Shanna Rose
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Shanna Rose has a total of 1 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniel L. Smith
New York University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 26 December 2014
- Published by MIT Press
- p. 135-176
Federal Budget Reform
In this chapter, Shanna Rose and Daniel Smith investigate the extent to which various state budgetary rules have been successful in imposing fiscal discipline on U.S. state governments, and whether such provisions should be considered by the federal government as a means of promoting fiscal sustainability. They find that (1) balanced budget amendments have been fairly successful in limiting debts and deficits, especially in states that have rules that preclude carryover of deficits across budget years, (2) studies on state debt limits have been inconclusive regarding their success in limiting government spending, and (3) state tax and expenditure limits and the line item veto have had little success in restraining spending. The experience of state and local governments suggests that fiscal institutions have the potential to promote long-term fiscal sustainability. They conclude by noting that institutional and political barriers will make it difficult to impose such constraints on the federal government, but that such barriers may be surmountable, given the urgency of the current fiscal situation.
- 26 December 2014
- Published by MIT Press
- p. 135-176
Federal Budget Reform
In this chapter, Shanna Rose and Daniel Smith investigate the extent to which various state budgetary rules have been successful in imposing fiscal discipline on U.S. state governments, and whether such provisions should be considered by the federal government as a means of promoting fiscal sustainability. They find that (1) balanced budget amendments have been fairly successful in limiting debts and deficits, especially in states that have rules that preclude carryover of deficits across budget years, (2) studies on state debt limits have been inconclusive regarding their success in limiting government spending, and (3) state tax and expenditure limits and the line item veto have had little success in restraining spending. The experience of state and local governments suggests that fiscal institutions have the potential to promote long-term fiscal sustainability. They conclude by noting that institutional and political barriers will make it difficult to impose such constraints on the federal government, but that such barriers may be surmountable, given the urgency of the current fiscal situation.
- 17 November 2011
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration Review
- Vol. 72 (2) , 187-195
Budget Slack, Institutions, and Transparency
Economic theory suggests that it is optimal for governments to use precautionary saving as a countercyclical tool. However, the availability of surplus funds often triggers political pressure for tax cuts and spending increases. Mechanisms for alleviating that pressure include limiting the transparency of slack resources and limiting politicians’ discretion to use slack resources for purposes other than stabilization. This article investigates the extent to which these two mechanisms are substitutes. In particular, the authors examine whether the widespread adoption of budget stabilization funds (BSFs) in the U.S. states over the past several decades has been accompanied by a decline in conservative revenue forecast bias. Using panel data from 47 states over a 22‐year period, they find that the adoption of a BSF reduces revenue underestimation by approximately two‐thirds; however, the size of the effect depends in part on how much a state saves in the BSF and the rules governing BSF deposits and withdrawals. The results suggest that BSFs have the unintended effect of increasing fiscal transparency.
- 17 November 2011
- Published by Wiley in Public Administration Review
- Vol. 72 (2) , 187-195
Budget Slack, Institutions, and Transparency
Economic theory suggests that it is optimal for governments to use precautionary saving as a countercyclical tool. However, the availability of surplus funds often triggers political pressure for tax cuts and spending increases. Mechanisms for alleviating that pressure include limiting the transparency of slack resources and limiting politicians’ discretion to use slack resources for purposes other than stabilization. This article investigates the extent to which these two mechanisms are substitutes. In particular, the authors examine whether the widespread adoption of budget stabilization funds (BSFs) in the U.S. states over the past several decades has been accompanied by a decline in conservative revenue forecast bias. Using panel data from 47 states over a 22‐year period, they find that the adoption of a BSF reduces revenue underestimation by approximately two‐thirds; however, the size of the effect depends in part on how much a state saves in the BSF and the rules governing BSF deposits and withdrawals. The results suggest that BSFs have the unintended effect of increasing fiscal transparency.