplomatic negotiators in EU foreign policy. It first shows how, despite all the bureaucratic layers they are embedded in, individual negotiators have de facto acquired ultimate policymaking responsibilities, most prominently in the selection of tactics. This empowerment of individual diplomats occurs through a process of double state disaggregation: Policymaking responsibilities have shifted from the political to the bureaucratic level; then, within the latter, from the capital-based administration to the officials involved, often in single capacity, in negotiations. Next, it tests three individual characteristics (experience, style, and identity) against an original dataset of 138 questionnaires completed by EU diplomats and 17 interviews. It shows that negotiators’ personal traits explain the use of some, but not all, tactics. Specifically, they are less likely to matter when negotiators have to commit the state in significant and explicit ways, e.g., when threatening/exercising veto. When this does not happen (e.g., showing flexibility in the delegation’s position or using persuasion), the influence of individual characteristics is instead strong.

Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon gives the European Parliament (EP) the power to consent on the terms of the withdrawal agreement between the exiting state and the EU. As Brexit is the first case where art. 50 has been invoked, the role of the EP in such a procedure is uncharted territory. This article assesses to what extent the EP has contributed to the Brexit negotiations until November 2018. Drawing on official documentation and thirteen original interviews with EU policy-makers, it maps the Parliament’s organisational adaptation to prepare itself for the challenge. Through its steering group and coordinator, and by carefully issuing resolutions, the EP has managed to become a ‘quasi-negotiator’. More difficult to detect is the EP’s actual influence, as its preferences were closely aligned to those of the other EU institutions. Overall, the EP had a selective attention in the process, primarily focusing on citizens’ rights.

The Introduction presents the rationale, the research questions and the hypotheses of the Special Issue. While the European Parliament (EP) has unquestionably been one of the winners of the Lisbon Treaty, its empowerment has taken place while several crises – from the financial crisis to Brexit – hit the EU. Against this backdrop, it sets the scene for the questions that will guide the various articles of the Special Issue: to what extent has the EP effectively used the new powers conferred to it by the Lisbon Treaty? What conditions have favoured or limited its capacity to shape policies? In testing times for integration, the EP often struggles to translate its institutional powers into policy influence. The articles in this collection show that this is more likely to happen when issues are close to the sovereignty of the member states, and when decisions generate well-identifiable costs at the national level.

This article studies the influence of the European Parliament (EP) in the reform of the EU’s economic governance. Descriptively, it aims to provide a systematic map of the negotiations of the Six- and the Two-Pack legislation, focusing on the key controversies between the co-legislators, and comparing the position of the EP with the Commission’s legislative proposals, the Council position and the final legislative output. The surprisingly limited influence of the EP – given its formal powers and the assessment made by most scholars – is then assessed through rational choice and sociological institutionalist perspectives. While the more favourable BATNA (best alternative to a negotiated agreement) of the Council could explain the outcome of the Two-Pack, and a norm of responsibility triggered by the crisis could account for the limited impact of the EP on the Six-Pack, the authors advance a different explanation. They suggest that in policy areas close to ‘core state powers’, such as budgetary surveillance, the member states still have a primary role to play. Despite the extension of codecision, the EP is expected to act within the boundaries that member states define. The authors’ policy-based explanation adds a new perspective on the study of the EP’s influence on EU law-making.