Juan Mao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Juan Mao has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Michael Ettredge
University of Kansas
2 shared publications- Onur Bayar
University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, USA
2 shared publications - Yini Liu
Univ Western Ontario, Finance, London, ON N6A 3K7, Canada
2 shared publications Baolei Qi
Department of Accounting, Xi’an Jiaotong University, Xi’an, People’s Republic of China
1 shared publication- Baolei Qi
School of Management Xi'an Jiaotong University Xi'an China
1 shared publication Guochang Zhang
Department of Accounting, University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong, People’s Republic of China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 88
Litigation and information effects on private sales of securities
- 16 July 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Corporate Finance
- Vol. 88
Open AccessLitigation and information effects on private sales of securities
- 13 February 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting and Business Research
- Vol. 54 (3) , 278-303
The scale and scope of the client portfolio and audit quality at the individual auditor level: evidence from China
We examine the relation between the scale and scope of an individual auditor’s client portfolio and audit quality. Using a sample of auditor-years for the period of 2001–2016 from China, where the personal identities of signing auditors are publicly disclosed, we find that auditors with large client portfolio scale (measured by an auditor’s total audit fees from clients) provide higher quality audits (measured by discretionary accruals and the likelihood of issuing modified audit opinions). However, auditors with large client portfolio scope (measured by the number of industries where clients are located) provide lower quality audits. Further analyses indicate that auditors of higher ability and reputation tend to have larger client scales and wider client scopes. Overall, our results suggest that, at the individual auditor level, the scale of the client portfolio conveys the auditor’s ability, and given the scale, the industry and geographic scope of clients reflects the auditor’s workload.
- 13 February 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Accounting and Business Research
- Vol. 54 (3) , 278-303
The scale and scope of the client portfolio and audit quality at the individual auditor level: evidence from China
We examine the relation between the scale and scope of an individual auditor’s client portfolio and audit quality. Using a sample of auditor-years for the period of 2001–2016 from China, where the personal identities of signing auditors are publicly disclosed, we find that auditors with large client portfolio scale (measured by an auditor’s total audit fees from clients) provide higher quality audits (measured by discretionary accruals and the likelihood of issuing modified audit opinions). However, auditors with large client portfolio scope (measured by the number of industries where clients are located) provide lower quality audits. Further analyses indicate that auditors of higher ability and reputation tend to have larger client scales and wider client scopes. Overall, our results suggest that, at the individual auditor level, the scale of the client portfolio conveys the auditor’s ability, and given the scale, the industry and geographic scope of clients reflects the auditor’s workload.
- 5 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (4) , 2461-2495
Is There a Brain Drain in Auditing? The Determinants and Consequences of Auditors Leaving Public Accounting*
This study investigates why auditors leave public accounting and the consequences of auditor departures, both of which have been of great concern for audit firms and regulators worldwide. Using data from China and controlling for demographics, we find that audit partners and managers, auditors who generate more revenue, and auditors who provide higher audit quality have a lower likelihood of departure, while non–Big 4 auditors have a higher likelihood of departing public accounting. We also find that an audit firm is likely to lose clients when an auditor departs. Clients who stay with the same firm pay lower audit fees but with no drop‐off in audit quality after a signing auditor departs. In supplementary analyses, we also demonstrate that the determinants and consequences of auditor departures are different for auditors who leave the firm but not the profession (i.e., auditor turnover). Specifically, high audit quality is associated with a lower likelihood of auditor departure, but it increases auditor turnover. We also observe that audit quality is reduced for the clients who stay with an audit firm after highly skilled auditors depart for high‐visibility corporate positions. Our study provides insights that should be of interest to the audit profession, audit firms, and regulators.
