Kristin Vekasi
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Kristin Vekasi has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jiwon Nam
School of Policy and International Affairs, University of Maine, Orono, ME, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 September 2023
- Published by University of California Press in Current History
- Vol. 122 (845) , 235-237
Is ‘Economic Security’ Making the Asia-Pacific Safer?
Trade agreements and production networks have made the Asia-Pacific an area of peaceful economic interdependence. An accelerating trend of protectionist measures in the name of economic security could pull the region apart.
- 1 September 2023
- Published by University of California Press in Current History
- Vol. 122 (845) , 235-237
Is ‘Economic Security’ Making the Asia-Pacific Safer?
Trade agreements and production networks have made the Asia-Pacific an area of peaceful economic interdependence. An accelerating trend of protectionist measures in the name of economic security could pull the region apart.
- 1 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 45-68
Securing Supply Chain Resiliency for Critical Rare Earth Metals
- 1 March 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 45-68
Securing Supply Chain Resiliency for Critical Rare Earth Metals
- 8 July 2022
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 383-399
Trade wars at the intersection of memory and industrial policy in Japan and South Korea
Japan-South Korea trade frictions highlight the intersection of the politics of memory and identity with economic competition and industrial policy. The policy mechanisms show how states use national security-related non-tariff barriers to avoid sanctions from trade institutions via points of supply chain vulnerability. Both Japan and South Korea leveraged their economic ties to help advance domestic political goals related to the contested memory of Japan's violent occupation of South Korea. Japan utilized its export control system in ways that threatened South Korea's export-oriented economic system, leveraging a supply chain choke point to further industrial policy goals in the semiconductor industry where they were able to potentially cause significant damage to the Korean economy. While Japan's weaponization of trade has not shifted the underlying dynamics of the semiconductor market, it has provided them with more leverage in navigating the politics of memory.
- 8 July 2022
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 383-399
Trade wars at the intersection of memory and industrial policy in Japan and South Korea
Japan-South Korea trade frictions highlight the intersection of the politics of memory and identity with economic competition and industrial policy. The policy mechanisms show how states use national security-related non-tariff barriers to avoid sanctions from trade institutions via points of supply chain vulnerability. Both Japan and South Korea leveraged their economic ties to help advance domestic political goals related to the contested memory of Japan's violent occupation of South Korea. Japan utilized its export control system in ways that threatened South Korea's export-oriented economic system, leveraging a supply chain choke point to further industrial policy goals in the semiconductor industry where they were able to potentially cause significant damage to the Korean economy. While Japan's weaponization of trade has not shifted the underlying dynamics of the semiconductor market, it has provided them with more leverage in navigating the politics of memory.
- 30 December 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs
- Vol. 6 (3) , 299-326
Boycotting Japan: Explaining Divergence in Chinese and South Korean Economic Backlash
Japan has a ‘cold politics, hot economics’ relationship with both China and South Korea where political relations are tense and business overall flourishes. Despite the similarities, the political mobilisation of consumers in response to Japanese business interests diverge: event, trade and tourism data show that South Koreans are less likely to link economic interests with their political grievances with Japan compared to their Chinese counterparts even though the sources of the tensions are largely parallel. The divergence arises from different ways economic globalisation has shaped national identity. In China, economic globalisation has strengthened a nativist identity with strong anti-foreign components. Korean national identity has been formed by economic integration and interdependence. While strong national identity and anti-foreign elements exist, they are delinked from economic interests. Survey and event data from South Korea and China show that the variation in consumer politics is driven by attitudinal differences in the population that is strongly anti-Japanese. Social media data shows how citizens link or delink politics and business to mobilise for collective action and provide qualitative evidence that how identities interact with globalisation explain country-level variation.
- 30 December 2019
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Asian Security and International Affairs
- Vol. 6 (3) , 299-326
Boycotting Japan: Explaining Divergence in Chinese and South Korean Economic Backlash
Japan has a ‘cold politics, hot economics’ relationship with both China and South Korea where political relations are tense and business overall flourishes. Despite the similarities, the political mobilisation of consumers in response to Japanese business interests diverge: event, trade and tourism data show that South Koreans are less likely to link economic interests with their political grievances with Japan compared to their Chinese counterparts even though the sources of the tensions are largely parallel. The divergence arises from different ways economic globalisation has shaped national identity. In China, economic globalisation has strengthened a nativist identity with strong anti-foreign components. Korean national identity has been formed by economic integration and interdependence. While strong national identity and anti-foreign elements exist, they are delinked from economic interests. Survey and event data from South Korea and China show that the variation in consumer politics is driven by attitudinal differences in the population that is strongly anti-Japanese. Social media data shows how citizens link or delink politics and business to mobilise for collective action and provide qualitative evidence that how identities interact with globalisation explain country-level variation.
