Andrea Galeotti
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Andrea Galeotti has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Sanjeev Goyal
2 shared publications- Daniele Condorelli
University of Warwick , UK
1 shared publication - Sanjeev Goyal
University of Cambridge
1 shared publication - Syngjoo Choi
University College London
1 shared publication - Vasiliki Skreta
University of Texas at Austin Austin Texas USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 11 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 27 (4) , 669-685
Selling through referrals
We endogenize intermediaries' choice to operate as agents or merchants in a market where there are frictions due to asymmetric information about consumption values. A seller has an object for sale and can reach buyers only through intermediaries. Intermediaries can either mediate the transaction by buying and reselling—the merchant mode—or refer buyers to the seller for a fee—the referral mode. When the seller has a strong bargaining position and can condition the asking price to the intermediaries' business model choice, all intermediaries specialize in agency. The seller's and intermediaries' joint profits equal the seller's profits when he has access to all buyers. When the seller does not have such bargaining power, the level of the referral fee and the degree of competition among intermediaries determine the business mode adoption. A hybrid agency–merchant mode may be adopted in equilibrium. Banning the referral mode can decrease welfare because the merchant mode is associated with additional allocative distortions due to asymmetric information.
- 11 May 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 27 (4) , 669-685
Selling through referrals
We endogenize intermediaries' choice to operate as agents or merchants in a market where there are frictions due to asymmetric information about consumption values. A seller has an object for sale and can reach buyers only through intermediaries. Intermediaries can either mediate the transaction by buying and reselling—the merchant mode—or refer buyers to the seller for a fee—the referral mode. When the seller has a strong bargaining position and can condition the asking price to the intermediaries' business model choice, all intermediaries specialize in agency. The seller's and intermediaries' joint profits equal the seller's profits when he has access to all buyers. When the seller does not have such bargaining power, the level of the referral fee and the degree of competition among intermediaries determine the business mode adoption. A hybrid agency–merchant mode may be adopted in equilibrium. Banning the referral mode can decrease welfare because the merchant mode is associated with additional allocative distortions due to asymmetric information.
- 14 February 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 15 (4) , 784-817
Trading in Networks: Theory and Experiments
We propose a model of posted prices in networks. The model maps traditional concepts of market power, competition, and double marginalization into networks, allowing for the study of pricing in complex structures of intermediation, such as supply chains, transportation and communication networks, and financial brokerage. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium prices. Our experiments complement our theoretical work and point to node criticality as an organizing principle for understanding pricing, efficiency, and the division of surplus in networked markets. (JEL: C70, C71, C91, C92, D40)
- 14 February 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 15 (4) , 784-817
Trading in Networks: Theory and Experiments
We propose a model of posted prices in networks. The model maps traditional concepts of market power, competition, and double marginalization into networks, allowing for the study of pricing in complex structures of intermediation, such as supply chains, transportation and communication networks, and financial brokerage. We provide a complete characterization of equilibrium prices. Our experiments complement our theoretical work and point to node criticality as an organizing principle for understanding pricing, efficiency, and the division of surplus in networked markets. (JEL: C70, C71, C91, C92, D40)
- 12 January 2012
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Network Economics
- Vol. 11 (3)
Special Issue Introduction: Social Networks and Economics
The aim of the special issue is to explore open problems at the frontier of the Economics of Social Networks. The papers in this special issue range across pure and applied theory and empirical investigations, and in this they reflect the richness of on-going research in the economics of networks. © 2012 De Gruyter
- 12 January 2012
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Network Economics
- Vol. 11 (3)
Special Issue Introduction: Social Networks and Economics
The aim of the special issue is to explore open problems at the frontier of the Economics of Social Networks. The papers in this special issue range across pure and applied theory and empirical investigations, and in this they reflect the richness of on-going research in the economics of networks. © 2012 De Gruyter
- 12 January 2012
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Network Economics
- Vol. 11 (3)
Network Multipliers: The Optimality of Targeting Neighbors
A firm wishes to inform a community of individuals about its product. Information travels within the community because of the social interactions between individuals. We establish that social interactions appear in a firm's payoff as a network multiplier, which is increasing both in the mean and in the variance of the distribution of connections. We then show that the degree distribution of a neighbor first order dominates the degree distribution of a node; so a firm must pick the neighbor of a node rather than a node itself as the target of communication. The advantages of employing an indirect communication strategy are greater in more dispersed networks. © 2012 De Gruyter
- 12 January 2012
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Review of Network Economics
- Vol. 11 (3)
Network Multipliers: The Optimality of Targeting Neighbors
A firm wishes to inform a community of individuals about its product. Information travels within the community because of the social interactions between individuals. We establish that social interactions appear in a firm's payoff as a network multiplier, which is increasing both in the mean and in the variance of the distribution of connections. We then show that the degree distribution of a neighbor first order dominates the degree distribution of a node; so a firm must pick the neighbor of a node rather than a node itself as the target of communication. The advantages of employing an indirect communication strategy are greater in more dispersed networks. © 2012 De Gruyter