Chen Chen
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Chen Chen has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adrian Perrig
ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Daniele Enrico Asoni
ETH Zurich
1 shared publication - David Barrera
ETH Zürich ETH Zürich George Danezis University College London Adrian Perrig
1 shared publication - George Danezis
Mysten Labs, London, United Kingdom and University College London (UCL), London, United Kingdom
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 22 December 2016
- Published by Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium Advisory Board in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
- Vol. 2017 (1) , 100-117
PHI: Path-Hidden Lightweight Anonymity Protocol at Network Layer
We identify two vulnerabilities for existing highspeed network-layer anonymity protocols, such as LAP and Dovetail. First, the header formats of LAP and Dovetail leak path information, reducing the anonymity-set size when an adversary launches topological attacks. Second, ASes can launch session hijacking attacks to deanonymize destinations. HORNET addresses these problems but incurs additional bandwidth overhead and latency. In this paper, we propose PHI, a Path-HIdden lightweight anonymity protocol that solves both challenges while maintaining the same level of efficiency as LAP and Dovetail. We present an efficient packet header format that hides path information and a new back-off setup method that is compatible with current and future network architectures. Our experiments demonstrate that PHI expands anonymity sets of LAP and Dovetail by over 30x and reaches 120 Gbps forwarding speed on a commodity software router.
- 22 December 2016
- Published by Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium Advisory Board in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
- Vol. 2017 (1) , 100-117
Open AccessPHI: Path-Hidden Lightweight Anonymity Protocol at Network Layer
We identify two vulnerabilities for existing highspeed network-layer anonymity protocols, such as LAP and Dovetail. First, the header formats of LAP and Dovetail leak path information, reducing the anonymity-set size when an adversary launches topological attacks. Second, ASes can launch session hijacking attacks to deanonymize destinations. HORNET addresses these problems but incurs additional bandwidth overhead and latency. In this paper, we propose PHI, a Path-HIdden lightweight anonymity protocol that solves both challenges while maintaining the same level of efficiency as LAP and Dovetail. We present an efficient packet header format that hides path information and a new back-off setup method that is compatible with current and future network architectures. Our experiments demonstrate that PHI expands anonymity sets of LAP and Dovetail by over 30x and reaches 120 Gbps forwarding speed on a commodity software router.
- Open Access
HORNET: High-speed Onion Routing at the Network Layer
We present HORNET, a system that enables high-speed end-to-end anonymous channels by leveraging next generation network architectures. HORNET is designed as a low-latency onion routing system that operates at the network layer thus enabling a wide range of applications. Our system uses only symmetric cryptography for data forwarding yet requires no per-flow state on intermediate nodes. This design enables HORNET nodes to process anonymous traffic at over 93 Gb/s. HORNET can also scale as required, adding minimal processing overhead per additional anonymous channel. We discuss design and implementation details, as well as a performance and security evaluation.
Open AccessHORNET: High-speed Onion Routing at the Network Layer
We present HORNET, a system that enables high-speed end-to-end anonymous channels by leveraging next generation network architectures. HORNET is designed as a low-latency onion routing system that operates at the network layer thus enabling a wide range of applications. Our system uses only symmetric cryptography for data forwarding yet requires no per-flow state on intermediate nodes. This design enables HORNET nodes to process anonymous traffic at over 93 Gb/s. HORNET can also scale as required, adding minimal processing overhead per additional anonymous channel. We discuss design and implementation details, as well as a performance and security evaluation.