Gene Flenady
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Gene Flenady has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Thomas Corbin
Centre for Research in Assessment and Digital Learning (CRADLE), Deakin University
5 shared publications - Robert Sparrow
Monash University
4 shared publications - Joanna Tai
Centre for Research in Assessment and Digital Learning (CRADLE), Deakin University
3 shared publications - Jack Reynolds
Deakin University
2 shared publications - Lucinda McKnight
Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia
2 shared publications - Margaret Bearman
Centre for Research in Assessment and Digital Learning (CRADLE), Deakin University, Melbourne, Australia
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 29 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 57-68
Designing assessment for recognitive feedback
Assessment in higher education functions in many powerful ways to shape learners’ futures. One core function is contributing to how learners understand themselves as well as to how others perceive learners. In this way, assessment and assessment mechanisms like feedback contribute to identity. In this chapter, we unpack the importance of recognitive feedback in assessment design. Recognitive feedback is feedback where mutual recognition between student and teacher is possible, such that knowledge development and information transfer are supported at the same time as identity formation, thus involving learners’ sense of role and purpose. We explore how assessment could be designed with recognitive feedback in view, taking advantage of the variety of possible interactions and information sources within broader feedback ecosystems. These concepts contribute to pedagogical assessment designs, which may ultimately support learners to form an understanding of themselves and their capabilities with respect to the society they hope to be part of. We illustrate how these ideas might unfold through two examples, and then draw out some assessment design principles that support mutual recognition through feedback.
- 29 October 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 57-68
Designing assessment for recognitive feedback
Assessment in higher education functions in many powerful ways to shape learners’ futures. One core function is contributing to how learners understand themselves as well as to how others perceive learners. In this way, assessment and assessment mechanisms like feedback contribute to identity. In this chapter, we unpack the importance of recognitive feedback in assessment design. Recognitive feedback is feedback where mutual recognition between student and teacher is possible, such that knowledge development and information transfer are supported at the same time as identity formation, thus involving learners’ sense of role and purpose. We explore how assessment could be designed with recognitive feedback in view, taking advantage of the variety of possible interactions and information sources within broader feedback ecosystems. These concepts contribute to pedagogical assessment designs, which may ultimately support learners to form an understanding of themselves and their capabilities with respect to the society they hope to be part of. We illustrate how these ideas might unfold through two examples, and then draw out some assessment design principles that support mutual recognition through feedback.
- Open Access
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Higher Education
- p. 1-16
Hybrid reading practices: how GenAI summarisers can support rather than replace reading
Academic reading forms a crucial foundation for learning, essential not only for knowledge acquisition but for developing the critical thinking and disciplinary expertise that define higher educati...
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Studies in Higher Education
- p. 1-16
Open AccessHybrid reading practices: how GenAI summarisers can support rather than replace reading
Academic reading forms a crucial foundation for learning, essential not only for knowledge acquisition but for developing the critical thinking and disciplinary expertise that define higher educati...
- Open Access
- 19 May 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-20
On not being a robot: AI as a threat to rational agency
- 19 May 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Inquiry
- p. 1-20
Open AccessOn not being a robot: AI as a threat to rational agency
- Open Access
- 25 February 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Teaching in Higher Education
- Vol. 31 (5) , 1034-1049
The pedagogical power of recognition in feedback
Feedback is widely recognised as essential to student learning in higher education, yet its effectiveness remains persistently inconsistent (Boud and Molloy 2012). Despite decades of research and s...
- 25 February 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Teaching in Higher Education
- Vol. 31 (5) , 1034-1049
Open AccessThe pedagogical power of recognition in feedback
Feedback is widely recognised as essential to student learning in higher education, yet its effectiveness remains persistently inconsistent (Boud and Molloy 2012). Despite decades of research and s...
- 17 May 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Teaching in Higher Education
- Vol. 31 (1) , 163-172
Cut the bullshit: why GenAI systems are neither collaborators nor tutors
- 17 May 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Teaching in Higher Education
- Vol. 31 (1) , 163-172
Cut the bullshit: why GenAI systems are neither collaborators nor tutors
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 2 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in AI & SOCIETY
- Vol. 40 (7) , 5285-5296
Bullshit universities: the future of automated education
The advent of ChatGPT, and the subsequent rapid improvement in the performance of what has become known as Generative AI, has led to many pundits declaring that AI will revolutionize education, as well as work, in the future. In this paper, we argue that enthusiasm for the use of AI in tertiary education is misplaced. A proper understanding of the nature of the outputs of AI suggests that it would be profoundly misguided to replace human teachers with AI, while the history of automation in other settings suggests that it is naïve to think that AI can be developed to assist human teachers without replacing them. The dream that AI could teach students effectively neglects the importance of ‘learning how’ in order to ‘learn that’, that teachers are also role models, and the social nature of education. To the extent that students need to learn how to use AI, they should do so in specialized study skills units. Rather than creating a market for dodgy educational AI by lowering their ambitions about what they can offer, universities should invest in smaller class sizes and teachers who are passionate about their disciplines. To flourish in the future, just as much as they do today, societies will need people who have learned to think and not—or not just—intelligent machines.
