Héctor Marín Manrique
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Héctor Marín Manrique has a total of 52 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Michael John Walker
University of Murcia
13 shared publications Michael J. Walker
Department of Zoology and Physical Anthropology, Faculty of Biology, University of Murcia, 30100 Murcia, Spain
8 shared publications- Josep Call
School of Psychology and Neuroscience, University of St. Andrews, St. Andrews, UK
6 shared publications - Karl John Friston
Institute of Neurology, University College London
5 shared publications C M.G. Aragon
3 shared publications- Dwight W. Read
UCLA
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
- p. 1-12
Handling of Reputation-Damaging Information in Adolescents and Young Adults With Autism
Purpose: This study investigated how adolescents and young adults, both with and without Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), handle and disseminate gossip, particularly when it involves norm-violating, reputation-damaging information. Methods: We presented participants with a series of narratives in which a fictional character either adhered to or violated established social norms and asked participants whether they would disclose the newly acquired information. Results: We found that negative content—especially involving norm transgressions—was 1.5 times more likely to be shared, regardless of neurodevelopmental profile. Surprisingly, participants across both groups—those with ASD and those without—were equally likely to disseminate harmful gossip, challenging assumptions about reduced reputational sensitivity among autistic participants. However, differences emerged in qualitative patterns: participants in the comparison group often preferred peer recipients and cited reputational protection as a reason for withholding gossip, while participants in the autistic sample more frequently shared information with authority figures and did not reference reputational concerns. Conclusion: These tendencies suggest that individuals in the comparison group may be more motivated by social affiliation, whereas their age-matched autistic counterparts may place greater emphasis on norm enforcement. Overall, our results highlight a communicative hierarchy in which norm-related information takes precedence. Given that the autistic sample had a significantly lower mean IQ than the comparison sample, caution is warranted when generalizing these findings to the broader population of autistic adolescents and young adults.
- 28 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders
- p. 1-12
Open AccessHandling of Reputation-Damaging Information in Adolescents and Young Adults With Autism
Purpose: This study investigated how adolescents and young adults, both with and without Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), handle and disseminate gossip, particularly when it involves norm-violating, reputation-damaging information. Methods: We presented participants with a series of narratives in which a fictional character either adhered to or violated established social norms and asked participants whether they would disclose the newly acquired information. Results: We found that negative content—especially involving norm transgressions—was 1.5 times more likely to be shared, regardless of neurodevelopmental profile. Surprisingly, participants across both groups—those with ASD and those without—were equally likely to disseminate harmful gossip, challenging assumptions about reduced reputational sensitivity among autistic participants. However, differences emerged in qualitative patterns: participants in the comparison group often preferred peer recipients and cited reputational protection as a reason for withholding gossip, while participants in the autistic sample more frequently shared information with authority figures and did not reference reputational concerns. Conclusion: These tendencies suggest that individuals in the comparison group may be more motivated by social affiliation, whereas their age-matched autistic counterparts may place greater emphasis on norm enforcement. Overall, our results highlight a communicative hierarchy in which norm-related information takes precedence. Given that the autistic sample had a significantly lower mean IQ than the comparison sample, caution is warranted when generalizing these findings to the broader population of autistic adolescents and young adults.
- Open Access
- 7 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Handling of reputation-damaging information in adolescents and young adults with autism
Purpose: This study investigated how adolescents and young adults, both with and without Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), handle and disseminate gossip, particularly when it involves norm-violating, reputation-damaging information. Methods: We presented participants with a series of narratives in which a fictional character either adhered to or violated established social norms, and asked participants whether they would disclose the newly acquired information. Results: We found that negative content—especially involving norm transgressions—was 1.5 times more likely to be shared, regardless of neurodevelopmental profile. Surprisingly, participants across both groups—those with ASD and those without—were equally likely to disseminate harmful gossip, challenging assumptions about reduced reputational sensitivity among autistic participants. However, differences emerged in qualitative patterns: participants in the comparison group often preferred peer recipients and cited reputational protection as a reason for withholding gossip, while participants in the autistic sample more frequently shared information with authority figures and did not reference reputational concerns. Conclusion: These tendencies suggest that individuals in the comparison group may be more motivated by social affiliation, whereas their age-matched autistic counterparts may place greater emphasis on norm enforcement. The findings align with the view that gossip serves dual functions: as a moral tool to sanction norm violations and as an epistemic tool to update a group’s collective knowledge. Overall, our results highlight a communicative hierarchy in which norm-related information takes precedence.