- 5 December 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Japanese Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 20 (1) , 2-20
Politics, markets, and rare commodities: responses to Chinese rare earth policy
This paper examines economic statecraft in the case of rare-earth elements, of which China controls over 90% of the world's current supply, and famously cut off exports to Japan during a territorial dispute in 2010. The rare-earth sanctions provide an opportunity to investigate claims of economic statecraft, power and interdependence, and the political implications of near-monopoly control of a resource critical for high-tech military, consumer, medical, and environmental industries. A vector error correction model statistically disentangles the effects of China's economic statecraft from their rare-earth quota and pricing policies. Prior to the sanctions, there was little international supply diversification. China's purported use of rare-earth elements was an economically costly diplomatic signal that demonstrated their potential leverage, but also had unintended consequences, as Japan moved to diversify rare-earth supplies and in doing so deepened diplomatic ties with China's neighbors. Economic statecraft served to heighten regional tensions and undermine the China's own end goals.
- 5 December 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Japanese Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 20 (1) , 2-20
Politics, markets, and rare commodities: responses to Chinese rare earth policy
This paper examines economic statecraft in the case of rare-earth elements, of which China controls over 90% of the world's current supply, and famously cut off exports to Japan during a territorial dispute in 2010. The rare-earth sanctions provide an opportunity to investigate claims of economic statecraft, power and interdependence, and the political implications of near-monopoly control of a resource critical for high-tech military, consumer, medical, and environmental industries. A vector error correction model statistically disentangles the effects of China's economic statecraft from their rare-earth quota and pricing policies. Prior to the sanctions, there was little international supply diversification. China's purported use of rare-earth elements was an economically costly diplomatic signal that demonstrated their potential leverage, but also had unintended consequences, as Japan moved to diversify rare-earth supplies and in doing so deepened diplomatic ties with China's neighbors. Economic statecraft served to heighten regional tensions and undermine the China's own end goals.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Chinese Political Science
- Vol. 23 (4) , 637-638
S. Kalantzakos: China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Chinese Political Science
- Vol. 23 (4) , 637-638
S. Kalantzakos: China and the Geopolitics of Rare Earths
- 7 December 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 232, 1133-1134
Inheritance of Loss: China, Japan, and the Political Economy of Redemption after Empire Yukiko Koga Chicago, IL, and London: Chicago University Press, 2016 xxvii + 328 pp. $27.50; £20.50 ISBN 978-0-22641227-6
- 7 December 2017
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in The China Quarterly
- Vol. 232, 1133-1134
Inheritance of Loss: China, Japan, and the Political Economy of Redemption after Empire Yukiko Koga Chicago, IL, and London: Chicago University Press, 2016 xxvii + 328 pp. $27.50; £20.50 ISBN 978-0-22641227-6
- 18 January 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Chinese Journal of International Politics
- Vol. 10 (1) , 95-129
Transforming Geopolitical Risk: Public Diplomacy of Multinational Firms for Foreign Audiences
This article addresses the strategies of multinational firms when faced with business risk arising from nationalist tensions and interstate conflict, focusing on the use of social engagement activities under the rubric of corporate social responsibility (CSR) that are targeted at the host country’s society at large. The adoption of this strategy is contingent on firms’ risk perception: firms with higher degrees of risk perception invest more resources in social strategies. Moreover, as firms are more exposed to risk over time, they shift their risk management strategies to ones that try to transform the nature of risk through private sector activities that resemble public diplomacy. The argument is tested quantitatively using unique data on the contributions of Japanese firms to social engagement activities in China, and qualitatively with descriptive statistics from surveys of CSR activities and elite interviews with state and business actors in China and Japan. The findings highlight new sociopolitical roles for multinational firms in international politics.
- 18 January 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Chinese Journal of International Politics
- Vol. 10 (1) , 95-129
Transforming Geopolitical Risk: Public Diplomacy of Multinational Firms for Foreign Audiences
This article addresses the strategies of multinational firms when faced with business risk arising from nationalist tensions and interstate conflict, focusing on the use of social engagement activities under the rubric of corporate social responsibility (CSR) that are targeted at the host country’s society at large. The adoption of this strategy is contingent on firms’ risk perception: firms with higher degrees of risk perception invest more resources in social strategies. Moreover, as firms are more exposed to risk over time, they shift their risk management strategies to ones that try to transform the nature of risk through private sector activities that resemble public diplomacy. The argument is tested quantitatively using unique data on the contributions of Japanese firms to social engagement activities in China, and qualitatively with descriptive statistics from surveys of CSR activities and elite interviews with state and business actors in China and Japan. The findings highlight new sociopolitical roles for multinational firms in international politics.