Paolo Diego Bubbio

This article examines how Kant’s conception of sacrifice in Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason connects with his account of the sublime in the Critique of Judgment. We argue that the analogy between sacrifice and sublimity illuminates the transformation involved in moral rebirth, whereby the old self is relinquished for the sake of the new. This transformation comprises two interrelated aspects: suppressive sacrifice, which subordinates self-centered inclinations to the moral law, and kenotic sacrifice, in which self-centeredness is relinquished as part of a radical reorientation of one’s disposition. By situating these aspects within Kant’s discussions of grace, the archetype–prototype distinction, and the imagination’s “sacrifice” during experiences of the sublime, we show how sacrifice functions as a symbol both of the moral exemplar (Vorbild) and of the conversion process. The resulting threefold analogy—between the old/new self, Christ’s kenotic self-emptying, and the imagination’s renunciation within the experience of the sublime—reveals how aesthetic experience, especially the sublime, helps exemplify and empower moral transformation in Kant’s thought, supplementing what his ethics alone can explain.

The article delves into two closely intertwined notions that have increasingly taken centre stage in Gianni Vattimo’s thought since the mid-eighties: secularisation and kenosis. The significance of these themes in Vattimo’s late work is such that, it is argued, it amounts to an actual Kehre, or turn. However, akin to Heidegger, Vattimo’s Kehre is not a radical break but a shift in research and reflection towards themes that, although already present in his philosophy, have assumed more distinctly religious nuances and have progressively developed up to the point where they have formed an organic perspective. The article traces this development, commencing with the notion of secularisation to then explore its interweaving with themes of emancipation and the violence of metaphysics. It concludes with a reflection on the central role of kenosis and its significance in Vattimo’s thought.

This paper explores the death of God narrative through the lens of kenosis, drawing insights from thinkers such as Marcel, Heidegger, Vattimo, and Girard. It investigates the implications of kenotic thought for contemporary religious and philosophical discourse, exploring various interpretations of kenosis, ranging from Altizer and Žižek’s apocalyptic views to Vattimo’s more hopeful perspective. Through critical engagement with these viewpoints, this paper advocates for a nuanced understanding of kenosis inspired by Hegel, one that bypasses both radical theology and excessive optimism. Methodologically, this study adopts a hermeneutic approach, analyzing key texts and engaging in philosophical dialogue. This paper concludes that rethinking kenotic thought could provide a robust framework for grappling with the death of God in the contemporary context, offering avenues for ethical reflection, social critique, and speculative renewal.

This article investigates the connection between Hegel’s notion of kenosis and his account of justice, exploring the relevance of this connection in assessing Hegel’s political theology and its lasting influence. The inquiry approaches the kenotic aspect of Hegel’s thought by focusing on the notion of Entäußerung as externalisation, aiming to highlight its active aspect. The article argues that within the dialectical mediation between interiorisation and externalisation, Hegel’s conception of justice is functionally structured as a form of Entäußerung. It surveys some of the most notable responses offered in recent decades to the question whether Hegel can contribute to the dismantling of inequality and the affirmation of justice. Subsequently, it argues that an interpretation of justice that takes into consideration the dual movement of interiorisation and externalisation enables the recollection and transformation of memories of struggles in the pursuit of justice. Lastly, the article explores the advantages that interpreting justice as Entäußerung offers in terms of social change and progress compared to alternative perspectives, and suggests that such an interpretation can provide a meaningful contribution to a new political theology of the oppressed.

This chapter explores the significance of the “I-hood” model developed throughout the book by delineating its fundamental features. It conducts a comparative analysis, juxtaposing the conception of “I-hood” derived from the combined analysis of Hegel’s and Heidegger’s accounts with insights offered by contemporary philosophy of self. Finally, the chapter posits that a reinterpretation of Hegel’s and Heidegger’s conceptions of “I-hood” holds the potential to contribute valuable resources for rethinking “I-hood” and fostering a contemporary mode of philosophising about it. This revised model, it is argued, introduces an alternative and more adaptable framework better suited to address contemporary challenges. The chapter also identifies avenues for future research, including the exploration and expansion of insights such as the irreducibility of the “gaze”, the notion of coenaesthesis, a perspectival account of knowledge, and the role of myth.

