Rebecca Strating
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Rebecca Strating has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jasmine-Kim Westendorf
La Trobe University , Australia
2 shared publications - Alexander E. Davis
University of Western Australia
1 shared publication - Benjamin T. Jones
Central Queensland University
1 shared publication - Bridget Brooklyn
Western Sydney University
1 shared publication - Christian Bueger
University of Copenhagen
1 shared publication - Elizabeth Mendenhall
University of Rhode Island
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 16 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asian Studies Review
- p. 1-22
Australia’s Strategic Institutional Innovation in the Indo–Pacific
Asia’s geopolitical environment has become more demanding for regional states, particularly with the military and economic rise of China and the uncertainty surrounding the second Trump administrat...
- 16 August 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Asian Studies Review
- p. 1-22
Australia’s Strategic Institutional Innovation in the Indo–Pacific
Asia’s geopolitical environment has become more demanding for regional states, particularly with the military and economic rise of China and the uncertainty surrounding the second Trump administrat...
- Open Access
- 20 March 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
‘Muddying the waters’: Narrative DoppelGängers, information operations and US–China competition in the South China Sea
Beyond military and economic domains, strategic competition also unfolds in the international information ecosystem as great powers vie for influence through strategic narratives. In the context of US–China strategic competition, the South China Sea disputes have increasingly become a theatre for ‘image wars’ as political actors use narratives and counter-narratives to assert and defend their legitimacy. This article is concerned with how narrative competition occurs through ‘mirroring’ – what is described as ‘narrative DoppelGängers’ – that aims to produce alternative realities that obfuscate, confuse and blur the lines between ‘truth’ and ‘fiction’. Political actors borrow or mimic concepts, images and websites to construct and reify different political realities by developing legitimate-appearing narratives that make it difficult to tell fact from fabrication. Using the South China Sea as a case study, the article identifies forms of narrative mirroring to provide new insights into how great powers compete in the information ecosystem.
- 20 March 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
Open Access‘Muddying the waters’: Narrative DoppelGängers, information operations and US–China competition in the South China Sea
Beyond military and economic domains, strategic competition also unfolds in the international information ecosystem as great powers vie for influence through strategic narratives. In the context of US–China strategic competition, the South China Sea disputes have increasingly become a theatre for ‘image wars’ as political actors use narratives and counter-narratives to assert and defend their legitimacy. This article is concerned with how narrative competition occurs through ‘mirroring’ – what is described as ‘narrative DoppelGängers’ – that aims to produce alternative realities that obfuscate, confuse and blur the lines between ‘truth’ and ‘fiction’. Political actors borrow or mimic concepts, images and websites to construct and reify different political realities by developing legitimate-appearing narratives that make it difficult to tell fact from fabrication. Using the South China Sea as a case study, the article identifies forms of narrative mirroring to provide new insights into how great powers compete in the information ecosystem.
- Open Access
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Security Policy
- Vol. 46 (4) , 1079-1109
Symbolism or substance? Europe’s naval engagement in the Indo-Pacific
- 26 June 2025
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Security Policy
- Vol. 46 (4) , 1079-1109
Open AccessSymbolism or substance? Europe’s naval engagement in the Indo-Pacific
- Open Access
- 2 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 59 (3) , 314-330
International reputation and the Voice to Parliament referendum
- 2 July 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australian Journal of Political Science
- Vol. 59 (3) , 314-330
Open AccessInternational reputation and the Voice to Parliament referendum
- Open Access
- 24 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Marine Policy
- Vol. 159
Human rights at sea: The limits of inter-state cooperation in addressing forced labour on fishing vessels
- 24 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Marine Policy
- Vol. 159
Open AccessHuman rights at sea: The limits of inter-state cooperation in addressing forced labour on fishing vessels
- Open Access
- 27 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Security Policy
- Vol. 44 (3) , 372-409
The rules-based order as rhetorical entrapment: Comparing maritime dispute resolution in the Indo-Pacific
In response to challenges to Asia’s security order, regional powers such Australia, India, and Japan have adopted new “Indo-Pacific” strategic narratives to promote and defend the “rules-based order.” These narratives use China’s maritime disputes with smaller neighbors in the South China Sea as a key example of Beijing’s revisionist intentions. Yet such narratives expose “rules-based order” advocates to risks of “rhetorical entrapment” as other actors compel them to abide by the standards they have set. To what extent have Indo-Pacific powers been forced to follow the rules in their own asymmetrical maritime disputes? This article examines three Indo-Pacific cases: Timor Sea Compulsory Conciliation between Australia and Timor-Leste, the Chagos Island Marine Protected Area Arbitration between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, and the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between India and Bangladesh. To varying degrees, this article finds that strategic narratives constrained the policy options of all three Indo-Pacific powers.
- 27 April 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Contemporary Security Policy
- Vol. 44 (3) , 372-409
Open AccessThe rules-based order as rhetorical entrapment: Comparing maritime dispute resolution in the Indo-Pacific
In response to challenges to Asia’s security order, regional powers such Australia, India, and Japan have adopted new “Indo-Pacific” strategic narratives to promote and defend the “rules-based order.” These narratives use China’s maritime disputes with smaller neighbors in the South China Sea as a key example of Beijing’s revisionist intentions. Yet such narratives expose “rules-based order” advocates to risks of “rhetorical entrapment” as other actors compel them to abide by the standards they have set. To what extent have Indo-Pacific powers been forced to follow the rules in their own asymmetrical maritime disputes? This article examines three Indo-Pacific cases: Timor Sea Compulsory Conciliation between Australia and Timor-Leste, the Chagos Island Marine Protected Area Arbitration between the United Kingdom and Mauritius, and the Bay of Bengal Maritime Boundary Arbitration between India and Bangladesh. To varying degrees, this article finds that strategic narratives constrained the policy options of all three Indo-Pacific powers.