- 2 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in AI & SOCIETY
- Vol. 40 (7) , 5285-5296
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessBullshit universities: the future of automated education
The advent of ChatGPT, and the subsequent rapid improvement in the performance of what has become known as Generative AI, has led to many pundits declaring that AI will revolutionize education, as well as work, in the future. In this paper, we argue that enthusiasm for the use of AI in tertiary education is misplaced. A proper understanding of the nature of the outputs of AI suggests that it would be profoundly misguided to replace human teachers with AI, while the history of automation in other settings suggests that it is naïve to think that AI can be developed to assist human teachers without replacing them. The dream that AI could teach students effectively neglects the importance of ‘learning how’ in order to ‘learn that’, that teachers are also role models, and the social nature of education. To the extent that students need to learn how to use AI, they should do so in specialized study skills units. Rather than creating a market for dodgy educational AI by lowering their ambitions about what they can offer, universities should invest in smaller class sizes and teachers who are passionate about their disciplines. To flourish in the future, just as much as they do today, societies will need people who have learned to think and not—or not just—intelligent machines.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 24 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Minds and Machines
- Vol. 35 (1) , 1-16
The Testimony Gap: Machines and Reasons
Most people who have considered the matter have concluded that machines cannot be moral agents. Responsibility for acting on the outputs of machines must always rest with a human being. A key problem for the ethical use of AI, then, is to ensure that it does not block the attribution of responsibility to humans or lead to individuals being unfairly held responsible for things over which they had no control. This is the “responsibility gap”. In this paper, we argue that the claim that machines cannot be held responsible for their actions has unacknowledged implications for the conditions under which the outputs of AI can serve as reasons for belief. Following Robert Brandom, we argue that, because the assertion of a claim is an action, moral agency is a necessary condition for the giving and evaluating of reasons in discourse. Thus, the same considerations that suggest that machines cannot be held responsible for their actions suggest that they cannot be held to account for the epistemic value — or lack of value — of their outputs. If there is a responsibility gap, there is also a “testimony gap.” An under-recognised problem with the use of AI, then, is to ensure that it does not block the attribution of testimony to human beings or lead to individuals being held responsible for claims that they have not asserted. More generally, the “assertions” of machines are only capable of serving as justifications for belief or action where one or more people accept responsibility for them.
- 24 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Minds and Machines
- Vol. 35 (1) , 1-16
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessThe Testimony Gap: Machines and Reasons
Most people who have considered the matter have concluded that machines cannot be moral agents. Responsibility for acting on the outputs of machines must always rest with a human being. A key problem for the ethical use of AI, then, is to ensure that it does not block the attribution of responsibility to humans or lead to individuals being unfairly held responsible for things over which they had no control. This is the “responsibility gap”. In this paper, we argue that the claim that machines cannot be held responsible for their actions has unacknowledged implications for the conditions under which the outputs of AI can serve as reasons for belief. Following Robert Brandom, we argue that, because the assertion of a claim is an action, moral agency is a necessary condition for the giving and evaluating of reasons in discourse. Thus, the same considerations that suggest that machines cannot be held responsible for their actions suggest that they cannot be held to account for the epistemic value — or lack of value — of their outputs. If there is a responsibility gap, there is also a “testimony gap.” An under-recognised problem with the use of AI, then, is to ensure that it does not block the attribution of testimony to human beings or lead to individuals being held responsible for claims that they have not asserted. More generally, the “assertions” of machines are only capable of serving as justifications for belief or action where one or more people accept responsibility for them.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 7 February 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education
- Vol. 50 (5) , 718-731
Understanding the place and value of GenAI feedback: a recognition-based framework
- 7 February 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Assessment & Evaluation in Higher Education
- Vol. 50 (5) , 718-731
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessUnderstanding the place and value of GenAI feedback: a recognition-based framework
- Open Access
- 9 December 2024
- Published by University of Adelaide in Learning Letters
- Vol. 3, 35
Reading at university in the time of GenAI
Concerns around Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) in higher education have so far largely centred on assessment integrity, resulting in fundamental questions about students’ broader engagement with these tools remaining underexplored. This paper reports on the findings of a survey that forms part of a wider study, comprising the first empirical investigation of GenAI use by university students as a method of engaging with their academic readings. Our survey of 101 students shows that over half of all students surveyed used GenAI to some degree as a method of engaging with their unit readings. Our findings suggest that students turn to these tools in response to time constraints and conceptual difficulties, while maintaining complex attitudes toward their use: most welcome their availability, yet few report trusting or relying on GenAI-generated interpretations or summaries of texts. Importantly, our data reveals substantial demographic variations in usage patterns, with international students and those taking subjects as electives showing significantly higher rates of AI use to assist with reading. This suggests GenAI tools may be serving as important mediators for attempting to overcome epistemic barriers to learning, particularly for students who face additional linguistic or disciplinary challenges.
