Hélène Le Bouder
Research Subjects
Hélène Le Bouder has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Gaël Thomas
DGA Maitrise de l’Information, Bruz and France, --- Select a Country --
3 shared publicationsEdwin Bourget
IMT-Atlantique SRCD, Cesson-Sévigné and France, --- Select a Country --
2 shared publications- Jean-Louis Lanet
INRIA, LHS-PEC
2 shared publications Mariem Graa
IMT-Atlantique SRCD, Cesson-Sévigné and France, --- Select a Country --
2 shared publicationsNora Cuppens
IMT-Atlantique SRCD, Cesson-Sévigné and France, --- Select a Country --
2 shared publicationsJean-Yves Zie
CEA-TECH, Centre de Microélectronique de Provence
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 January 2018
- Published by INSTICC
- p. 332-339
Theoretical Security Evaluation of the Human Semantic Authentication Protocol
Using a secret password or a PIN (Personal Identification Number) code is a common way to authenticate a user. Unfortunately this protection does not resist an attacker that can eavesdrop on the user (shoulder surfing attack). The Human Semantic Authentication (HSA) protocol proposes a solution against this attack. The main idea is to have concept passwords and to propose images that the user must correctly select in order to authenticate. A concept can be represented by different pictures, so one observation is not enough to retrieve the secret. In this paper, the security/efficiency trade-off in the HSA protocol is evaluated. A probabilistic approach is used. Under the assumption that the picture/concept database is known to the attacker, we show that HSA is barely more resistant to shoulder surfing attacks than a PIN code. More precisely we show that the probability to retrieve the secret concept password increases rapidly with the number of observations. Moreover the constraints o
- 1 January 2018
- Published by INSTICC
- p. 332-339
Theoretical Security Evaluation of the Human Semantic Authentication Protocol
Using a secret password or a PIN (Personal Identification Number) code is a common way to authenticate a user. Unfortunately this protection does not resist an attacker that can eavesdrop on the user (shoulder surfing attack). The Human Semantic Authentication (HSA) protocol proposes a solution against this attack. The main idea is to have concept passwords and to propose images that the user must correctly select in order to authenticate. A concept can be represented by different pictures, so one observation is not enough to retrieve the secret. In this paper, the security/efficiency trade-off in the HSA protocol is evaluated. A probabilistic approach is used. Under the assumption that the picture/concept database is known to the attacker, we show that HSA is barely more resistant to shoulder surfing attacks than a PIN code. More precisely we show that the probability to retrieve the secret concept password increases rapidly with the number of observations. Moreover the constraints o
- 1 January 2018
- Published by INSTICC
Theoretical Security Evaluation of the Human Semantic Authentication Protocol
- 1 January 2018
- Published by INSTICC
Theoretical Security Evaluation of the Human Semantic Authentication Protocol
- Open Access
- 29 December 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 199-213
A Multi-round Side Channel Attack on AES Using Belief Propagation
- 29 December 2016
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 199-213
Open AccessA Multi-round Side Channel Attack on AES Using Belief Propagation