Guilherme Messas
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Guilherme Messas has a total of 34 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Giovanni Stanghellini
Department of Health Sciences, University of Florence, Florence, Italy
3 shared publications- Francesca Brencio
University of Birmingham
2 shared publications Lívia Fukuda
Santa Casa de São Paulo School of Medical Sciences, São Paulo, Brazil
2 shared publicationsMelissa Tamelini
University of São Paulo
2 shared publications- Anthony Vincent Fernandez
University of Southern Denmark
1 shared publication - Antonia Elvira Tonus
PUC-SP
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 16 March 2026
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Psicopatologia Fenomeno-Estrutural in Revista Psicopatologia Fenomenológica Contemporânea
- Vol. 15 (1) , 39-64
From “Things” to Structures
The general aim of this contribution is to discuss a dilemma which lies in the conception and exercise of psychiatry. This dilemma lies in the recognition that, on one hand the reified model for describing and understanding mental health is not sufficient for overcoming a Kraepelinian paradigm still influent in psychiatry; on the other hand, that despite this recognition we are still stuck with this theoretical model. To overcome this aporia, we propose a theoretical hypothesis which may contribute to abandon the reified paradigm in favor of a different approach for which what is at the stake in mental health conditions are not “things” happening in the brain, rather variations of subjective and intersubjective structures. Put it differently, “mental diseases” may not be seen as brain disorders, as the naturalist reductionism proposes, and as consequence, localized in the brain. Drawing on resources from classical phenomenological literature and its recent dialogue with enactivism, we propose a dialectic model of phenomenology, the use of which may contribute to the understanding of these variations and pave the route to a different consideration of mental health conditions. To explain our proposal, this paper is divided into three sections: in the first section, we appraise critically the epistemological model in psychiatry starting from the legacy of the Kraepelinian heritage still influent in this specialty and moving toward a more fine-grained model for describing and understanding mental health conditions. In the second section, we provide a theoretical hypothesis, namely the dialectic model of phenomenology, able to elicit the variations of the subjective and intersubjective structures that are at the core of mental health condition. In doing so, we examine four cardinal elements: ambiguity, reciprocity, negativity and betweenness, which dialectically shape the fundamental structures of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In the last section, we present some of the characteristics that phenomenological psychopathology assumes from a dialectical perspective in the paradigmatic case of schizophrenia.
- 16 March 2026
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Psicopatologia Fenomeno-Estrutural in Revista Psicopatologia Fenomenológica Contemporânea
- Vol. 15 (1) , 39-64
Open AccessFrom “Things” to Structures
The general aim of this contribution is to discuss a dilemma which lies in the conception and exercise of psychiatry. This dilemma lies in the recognition that, on one hand the reified model for describing and understanding mental health is not sufficient for overcoming a Kraepelinian paradigm still influent in psychiatry; on the other hand, that despite this recognition we are still stuck with this theoretical model. To overcome this aporia, we propose a theoretical hypothesis which may contribute to abandon the reified paradigm in favor of a different approach for which what is at the stake in mental health conditions are not “things” happening in the brain, rather variations of subjective and intersubjective structures. Put it differently, “mental diseases” may not be seen as brain disorders, as the naturalist reductionism proposes, and as consequence, localized in the brain. Drawing on resources from classical phenomenological literature and its recent dialogue with enactivism, we propose a dialectic model of phenomenology, the use of which may contribute to the understanding of these variations and pave the route to a different consideration of mental health conditions. To explain our proposal, this paper is divided into three sections: in the first section, we appraise critically the epistemological model in psychiatry starting from the legacy of the Kraepelinian heritage still influent in this specialty and moving toward a more fine-grained model for describing and understanding mental health conditions. In the second section, we provide a theoretical hypothesis, namely the dialectic model of phenomenology, able to elicit the variations of the subjective and intersubjective structures that are at the core of mental health condition. In doing so, we examine four cardinal elements: ambiguity, reciprocity, negativity and betweenness, which dialectically shape the fundamental structures of subjectivity and intersubjectivity. In the last section, we present some of the characteristics that phenomenological psychopathology assumes from a dialectical perspective in the paradigmatic case of schizophrenia.