This chapter analyses the development of the notions of “self” and “nature” in Heidegger’s thought across three phases. Using the notion of experience as a hermeneutic key, it sheds light on how Heidegger approaches the encounter of the self with nature. The argument posits an inseparable link between Heidegger’s conceptions of the self and nature, focusing on three key aspects, each of which exhibits significant continuities within Heidegger’s body of work: (1) the “irreducibility of the self” in a non-subjectivist way, (2) the recovery of a non-objectivist “originary” view of nature, (3) the commitment to overcoming the subject/object dichotomy. There is a parallelism in the treatment of the self and nature across each of the three phases, and the transformations in these notions serve to address the concerns mentioned earlier. The chapter concludes by addressing the unexplored aspect of the “violence of nature” in later Heidegger. Heidegger grapples with avoiding the dichotomy between nature and history, reframing their relation without collapsing them.

This chapter explores the philosophies of Hegel and Heidegger in unison, suggesting that beyond their expressional differences, they share a non-subjectivist conception of the “I/self”. Hegel aimed to overcome the subject/object divide, maintaining idealistic objectivity in their unity. Symmetrically, Heidegger sought to overcome this polarisation while retaining existential “subjectivity”. In order to grasp this unity of subject and object, experience is required. Experience, for Heidegger, is no longer a mere type of knowledge but the subjectness (Subjektität) of the subject. In this light, Hegel’s theory of recognition and Heidegger’s account of mineness (Jemeinigkeit) and authenticity, when combined, offer a comprehensive account of the “I/self”. This integration shifts the perspective on the “other” to someone faced in a cognitive relationship. Connecting Hegel’s theory of recognition and Heidegger’s notion of mineness paves the way for a novel model of the “I/self” as fundamentally relational in its mineness. On these grounds, the “I/self” – an “I” “beyond the subject” – emerges from nature into history.

The introduction unfolds across four sections, providing a comprehensive overview of the forthcoming work. In the first section, the book’s framework, blending hermeneutic interpretation with conceptual and argumentative analysis, is elucidated. The nuanced distinction between “I” and “self”, a theme interwoven into the exploration, is also discussed. The second section unveils the book’s structure, detailing its tripartite division dedicated to Hegel, Heidegger, and an integrated model of “I-hood”. Thematic exploration spans nature and history, experience and normativity. In the third section, the introduction delves into the methodological challenges inherent in reconciling Hegel’s and Heidegger’s philosophical vocabularies. The book’s central argument emerges: the synergistic potential of Hegel’s idealist metaphysics and Heidegger’s existential analytic shapes a non-subjectivist conception of “I-hood”. The fourth section outlines the plan of the book, elucidating the focus on thematic explorations in each chapter and the ultimate goal of fostering a comprehensive understanding of “I-hood” beyond traditional dichotomies.

This chapter investigates the relationship between the concept of the “I” and Hegel’s vision of world history. It first explores Hegel’s notion of “second nature”. Subsequently, it contends that the Philosophy of Right possesses a normative character, delineating the “I”’s affirmation as the normative source of objective spirit. The chapter proposes an account of world history as the self-conscious liberation of the “I” in time and objectivity and examines Hegel’s philosophy of history in light of the Philosophy of Right as the historical unfolding of the “I” through the forms of objective spirit. Addressing two alleged challenges – the nature of “intersubjective consciousness” and the concept of “world spirit” – the chapter suggests that a reconstruction of the conception of world history in light of Hegel’s “I” yields unexplored political implications. It argues that absolute spirit retains crucial intersubjective and perspectival traits inherent to the “I” and that grasping the circular movement between the “I” and absolute spirit sheds light on how normative categories can be challenged and transformed. This dynamic process involves the collective agency of humans within the realm of absolute spirit.

This chapter critically examines Hegel’s conception of nature, assesses his undertaking in formulating a philosophy of nature, and draws comparisons among recent interpretations. The central argument of the chapter is that the human being is related only mediately to nature through experience. The chapter delves into the role of experience as a bridge between the subjective dimension explored in the Phenomenology of Spirit and the comprehensive understanding of reality presented in the Encyclopaedia. By underscoring the transformative power of experience, the chapter brings to light the pivotal role of experience in shaping the “I” and bridging the domains of logic, nature, and spirit. In the conclusion, the chapter advocates for the significance of experience as a transformative and unifying force within Hegel’s philosophical framework. Through the experience of mutual recognition, the “I” overcomes the confines of the individual’s finite perspective, ascending from nature to a “second world” – the historical realm of spirit. This logical process marks the affirmation of the “I” as the normative source of objective spirit.