- 7 July 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessHandling of reputation-damaging information in adolescents and young adults with autism
Purpose: This study investigated how adolescents and young adults, both with and without Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), handle and disseminate gossip, particularly when it involves norm-violating, reputation-damaging information. Methods: We presented participants with a series of narratives in which a fictional character either adhered to or violated established social norms, and asked participants whether they would disclose the newly acquired information. Results: We found that negative content—especially involving norm transgressions—was 1.5 times more likely to be shared, regardless of neurodevelopmental profile. Surprisingly, participants across both groups—those with ASD and those without—were equally likely to disseminate harmful gossip, challenging assumptions about reduced reputational sensitivity among autistic participants. However, differences emerged in qualitative patterns: participants in the comparison group often preferred peer recipients and cited reputational protection as a reason for withholding gossip, while participants in the autistic sample more frequently shared information with authority figures and did not reference reputational concerns. Conclusion: These tendencies suggest that individuals in the comparison group may be more motivated by social affiliation, whereas their age-matched autistic counterparts may place greater emphasis on norm enforcement. The findings align with the view that gossip serves dual functions: as a moral tool to sanction norm violations and as an epistemic tool to update a group’s collective knowledge. Overall, our results highlight a communicative hierarchy in which norm-related information takes precedence.
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Let there be information: rethinking cultural evolution
Prevailing accounts of cognitive evolution and cumulative culture frequently rely on narrative reconstructions and analogical projections, extrapolating from contemporary human cognition to infer the mental capacities of extinct humans. While such approaches may illuminate recent cultural developments, their applicability to deep prehistory is limited. We propose an alternative framework grounded in the thermodynamic imperative shared by several past and present members of the genus Homo: the reduction of entropy in organism–environment interactions. Central to this framework is the concept of Zones of Bounded Surprisal (ZBS), which formalises adaptive cognition in terms of the capacity to register, tolerate, and integrate new (surprising) information. Rather than treating cultural accumulation as having been continuous, uninterrupted and progressive, ZBS foregrounds information as a driver of evolutionary dynamics relevant in natural selection. We argue that stone-age vagaries of cultural evolution in Homo should be considered from the standpoint of the transmissibility of information between preliterate human beings — with variably evolving ZBS — under different demographic, social, and material constraints. This account foregrounds the role of ZBS in adaptive engagement with novelty and epistemic affordances by extant and extinct Homo.
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessLet there be information: rethinking cultural evolution
Prevailing accounts of cognitive evolution and cumulative culture frequently rely on narrative reconstructions and analogical projections, extrapolating from contemporary human cognition to infer the mental capacities of extinct humans. While such approaches may illuminate recent cultural developments, their applicability to deep prehistory is limited. We propose an alternative framework grounded in the thermodynamic imperative shared by several past and present members of the genus Homo: the reduction of entropy in organism–environment interactions. Central to this framework is the concept of Zones of Bounded Surprisal (ZBS), which formalises adaptive cognition in terms of the capacity to register, tolerate, and integrate new (surprising) information. Rather than treating cultural accumulation as having been continuous, uninterrupted and progressive, ZBS foregrounds information as a driver of evolutionary dynamics relevant in natural selection. We argue that stone-age vagaries of cultural evolution in Homo should be considered from the standpoint of the transmissibility of information between preliterate human beings — with variably evolving ZBS — under different demographic, social, and material constraints. This account foregrounds the role of ZBS in adaptive engagement with novelty and epistemic affordances by extant and extinct Homo.
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Active inference contributes to a unified theory of cognitive development.
It is argued that the well-known approaches of Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky to developmental psychology can be harmonised by taking the standpoint of “active inference” which over the past two decades has attracted the attention of an increasing number of researchers in cognitive psychology, computation, and neuroscience, influenced by the psychiatrist and neuroscientist Karl Friston and his colleagues. The argument advanced in this work tentatively indicates that a recalibration of educational policy may be warranted in the context of contemporary schooling. In particular, the rapid emergence of artificial intelligence introduces the plausible prospect of machine-assisted instruction assuming a partial role in functions traditionally performed by human educators. This invites a critical re-examination of existing pedagogical frameworks, particularly regarding how latest technologies can be integrated in ways that enhance– rather than undermine – the professional and relational dimensions of teaching.