- 9 December 2024
- Published by University of Adelaide in Learning Letters
- Vol. 3, 35
Open AccessReading at university in the time of GenAI
Concerns around Generative Artificial Intelligence (GenAI) in higher education have so far largely centred on assessment integrity, resulting in fundamental questions about students’ broader engagement with these tools remaining underexplored. This paper reports on the findings of a survey that forms part of a wider study, comprising the first empirical investigation of GenAI use by university students as a method of engaging with their academic readings. Our survey of 101 students shows that over half of all students surveyed used GenAI to some degree as a method of engaging with their unit readings. Our findings suggest that students turn to these tools in response to time constraints and conceptual difficulties, while maintaining complex attitudes toward their use: most welcome their availability, yet few report trusting or relying on GenAI-generated interpretations or summaries of texts. Importantly, our data reveals substantial demographic variations in usage patterns, with international students and those taking subjects as electives showing significantly higher rates of AI use to assist with reading. This suggests GenAI tools may be serving as important mediators for attempting to overcome epistemic barriers to learning, particularly for students who face additional linguistic or disciplinary challenges.
- Open Access
- 25 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy of Management
- Vol. 23 (4) , 461-480
Quiet Quitting as Compensatory Respect: Meaningful Work, Recognition, and the Entrepreneurial Ethic
This paper employs Axel Honneth’s recognition theory to interpret ‘quiet quitting’ – the practice of limiting work efforts to contracted requirements – as a strategic response by workers facing misrecognition in their work environment. Honneth argues that misrecognition in any one of three social spheres (the family, political society, and the workplace) constitutes disrespect and causes psychological harm. While Honneth contends that experiences of disrespect tend to motivate collective “struggles for recognition,” we suggest that quiet quitters present an alternative response to disrespect, individually seeking recognition in other social spheres rather than engaging in collective action. Further, we draw on Honneth to suggest that the contemporary “entrepreneurial” work ethic – the widespread expectation that workers invest emotionally in their work role – can in practice undermine workplace recognition, contributing to quiet quitters’ compensatory emphasis on recognitive relations outside of work. This recognition-theoretical approach extends current discussions around quiet quitting and yields valuable insights for management theory and practice regarding the critical role of genuine employee recognition in promoting individual well-being and meaningful work experiences.
- 25 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Philosophy of Management
- Vol. 23 (4) , 461-480
Open AccessQuiet Quitting as Compensatory Respect: Meaningful Work, Recognition, and the Entrepreneurial Ethic
This paper employs Axel Honneth’s recognition theory to interpret ‘quiet quitting’ – the practice of limiting work efforts to contracted requirements – as a strategic response by workers facing misrecognition in their work environment. Honneth argues that misrecognition in any one of three social spheres (the family, political society, and the workplace) constitutes disrespect and causes psychological harm. While Honneth contends that experiences of disrespect tend to motivate collective “struggles for recognition,” we suggest that quiet quitters present an alternative response to disrespect, individually seeking recognition in other social spheres rather than engaging in collective action. Further, we draw on Honneth to suggest that the contemporary “entrepreneurial” work ethic – the widespread expectation that workers invest emotionally in their work role – can in practice undermine workplace recognition, contributing to quiet quitters’ compensatory emphasis on recognitive relations outside of work. This recognition-theoretical approach extends current discussions around quiet quitting and yields valuable insights for management theory and practice regarding the critical role of genuine employee recognition in promoting individual well-being and meaningful work experiences.