Lucian Cojocar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Lucian Cojocar has a total of 13 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Herbert Bos
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
5 shared publications - Cristiano Giuffrida
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam, Amsterdam, Netherlands
2 shared publications Kaveh Razavi
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
2 shared publicationsAshish Kumar
1 shared publicationAurélien Francillon
EURECOM
1 shared publicationDavide Balzarotti
EURECOM
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 55-71
Exploiting Correcting Codes: On the Effectiveness of ECC Memory Against Rowhammer Attacks
Given the increasing impact of Rowhammer, and the dearth of adequate other hardware defenses, many in the security community have pinned their hopes on error-correcting code (ECC) memory as one of the few practical defenses against Rowhammer attacks. Specifically, the expectation is that the ECC algorithm will correct or detect any bits they manage to flip in memory in real-world settings. However, the extent to which ECC really protects against Rowhammer is an open research question, due to two key challenges. First, the details of the ECC implementations in commodity systems are not known. Second, existing Rowhammer exploitation techniques cannot yield reliable attacks in presence of ECC memory. In this paper, we address both challenges and provide concrete evidence of the susceptibility of ECC memory to Rowhammer attacks. To address the first challenge, we describe a novel approach that combines a custom-made hardware probe, Rowhammer bit flips, and a cold boot attack to reverse engineer ECC functions on commodity AMD and Intel processors. To address the second challenge, we present ECCploit, a new Rowhammer attack based on composable, data-controlled bit flips and a novel side channel in the ECC memory controller. We show that, while ECC memory does reduce the attack surface for Rowhammer, ECCploit still allows an attacker to mount reliable Rowhammer attacks against vulnerable ECC memory on a variety of systems and configurations. In addition, we show that, despite the non-trivial constraints imposed by ECC, ECCploit can still be powerful in practice and mimic the behavior of prior Rowhammer exploits.
- 1 May 2019
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- p. 55-71
Exploiting Correcting Codes: On the Effectiveness of ECC Memory Against Rowhammer Attacks
Given the increasing impact of Rowhammer, and the dearth of adequate other hardware defenses, many in the security community have pinned their hopes on error-correcting code (ECC) memory as one of the few practical defenses against Rowhammer attacks. Specifically, the expectation is that the ECC algorithm will correct or detect any bits they manage to flip in memory in real-world settings. However, the extent to which ECC really protects against Rowhammer is an open research question, due to two key challenges. First, the details of the ECC implementations in commodity systems are not known. Second, existing Rowhammer exploitation techniques cannot yield reliable attacks in presence of ECC memory. In this paper, we address both challenges and provide concrete evidence of the susceptibility of ECC memory to Rowhammer attacks. To address the first challenge, we describe a novel approach that combines a custom-made hardware probe, Rowhammer bit flips, and a cold boot attack to reverse engineer ECC functions on commodity AMD and Intel processors. To address the second challenge, we present ECCploit, a new Rowhammer attack based on composable, data-controlled bit flips and a novel side channel in the ECC memory controller. We show that, while ECC memory does reduce the attack surface for Rowhammer, ECCploit still allows an attacker to mount reliable Rowhammer attacks against vulnerable ECC memory on a variety of systems and configurations. In addition, we show that, despite the non-trivial constraints imposed by ECC, ECCploit can still be powerful in practice and mimic the behavior of prior Rowhammer exploits.
- 26 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 160-179
Instruction Duplication: Leaky and Not Too Fault-Tolerant!
- 26 January 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 160-179
Instruction Duplication: Leaky and Not Too Fault-Tolerant!
