Emita W. Astami
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Emita W. Astami has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bambang Hartadi
Universitas Teknologi Yogyakarta, Sleman, Indonesia
2 shared publications - John Evans
Curtin University
1 shared publication Rusmin Rusmin
Universitas Teknologi Yogyakarta, Sleman, Indonesia
1 shared publication- Rusmin Rusmin1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 March 2017
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Accounting & Information Management
- Vol. 25 (1) , 21-42
The role of audit quality and culture influence on earnings management in companies with excessive free cash flow
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of culture and audit quality on managers’ decisions regarding accounting accruals. It focuses on companies experiencing excessive free cash flow, as these companies have been associated with an agency problem. Design/methodology/approach: This study measures the magnitude of discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management using the cross-sectional modified Jones model. Excessive free cash flow is scrutinized by the method used by Chung et al. (2005). Listed companies in nine countries in the Asia-Pacific region are represented in this study. The statistical analyses are used to examine the influence of cultural aspect, the role of external monitoring by high-quality auditors and the earnings management practice in the companies with excessive free-cash-flow. Findings: The empirical results presented in this paper provide support for the proposition that managers of companies with excessive free-cash-flow will make investment decisions that are not always in the best interest of the shareholders and use accounting discretion to increase reported earnings. This study provides empirical evidence that these companies have been associated with an agency problem and the role of external auditor persists in a setting, where cultural differences prevail in across countries. Practical implications: In cross-border trade and investment, the findings provide the opportunity to exploit a setting, where cultural differences prevail, whereas other potentially influential variables, including the role of external monitoring by high-quality auditors, are relatively constant across countries. Originality/value: Previous studies (Leuz et al., 2003; and Enomoto et al., 2015) examine factors influencing earnings management internationally have concentrated on legal institutions and investor protection. Han et al. (2010) completed a cross-country study on the effects of national culture on earnings management. This study focuses on companies across countries experiencing with excessive free cash flow and examines the cultural aspect and the effectiveness of external monitoring by high-quality auditors operating in different countries in mitigating managerial opportunism.
- 6 March 2017
- Published by Emerald Publishing in International Journal of Accounting & Information Management
- Vol. 25 (1) , 21-42
The role of audit quality and culture influence on earnings management in companies with excessive free cash flow
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine the effect of culture and audit quality on managers’ decisions regarding accounting accruals. It focuses on companies experiencing excessive free cash flow, as these companies have been associated with an agency problem. Design/methodology/approach: This study measures the magnitude of discretionary accruals as a proxy for earnings management using the cross-sectional modified Jones model. Excessive free cash flow is scrutinized by the method used by Chung et al. (2005). Listed companies in nine countries in the Asia-Pacific region are represented in this study. The statistical analyses are used to examine the influence of cultural aspect, the role of external monitoring by high-quality auditors and the earnings management practice in the companies with excessive free-cash-flow. Findings: The empirical results presented in this paper provide support for the proposition that managers of companies with excessive free-cash-flow will make investment decisions that are not always in the best interest of the shareholders and use accounting discretion to increase reported earnings. This study provides empirical evidence that these companies have been associated with an agency problem and the role of external auditor persists in a setting, where cultural differences prevail in across countries. Practical implications: In cross-border trade and investment, the findings provide the opportunity to exploit a setting, where cultural differences prevail, whereas other potentially influential variables, including the role of external monitoring by high-quality auditors, are relatively constant across countries. Originality/value: Previous studies (Leuz et al., 2003; and Enomoto et al., 2015) examine factors influencing earnings management internationally have concentrated on legal institutions and investor protection. Han et al. (2010) completed a cross-country study on the effects of national culture on earnings management. This study focuses on companies across countries experiencing with excessive free cash flow and examines the cultural aspect and the effectiveness of external monitoring by high-quality auditors operating in different countries in mitigating managerial opportunism.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Board: role, duties and composition
- Vol. 7 (3) , 52-64
Ownership structure, charaсteristic differences and the size of corporate board of commissioner: The case of Indonesia state-owned enterprises
This study scrutinises the association between ownership identity and board size in a unique institutional setting: state-owned enterprises in Indonesia, a country incorporating a two-tier management structure. It investigates whether the ownership identity explains the size of the board of commissioners by using the year 2006 data set from 155 SOEs in Indonesia consisting of 112 of fully SOEs and 43 of partially- privatised SOEs. This study hypothesizes that SOEs with a higher level of private sector ownership will have a greater incentive to monitor the performance of executive management through board of commissioners than those SOEs that are fully owned by the state government. It finds that compared to those fully SOEs, the partially-privatised SOEs are likely to have more board of commissioners. Even though this result is not statistically significant and, therefore, the proposed hypothesis is not statistically supported, the regression statistical analysis reveals that control variables assist in explaining the size of board of commissioners. The size of the board of directors as a control variable is significantly associated with the size of the board of commissioners. Other control variables including size of the SOE as well as the return on equity measure moderately explain the size of the board of commissioners. The findings give insight to stakeholders such as regulators or the private sector investors interested in making investment decisions in Indonesia considering the ownership structure and the effect on the effectiveness of the board of commissioners.
- 1 January 2011
- Published by Virtus Interpress in Corporate Board: role, duties and composition
- Vol. 7 (3) , 52-64
Open AccessOwnership structure, charaсteristic differences and the size of corporate board of commissioner: The case of Indonesia state-owned enterprises
This study scrutinises the association between ownership identity and board size in a unique institutional setting: state-owned enterprises in Indonesia, a country incorporating a two-tier management structure. It investigates whether the ownership identity explains the size of the board of commissioners by using the year 2006 data set from 155 SOEs in Indonesia consisting of 112 of fully SOEs and 43 of partially- privatised SOEs. This study hypothesizes that SOEs with a higher level of private sector ownership will have a greater incentive to monitor the performance of executive management through board of commissioners than those SOEs that are fully owned by the state government. It finds that compared to those fully SOEs, the partially-privatised SOEs are likely to have more board of commissioners. Even though this result is not statistically significant and, therefore, the proposed hypothesis is not statistically supported, the regression statistical analysis reveals that control variables assist in explaining the size of board of commissioners. The size of the board of directors as a control variable is significantly associated with the size of the board of commissioners. Other control variables including size of the SOE as well as the return on equity measure moderately explain the size of the board of commissioners. The findings give insight to stakeholders such as regulators or the private sector investors interested in making investment decisions in Indonesia considering the ownership structure and the effect on the effectiveness of the board of commissioners.