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessActive inference contributes to a unified theory of cognitive development.
It is argued that the well-known approaches of Jean Piaget and Lev Vygotsky to developmental psychology can be harmonised by taking the standpoint of “active inference” which over the past two decades has attracted the attention of an increasing number of researchers in cognitive psychology, computation, and neuroscience, influenced by the psychiatrist and neuroscientist Karl Friston and his colleagues. The argument advanced in this work tentatively indicates that a recalibration of educational policy may be warranted in the context of contemporary schooling. In particular, the rapid emergence of artificial intelligence introduces the plausible prospect of machine-assisted instruction assuming a partial role in functions traditionally performed by human educators. This invites a critical re-examination of existing pedagogical frameworks, particularly regarding how latest technologies can be integrated in ways that enhance– rather than undermine – the professional and relational dimensions of teaching.
- Open Access
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in BioSystems
- Vol. 264, 105793
An active inference explanation of discriminatory cognition with regard to social attitudes and harmful behaviour
- 30 April 2026
- Published by Elsevier in BioSystems
- Vol. 264, 105793
Open AccessAn active inference explanation of discriminatory cognition with regard to social attitudes and harmful behaviour
- Open Access
- 25 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Active Inference dissolves the Moore paradox
Moore’s paradox, exemplified by statements such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining”, highlights a tension between belief and assertion that is logically possible yet pragmatically puzzling. While extensively discussed in philosophy and cognitive science, the paradox has lacked a mechanistic explanation grounded in neuroscience or cognitive processing. Recent work suggests that the paradox is pragmatic or perspectival rather than semantic, emphasizing its relation to theory of mind. This paper proposes a mechanistic account using the framework of Active Inference and the Hierarchical Mechanistic Mind (HMM), in which the brain functions as a hierarchically structured predictive engine. From this perspective, Moorean statements generate a conflict in self-model precision weighting, simultaneously encoding high and low confidence in the same belief, which the HMM cannot reconcile without internal instability. This approach reframes the paradox not as a linguistic anomaly but as an illustration of the default workings of the mind. Crucially, it supports a reversal of the commonsense view of perception: experiences arise from high-precision beliefs rather than the other way around. The analysis underscores that belief is constitutive of conscious experience, offering a neurocognitive account that bridges philosophical insight and empirical modelling.
- 25 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessActive Inference dissolves the Moore paradox
Moore’s paradox, exemplified by statements such as “It is raining but I do not believe that it is raining”, highlights a tension between belief and assertion that is logically possible yet pragmatically puzzling. While extensively discussed in philosophy and cognitive science, the paradox has lacked a mechanistic explanation grounded in neuroscience or cognitive processing. Recent work suggests that the paradox is pragmatic or perspectival rather than semantic, emphasizing its relation to theory of mind. This paper proposes a mechanistic account using the framework of Active Inference and the Hierarchical Mechanistic Mind (HMM), in which the brain functions as a hierarchically structured predictive engine. From this perspective, Moorean statements generate a conflict in self-model precision weighting, simultaneously encoding high and low confidence in the same belief, which the HMM cannot reconcile without internal instability. This approach reframes the paradox not as a linguistic anomaly but as an illustration of the default workings of the mind. Crucially, it supports a reversal of the commonsense view of perception: experiences arise from high-precision beliefs rather than the other way around. The analysis underscores that belief is constitutive of conscious experience, offering a neurocognitive account that bridges philosophical insight and empirical modelling.