- Open Access
- 23 April 2017
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Off-the-shelf Embedded Devices as Platforms for Security Research
With increasing concerns about the security and trustworthiness of embedded devices, the importance of research on their firmware is growing. Unfortunately, researchers with new ideas for improving the security of these devices (e.g., fuzzing) or studying adversarial scenarios (e.g., malware) face massive hurdles when applying them to actual hardware. To conduct realistic experiments, we need real-world hardware that can be easily used for security research. Unfortunately, such devices are scarce and depend entirely on efforts by the hacker community. In this paper, we describe two new devices that we have opened up, a programmable logic controller (PLC) and a solid sate drive (SSD). These two types of devices have not been previously reverse engineered and they are both interesting cases given the recent developments on the security of embedded devices and the rise of Internet of Things. We discuss possible new directions with these two \"real-world\" research platforms. We further make the results of our efforts available to the security community in order to make it easier to get started in this research area.
- 23 April 2017
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-6
Open AccessOff-the-shelf Embedded Devices as Platforms for Security Research
With increasing concerns about the security and trustworthiness of embedded devices, the importance of research on their firmware is growing. Unfortunately, researchers with new ideas for improving the security of these devices (e.g., fuzzing) or studying adversarial scenarios (e.g., malware) face massive hurdles when applying them to actual hardware. To conduct realistic experiments, we need real-world hardware that can be easily used for security research. Unfortunately, such devices are scarce and depend entirely on efforts by the hacker community. In this paper, we describe two new devices that we have opened up, a programmable logic controller (PLC) and a solid sate drive (SSD). These two types of devices have not been previously reverse engineered and they are both interesting cases given the recent developments on the security of embedded devices and the rise of Internet of Things. We discuss possible new directions with these two \"real-world\" research platforms. We further make the results of our efforts available to the security community in order to make it easier to get started in this research area.
- Open Access
- 7 December 2015
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 251-260
PIE
Embedded systems are responsible for the security and safety of modern societies, controlling the correct operation of cars and airplanes, satellites and medical equipment, military units and all critical infrastructures. Being integrated in large and complex environments, embedded systems need to support several communication protocols to interact with other devices or with their users. Interestingly, embedded software often implements protocols that deviate from their original specifications. Some are extended with additional features, while others are completely undocumented. Furthermore, embedded parsers often consist of complex C code which is optimized to improve performance and reduce size. However, this code is rarely designed with security in mind, and often lacks proper input validation, making those devices vulnerable to memory corruption attacks. Furthermore, most embedded designs are closed source and third party security evaluations are only possible by looking at the binary firmware. In this paper we propose a methodology to identify parsers and complex processing logic present in binary code without access to their source code or documentation. Specifically we establish and evaluate a heuristic for detecting this type of code by means of static analysis. Afterwards we demonstrate the utility of this heuristic to identify firmware components treating input, perform reverse engineering to extract protocols, and discover and analyze bugs on four widely used devices: a GPS receiver, a power meter, a hard disk drive (HDD) and a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC).
- 7 December 2015
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 251-260
Open AccessPIE
Embedded systems are responsible for the security and safety of modern societies, controlling the correct operation of cars and airplanes, satellites and medical equipment, military units and all critical infrastructures. Being integrated in large and complex environments, embedded systems need to support several communication protocols to interact with other devices or with their users. Interestingly, embedded software often implements protocols that deviate from their original specifications. Some are extended with additional features, while others are completely undocumented. Furthermore, embedded parsers often consist of complex C code which is optimized to improve performance and reduce size. However, this code is rarely designed with security in mind, and often lacks proper input validation, making those devices vulnerable to memory corruption attacks. Furthermore, most embedded designs are closed source and third party security evaluations are only possible by looking at the binary firmware. In this paper we propose a methodology to identify parsers and complex processing logic present in binary code without access to their source code or documentation. Specifically we establish and evaluate a heuristic for detecting this type of code by means of static analysis. Afterwards we demonstrate the utility of this heuristic to identify firmware components treating input, perform reverse engineering to extract protocols, and discover and analyze bugs on four widely used devices: a GPS receiver, a power meter, a hard disk drive (HDD) and a Programmable Logic Controller (PLC).