- 29 December 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 431-434
Values in Alcohol Use Disorders
- 21 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Affective Disorders
- Vol. 369, 986-994
Topography of depressive experiences. A dialectic approach
- 21 October 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Affective Disorders
- Vol. 369, 986-994
Topography of depressive experiences. A dialectic approach
- 27 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1-20
Dialectics of addiction: a psychopathologically-enriched comprehension of the clinical care of the addicted person
- 27 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 25 (4) , 1-20
Dialectics of addiction: a psychopathologically-enriched comprehension of the clinical care of the addicted person
- 12 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 38 (1) , 189-208
Psychotherapy of the oppressed: the education of Paulo Freire in dialogue with phenomenology
- 12 February 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Philosophical Psychology
- Vol. 38 (1) , 189-208
Psychotherapy of the oppressed: the education of Paulo Freire in dialogue with phenomenology
- Open Access
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Instituto de Treinamento e Pesquisa em Gestalt Terapia in PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDIES - Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica
- Vol. 30 (02) , 193-204
A FALTA DE HABITUALIDADE COM AS REGRAS DO JOGO DA VIDA COTIDIANA NA ESQUIZOFRENIA: SOBRE A PERDA DA EVIDÊNCIA NATURAL EM WOLFGANG BLANKENBURG
O presente artigo busca reconstruir o argumento de Wolfgang Blankenburg, que caracteriza a experiência da esquizofrenia como uma falta de habitualidade em relação às regras do jogo da vida cotidiana. Em sua obra “A perda da evidência natural: uma contribuição à psicopatologia oligossintomática da esquizofrenia”, Blankenburg explora o caso clínico de Anne Rau, uma paciente que descreve sua dificuldade em reconhecer e seguir as "regras do jogo" que constituem a vida cotidiana, referindo-se a essa experiência como uma perda da "evidência natural". Utilizando os conceitos heideggerianos de "conjuntura" e "contexto remissivo", formulados em “Ser e Tempo”, este artigo realiza uma análise fenomenológica da relação de Anne Rau com essas regras. A ausência de habitualidade com as regras do jogo da vida cotidiana se manifesta em uma aparente falta de tato, comportamentos percebidos como estranhos e uma desorganização evidente em suas ações e discurso. Para compensar essa falta de habitualidade, Anne Rau recorre a um esforço reflexivo excessivo, o que dificulta até as situações mais simples.
- 1 January 2024
- Published by Instituto de Treinamento e Pesquisa em Gestalt Terapia in PHENOMENOLOGICAL STUDIES - Revista da Abordagem Gestáltica
- Vol. 30 (02) , 193-204
Open AccessA FALTA DE HABITUALIDADE COM AS REGRAS DO JOGO DA VIDA COTIDIANA NA ESQUIZOFRENIA: SOBRE A PERDA DA EVIDÊNCIA NATURAL EM WOLFGANG BLANKENBURG
O presente artigo busca reconstruir o argumento de Wolfgang Blankenburg, que caracteriza a experiência da esquizofrenia como uma falta de habitualidade em relação às regras do jogo da vida cotidiana. Em sua obra “A perda da evidência natural: uma contribuição à psicopatologia oligossintomática da esquizofrenia”, Blankenburg explora o caso clínico de Anne Rau, uma paciente que descreve sua dificuldade em reconhecer e seguir as "regras do jogo" que constituem a vida cotidiana, referindo-se a essa experiência como uma perda da "evidência natural". Utilizando os conceitos heideggerianos de "conjuntura" e "contexto remissivo", formulados em “Ser e Tempo”, este artigo realiza uma análise fenomenológica da relação de Anne Rau com essas regras. A ausência de habitualidade com as regras do jogo da vida cotidiana se manifesta em uma aparente falta de tato, comportamentos percebidos como estranhos e uma desorganização evidente em suas ações e discurso. Para compensar essa falta de habitualidade, Anne Rau recorre a um esforço reflexivo excessivo, o que dificulta até as situações mais simples.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 21 September 2023
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 14, 1240095
Phenomenology yesterday, today, and tomorrow: a proposed phenomenological response to the double challenges of contemporary recovery-oriented person-centered mental health care
This paper argues that a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology’s traditional twin roles in psychiatry (one science-centered, the other individual-centered) is needed to support the recovery-oriented practice that is at the heart of contemporary person-centered mental health care. The paper is in two main sections. Section I illustrates the different ways in which phenomenology’s two roles have played out over three significant periods of the history of phenomenology in 20th century psychiatry: with the introduction of phenomenology in Karl Jaspers’ General Psychopathology in 1913; with the development a few years later of structural phenomenological psychopathology; and in the period of post-War humanism. Section II is concerned with the role of phenomenology in contemporary mental health. There has been a turn to phenomenology in the current period, we argue, in response to what amounts to an uncoupling of academic psychiatry from front-line clinical care. Corresponding with the two roles of phenomenology, this uncoupling has both scientific aspects and clinical aspects. The latter, we suggest, is most fully expressed in a new model of “recovery,” defined, not by the values of professionals as experts-by-training, but by the values of patients and carers as experts-by-experience, specifically, by what is important to the quality of life of the individual concerned in the situation in question. We illustrate the importance of recovery, so defined, and the challenges raised by it for both the evidence-base and the values-base of clinical decision-making, with brief clinical vignettes. It is to these challenges we argue, that phenomenology through a synthesis of its twin roles is uniquely equipped to respond. Noting, however, the many barriers to such a synthesis, we argue that in the current state of development of the field, it is by way of a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology’s roles that we should proceed. From such a dialectic, a genuine synthesis of roles may ultimately emerge. We conclude with a note on the wider significance of these developments, arguing that contrary to 20th century stereotypes, they show psychiatry to be leading the way for healthcare as a whole, in developing the resources for 21st century person-centered clinical care.