- 5 June 2021
- Published by Wiley in Contemporary Accounting Research
- Vol. 38 (4) , 2461-2495
Is There a Brain Drain in Auditing? The Determinants and Consequences of Auditors Leaving Public Accounting*
This study investigates why auditors leave public accounting and the consequences of auditor departures, both of which have been of great concern for audit firms and regulators worldwide. Using data from China and controlling for demographics, we find that audit partners and managers, auditors who generate more revenue, and auditors who provide higher audit quality have a lower likelihood of departure, while non–Big 4 auditors have a higher likelihood of departing public accounting. We also find that an audit firm is likely to lose clients when an auditor departs. Clients who stay with the same firm pay lower audit fees but with no drop‐off in audit quality after a signing auditor departs. In supplementary analyses, we also demonstrate that the determinants and consequences of auditor departures are different for auditors who leave the firm but not the profession (i.e., auditor turnover). Specifically, high audit quality is associated with a lower likelihood of auditor departure, but it increases auditor turnover. We also observe that audit quality is reduced for the clients who stay with an audit firm after highly skilled auditors depart for high‐visibility corporate positions. Our study provides insights that should be of interest to the audit profession, audit firms, and regulators.
- 22 July 2020
- Published by Morressier GmbH
Non-Big 6 Audit Firms' Access to External Resources through Inter-Organizational Relationships (IORs): Insight from the PCAOB Form 2 from 2010 to 2018.
Small audit firms try to reduce their resource constraints in serving clients by creating inter-organizational relationships (IORs) through accou |
- 22 July 2020
- Published by Morressier GmbH
Non-Big 6 Audit Firms' Access to External Resources through Inter-Organizational Relationships (IORs): Insight from the PCAOB Form 2 from 2010 to 2018.
Small audit firms try to reduce their resource constraints in serving clients by creating inter-organizational relationships (IORs) through accou |
- 6 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 56 (1) , 143-184
How reverse merger firms raise capital in PIPEs: search costs and placement agent reputation
- 6 May 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting
- Vol. 56 (1) , 143-184
How reverse merger firms raise capital in PIPEs: search costs and placement agent reputation
Internal Control Deficiency Disclosures among Chinese Reverse Merger Firms
In recent years, financial reporting problems among Chinese reverse merger firms (CRMs), listed on US exchanges, have attracted unfavourable attention from regulators, investors, and the business press. Under the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), managers' Section 302 assessments of internal control over financial reporting are intended to provide investors with early warning about the likelihood of current and future non‐GAAP financial reporting problems. We investigate managers' propensity to issue unfavourable SOX 302 reports when internal control problems exist. We find that managers of CRMs have equal or greater propensity to issue adverse SOX 302 reports when serious internal control problems exist in the current quarter than those of control firms listed on US exchanges, including reverse merger and initial public offering (IPO) firms from the US and other countries as well as Chinese IPO firms. Furthermore, managers of CRMs also have an equal or greater propensity to issue adverse SOX 302 reports when internal control problems are not known to exist. One reasonable conclusion is that CRM firms tend to have weaker internal controls than comparison groups, and CRM firms are forthcoming in disclosing such weakness. Finally we analyze the specific nature of internal control deficiencies disclosed by each category of our sample firms.
Internal Control Deficiency Disclosures among Chinese Reverse Merger Firms
In recent years, financial reporting problems among Chinese reverse merger firms (CRMs), listed on US exchanges, have attracted unfavourable attention from regulators, investors, and the business press. Under the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), managers' Section 302 assessments of internal control over financial reporting are intended to provide investors with early warning about the likelihood of current and future non‐GAAP financial reporting problems. We investigate managers' propensity to issue unfavourable SOX 302 reports when internal control problems exist. We find that managers of CRMs have equal or greater propensity to issue adverse SOX 302 reports when serious internal control problems exist in the current quarter than those of control firms listed on US exchanges, including reverse merger and initial public offering (IPO) firms from the US and other countries as well as Chinese IPO firms. Furthermore, managers of CRMs also have an equal or greater propensity to issue adverse SOX 302 reports when internal control problems are not known to exist. One reasonable conclusion is that CRM firms tend to have weaker internal controls than comparison groups, and CRM firms are forthcoming in disclosing such weakness. Finally we analyze the specific nature of internal control deficiencies disclosed by each category of our sample firms.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Internal Control Deficiency Disclosures Among Chinese Reverse Merger Firms
- 1 January 2013
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessInternal Control Deficiency Disclosures Among Chinese Reverse Merger Firms