- 25 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 105-212
Part II
Over the course of the twentieth century, concerns about Australia's strategic dependence shifted from the United Kingdom to the United States. In 1951, the signing of the ANZUS treaty formalised the Australia–US alliance, a relationship which has retained its status as the ‘cornerstone’ or ‘linchpin’ of Australia's foreign policy. This chapter assesses the evolution of debates about Australia's strategic dependence on the United States and the abandonment anxieties that such dependence produces. It examines Australia's agency and influence within the alliance, and the ways in which Australian leaders have sought to advance its national interests on the world stage independently of the United States. Ultimately, the independence/dependence dichotomy fails to capture the complexities of Australia's bilateral relations with the United States.
- 25 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 105-212
Part II
Over the course of the twentieth century, concerns about Australia's strategic dependence shifted from the United Kingdom to the United States. In 1951, the signing of the ANZUS treaty formalised the Australia–US alliance, a relationship which has retained its status as the ‘cornerstone’ or ‘linchpin’ of Australia's foreign policy. This chapter assesses the evolution of debates about Australia's strategic dependence on the United States and the abandonment anxieties that such dependence produces. It examines Australia's agency and influence within the alliance, and the ways in which Australian leaders have sought to advance its national interests on the world stage independently of the United States. Ultimately, the independence/dependence dichotomy fails to capture the complexities of Australia's bilateral relations with the United States.
- 25 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 107-122
The Unbreakable Alliance? Strategic Dependence and Australia's US Alliance
Over the course of the twentieth century, concerns about Australia's strategic dependence shifted from the United Kingdom to the United States. In 1951, the signing of the ANZUS treaty formalised the Australia–US alliance, a relationship which has retained its status as the ‘cornerstone’ or ‘linchpin’ of Australia's foreign policy. This chapter assesses the evolution of debates about Australia's strategic dependence on the United States and the abandonment anxieties that such dependence produces. It examines Australia's agency and influence within the alliance, and the ways in which Australian leaders have sought to advance its national interests on the world stage independently of the United States. Ultimately, the independence/dependence dichotomy fails to capture the complexities of Australia's bilateral relations with the United States.
- 25 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 107-122
The Unbreakable Alliance? Strategic Dependence and Australia's US Alliance
Over the course of the twentieth century, concerns about Australia's strategic dependence shifted from the United Kingdom to the United States. In 1951, the signing of the ANZUS treaty formalised the Australia–US alliance, a relationship which has retained its status as the ‘cornerstone’ or ‘linchpin’ of Australia's foreign policy. This chapter assesses the evolution of debates about Australia's strategic dependence on the United States and the abandonment anxieties that such dependence produces. It examines Australia's agency and influence within the alliance, and the ways in which Australian leaders have sought to advance its national interests on the world stage independently of the United States. Ultimately, the independence/dependence dichotomy fails to capture the complexities of Australia's bilateral relations with the United States.
- 25 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-15
When and Where Is Australia?
On 24 September 2018, then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison posted an angry tweet after Byron Bay Shire council decided to move their Australia Day ceremony from 26 January. The decision came in response to growing public unease about using the date as a national celebration. Although Britain had claimed the continent and islands now called Australia in 1770, 26 January 1788 marked the beginning of European colonisation with the Gadigal people of Sydney being the first to be physically dispossessed of the land they had occupied for hundreds of generations. Like all First Nations, their sovereignty was never ceded and it is increasingly accepted that terra nullius was ‘legal fiction’ and was not used by the British to justify dispossession. 1 In 2017, three councils in Melbourne and a fourth in Fremantle decided to stop holding official celebrations on 26 January out of respect for First Nations people. 2 Then Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull responded by stripping the councils of their right to hold citizenship ceremonies. Likewise, Morrison removed Byron Bay Shire's right to hold citizenship ceremonies (until the Shire backed down and reversed the decision) but he went further than his predecessor by presenting any change to the Australia Day narrative as a form of national self-sabotage.
- 25 August 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 1-15
When and Where Is Australia?
On 24 September 2018, then-Prime Minister Scott Morrison posted an angry tweet after Byron Bay Shire council decided to move their Australia Day ceremony from 26 January. The decision came in response to growing public unease about using the date as a national celebration. Although Britain had claimed the continent and islands now called Australia in 1770, 26 January 1788 marked the beginning of European colonisation with the Gadigal people of Sydney being the first to be physically dispossessed of the land they had occupied for hundreds of generations. Like all First Nations, their sovereignty was never ceded and it is increasingly accepted that terra nullius was ‘legal fiction’ and was not used by the British to justify dispossession. 1 In 2017, three councils in Melbourne and a fourth in Fremantle decided to stop holding official celebrations on 26 January out of respect for First Nations people. 2 Then Prime Minister, Malcolm Turnbull responded by stripping the councils of their right to hold citizenship ceremonies. Likewise, Morrison removed Byron Bay Shire's right to hold citizenship ceremonies (until the Shire backed down and reversed the decision) but he went further than his predecessor by presenting any change to the Australia Day narrative as a form of national self-sabotage.