J. H. Snider
Research Subjects
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 21 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
The Development of the Periodic State Constitutional Convention Referendum Since America’s Founding
Fourteen U.S. state constitutions mandate a periodic state constitutional convention referendum (PCCR), with the specified period between referendums ranging from ten to twenty years. PCCR grants the people three votes: 1) whether to call a constitutional convention, 2) if called, who to elect as convention delegates, and 3) whether to approve the constitutional changes proposed by the convention. These votes correspond to granting the people a type of constitutional “initiation,” “proposal,” and “ratification” power, with the grant of direct initiation power what separates PCCR from the constitutional convention. Through the prism of what this article labels Legislature Bypass Theory, a variant of Constituent Power Theory, this article discusses the development of PCCR since America’s founding, with a focus on its legal, intellectual, and political history.
- 21 March 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessThe Development of the Periodic State Constitutional Convention Referendum Since America’s Founding
Fourteen U.S. state constitutions mandate a periodic state constitutional convention referendum (PCCR), with the specified period between referendums ranging from ten to twenty years. PCCR grants the people three votes: 1) whether to call a constitutional convention, 2) if called, who to elect as convention delegates, and 3) whether to approve the constitutional changes proposed by the convention. These votes correspond to granting the people a type of constitutional “initiation,” “proposal,” and “ratification” power, with the grant of direct initiation power what separates PCCR from the constitutional convention. Through the prism of what this article labels Legislature Bypass Theory, a variant of Constituent Power Theory, this article discusses the development of PCCR since America’s founding, with a focus on its legal, intellectual, and political history.
- Open Access
- 27 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Campaign Spending Law & Politics for Constitutional Convention Referendums: A Case Study of Alaska
Fourteen U.S. state constitutions, including Alaska, require that at periodic intervals the people have the right to call a constitutional convention via a referendum. Alaska’s period is every ten years, and its last such referendum was in 2022. Its referendum illustrates certain latent tendencies of convention referendum law and politics, including severe collective action problems and corresponding campaign finance imbalances that campaign finance disclosure laws have not rectified. On a per capita basis, Alaska’s convention referendum had the fourth highest combined “yes” and “no” contributions and highest “no” and dark money contributions among the 140 U.S. state ballot measures across 38 U.S. states in 2022. High spending by the “no” campaign continued even after the “no” campaign knew it was essentially assured of victory. Such spending may be designed to deter future “yes” campaigns in Alaska and other states.
- 27 January 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in APSA Preprints
Open AccessCampaign Spending Law & Politics for Constitutional Convention Referendums: A Case Study of Alaska
Fourteen U.S. state constitutions, including Alaska, require that at periodic intervals the people have the right to call a constitutional convention via a referendum. Alaska’s period is every ten years, and its last such referendum was in 2022. Its referendum illustrates certain latent tendencies of convention referendum law and politics, including severe collective action problems and corresponding campaign finance imbalances that campaign finance disclosure laws have not rectified. On a per capita basis, Alaska’s convention referendum had the fourth highest combined “yes” and “no” contributions and highest “no” and dark money contributions among the 140 U.S. state ballot measures across 38 U.S. states in 2022. High spending by the “no” campaign continued even after the “no” campaign knew it was essentially assured of victory. Such spending may be designed to deter future “yes” campaigns in Alaska and other states.
- Open Access
- 13 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The State Con-Con Papers
The State Con-Con Papers is a collection of J.H. Snider’s essays on the history, democratic function, and politics of the periodic state constitutional convention referendum, which is mandated by 14 U.S. state constitutions. The essays, organized chronologically, cover four of the most recent referendums: Hawaii (2018), New York (2017), Rhode Island (2014), and Maryland (2010). In each of these four states, the convention referendum is the only constitutional mechanism that allows the people — the sovereign — to bypass the state legislature’s gatekeeping power over constitutional amendment. The title, The State Con-Con Papers, draws an analogy with The Federalist Papers, a famous collection of newspaper commentaries that discuss the proposals generated by America’s 1787 constitutional convention.
- 13 August 2018
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe State Con-Con Papers
The State Con-Con Papers is a collection of J.H. Snider’s essays on the history, democratic function, and politics of the periodic state constitutional convention referendum, which is mandated by 14 U.S. state constitutions. The essays, organized chronologically, cover four of the most recent referendums: Hawaii (2018), New York (2017), Rhode Island (2014), and Maryland (2010). In each of these four states, the convention referendum is the only constitutional mechanism that allows the people — the sovereign — to bypass the state legislature’s gatekeeping power over constitutional amendment. The title, The State Con-Con Papers, draws an analogy with The Federalist Papers, a famous collection of newspaper commentaries that discuss the proposals generated by America’s 1787 constitutional convention.
- 1 March 2017
- Published by University of Chicago Press in American Political Thought
- Vol. 6 (2) , 256-293
Does the World Really Belong to the Living? The Decline of the Constitutional Convention in New York and Other US States, 1776–2015
In the preamble to the US Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson wrote that people have an “unalienable” right “to alter” their government. A total of 37 US states would eventually include in their state constitutions a similar provision promising the people the right at all times to alter or reform their government. Jefferson would later also argue that people should have a right to alter their constitution at periodic intervals. Eventually, 14 states, including New York, would adopt a constitutional provision implementing such a right. The distinctive democratic function of that right—except in states with the constitutional initiative—is that it allows the people to bypass the legislature’s gatekeeping power over constitutional reform. This article explains the long-term structural forces leading to increased opposition to calling a state constitutional convention. Some of these forces signal democratic dysfunction and should be cause for alarm.
- 1 March 2017
- Published by University of Chicago Press in American Political Thought
- Vol. 6 (2) , 256-293
Does the World Really Belong to the Living? The Decline of the Constitutional Convention in New York and Other US States, 1776–2015
In the preamble to the US Declaration of Independence, Thomas Jefferson wrote that people have an “unalienable” right “to alter” their government. A total of 37 US states would eventually include in their state constitutions a similar provision promising the people the right at all times to alter or reform their government. Jefferson would later also argue that people should have a right to alter their constitution at periodic intervals. Eventually, 14 states, including New York, would adopt a constitutional provision implementing such a right. The distinctive democratic function of that right—except in states with the constitutional initiative—is that it allows the people to bypass the legislature’s gatekeeping power over constitutional reform. This article explains the long-term structural forces leading to increased opposition to calling a state constitutional convention. Some of these forces signal democratic dysfunction and should be cause for alarm.
- 3 October 2003
- Published by Wiley in National Civic Review
- Vol. 92 (3) , 20-29
Should the public meeting enter the information age?
- 3 October 2003
- Published by Wiley in National Civic Review
- Vol. 92 (3) , 20-29
Should the public meeting enter the information age?