- 12 December 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Physics of Life Reviews
- Vol. 56, 115-117
Informational inbreeding: a useful concept to add to extant evolutionary theories: Comment on “Homo informatio” by Michael J. Walker
- 12 December 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Physics of Life Reviews
- Vol. 56, 115-117
Informational inbreeding: a useful concept to add to extant evolutionary theories: Comment on “Homo informatio” by Michael J. Walker
- Open Access
- 11 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
An active inference explanation of discriminatory cognition with regard to social attitudes and harmful behaviour
This paper offers an active inference narrative that considers deeply-held social attitudes and beliefs in relation to the cognitive concept of zones of bounded surprisal (ZBS) proposed by Manrique and Walker (2023). It is argued that narrow ZBS band-widths characterise the discriminatory minds of people who see themselves as an in-group. They tend not to be indignant or outspoken, but, instead, acquiescent and silent, when they witness poor behaviour of those whom otherwise they regard as members of their in-group. Plausibly, when such behaviour harms other people, as, for instance, in racist or gender-based violence, its perpetrators have a very narrow ZBS band-width: one that likely is a characteristic of dehumanising minds. Because such perpetrators see themselves as members of an in-group with entitlement to control aspects of society, they humiliate or abuse out-groups to which they assign others, and have no compunction about violating their dignity or human rights. We briefly consider policies that could lessen the unwelcome social repercussions of the behaviour of people with discriminatory and dehumanising minds.
- 11 November 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in OSF Preprints
Open AccessAn active inference explanation of discriminatory cognition with regard to social attitudes and harmful behaviour
This paper offers an active inference narrative that considers deeply-held social attitudes and beliefs in relation to the cognitive concept of zones of bounded surprisal (ZBS) proposed by Manrique and Walker (2023). It is argued that narrow ZBS band-widths characterise the discriminatory minds of people who see themselves as an in-group. They tend not to be indignant or outspoken, but, instead, acquiescent and silent, when they witness poor behaviour of those whom otherwise they regard as members of their in-group. Plausibly, when such behaviour harms other people, as, for instance, in racist or gender-based violence, its perpetrators have a very narrow ZBS band-width: one that likely is a characteristic of dehumanising minds. Because such perpetrators see themselves as members of an in-group with entitlement to control aspects of society, they humiliate or abuse out-groups to which they assign others, and have no compunction about violating their dignity or human rights. We briefly consider policies that could lessen the unwelcome social repercussions of the behaviour of people with discriminatory and dehumanising minds.
- Open Access
- 15 July 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Time-warps
Time and space are conflated in time-warps when asleep we dream. Our wakeful cognitive ability to keep them separate indicates different ways of envisaging self-hood. Awareness that dream-time and life-time are separate is itself a propensity of human minds that has evolved by natural selection with adaptive developments in cerebral neuronal circuitry that underpin human behavioural complexity. The contrast is highlighted between how memory of our spatio-temporal experiences appears to be treated by our brain one way when we are wide-awake and thus well aware of our unfolding personal life-history, and in a different way when, fast asleep, our dreaming dissolves any such awareness and our oneiric self-hood seems different from our real-life self-hood. The difference is considered from two angles. Regarding simultaneous memory-storage for an experience recalled from alternative perspectives, a theoretical possibility is proposed of a pro-system comparable to Cantor Ternary Set topology. Regarding the brain, the difference is considered in relation to the temporo-spatial theory of consciousness and the compatible concept of active inference forestalling surprisal by minimising variational free energy according to the free energy principle.
- 15 July 2024
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessTime-warps
Time and space are conflated in time-warps when asleep we dream. Our wakeful cognitive ability to keep them separate indicates different ways of envisaging self-hood. Awareness that dream-time and life-time are separate is itself a propensity of human minds that has evolved by natural selection with adaptive developments in cerebral neuronal circuitry that underpin human behavioural complexity. The contrast is highlighted between how memory of our spatio-temporal experiences appears to be treated by our brain one way when we are wide-awake and thus well aware of our unfolding personal life-history, and in a different way when, fast asleep, our dreaming dissolves any such awareness and our oneiric self-hood seems different from our real-life self-hood. The difference is considered from two angles. Regarding simultaneous memory-storage for an experience recalled from alternative perspectives, a theoretical possibility is proposed of a pro-system comparable to Cantor Ternary Set topology. Regarding the brain, the difference is considered in relation to the temporo-spatial theory of consciousness and the compatible concept of active inference forestalling surprisal by minimising variational free energy according to the free energy principle.
- Open Access
- 13 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
- Vol. 158, 105543
On some statistical and cerebral aspects of the limits of working memory capacity in anthropoid primates, with particular reference to Pan and Homo, and their significance for human evolution
- 13 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews
- Vol. 158, 105543
Open AccessOn some statistical and cerebral aspects of the limits of working memory capacity in anthropoid primates, with particular reference to Pan and Homo, and their significance for human evolution