- 21 September 2023
- Published by Frontiers Media SA in Frontiers in Psychology
- Vol. 14, 1240095
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessPhenomenology yesterday, today, and tomorrow: a proposed phenomenological response to the double challenges of contemporary recovery-oriented person-centered mental health care
This paper argues that a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology’s traditional twin roles in psychiatry (one science-centered, the other individual-centered) is needed to support the recovery-oriented practice that is at the heart of contemporary person-centered mental health care. The paper is in two main sections. Section I illustrates the different ways in which phenomenology’s two roles have played out over three significant periods of the history of phenomenology in 20th century psychiatry: with the introduction of phenomenology in Karl Jaspers’ General Psychopathology in 1913; with the development a few years later of structural phenomenological psychopathology; and in the period of post-War humanism. Section II is concerned with the role of phenomenology in contemporary mental health. There has been a turn to phenomenology in the current period, we argue, in response to what amounts to an uncoupling of academic psychiatry from front-line clinical care. Corresponding with the two roles of phenomenology, this uncoupling has both scientific aspects and clinical aspects. The latter, we suggest, is most fully expressed in a new model of “recovery,” defined, not by the values of professionals as experts-by-training, but by the values of patients and carers as experts-by-experience, specifically, by what is important to the quality of life of the individual concerned in the situation in question. We illustrate the importance of recovery, so defined, and the challenges raised by it for both the evidence-base and the values-base of clinical decision-making, with brief clinical vignettes. It is to these challenges we argue, that phenomenology through a synthesis of its twin roles is uniquely equipped to respond. Noting, however, the many barriers to such a synthesis, we argue that in the current state of development of the field, it is by way of a dialectical synthesis of phenomenology’s roles that we should proceed. From such a dialectic, a genuine synthesis of roles may ultimately emerge. We conclude with a note on the wider significance of these developments, arguing that contrary to 20th century stereotypes, they show psychiatry to be leading the way for healthcare as a whole, in developing the resources for 21st century person-centered clinical care.
- Open Access
- 31 August 2023
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Psicopatologia Fenomeno-Estrutural in Revista Psicopatologia Fenomenológica Contemporânea
- Vol. 12 (2) , 2-25
cem anos da psicopatologia fenomenológica
Em 2022 celebram-se os cem anos da psicopatologia fenomenológica. Essa celebração não encerra um valor meramente histórico, dado que a fenomenologia vem novamente ganhando espaço na agenda de saúde mental do século XXI. Examinar em retrospectiva os principais postulados da psicopatologia fenomenológica é, assim, refletir sobre os modos pelos quais ela pode influenciar as atividades práticas relacionadas à saúde mental. Este artigo propõe um exame sintético dos cem anos de psicopatologia fenomenológica desde uma perspectiva que a entende como uma visão de mundo coerente, com conceitos filosóficos e epistemológicos próprios, que funcionam como a raiz intelectual de sua vitalidade. Defendo, ao longo do artigo, que o núcleo da visão de mundo fenomenológica pode ser identificado na prioridade científica dada à estrutura da experiência, com ênfase para o papel constituinte da intersubjetividade. A seguir, exploro algumas decorrências pragmáticas desse núcleo filosófico sobre a psiquiatria e a psicologia clínica.
- 31 August 2023
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Psicopatologia Fenomeno-Estrutural in Revista Psicopatologia Fenomenológica Contemporânea
- Vol. 12 (2) , 2-25
Open Accesscem anos da psicopatologia fenomenológica
Em 2022 celebram-se os cem anos da psicopatologia fenomenológica. Essa celebração não encerra um valor meramente histórico, dado que a fenomenologia vem novamente ganhando espaço na agenda de saúde mental do século XXI. Examinar em retrospectiva os principais postulados da psicopatologia fenomenológica é, assim, refletir sobre os modos pelos quais ela pode influenciar as atividades práticas relacionadas à saúde mental. Este artigo propõe um exame sintético dos cem anos de psicopatologia fenomenológica desde uma perspectiva que a entende como uma visão de mundo coerente, com conceitos filosóficos e epistemológicos próprios, que funcionam como a raiz intelectual de sua vitalidade. Defendo, ao longo do artigo, que o núcleo da visão de mundo fenomenológica pode ser identificado na prioridade científica dada à estrutura da experiência, com ênfase para o papel constituinte da intersubjetividade. A seguir, exploro algumas decorrências pragmáticas desse núcleo filosófico sobre a psiquiatria e a psicologia clínica.
- 30 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 24 (4) , 1061-1078
Towards a phenomenological approach to psychopharmacology: drug-centered model and epistemic empowerment
- 30 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 24 (4) , 1061-1078
Towards a phenomenological approach to psychopharmacology: drug-centered model and epistemic empowerment
- Open Access
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Psicopatologia Fenomeno-Estrutural in Revista Psicopatologia Fenomenológica Contemporânea
- Vol. 12 (1) , 52-73
Esquizofrenia em Eugène Minkowski e Ludwig Binswanger
A proposta do presente artigo é discutir a contribuição de Eugène Minkowski e Ludwig Binswanger para se pensar a entidade nosológica “esquizofrenia”. Para isso, é realizada uma reconstrução histórica a respeito de sua essência: Emil Kraepelin a considera uma deterioração das faculdades psíquicas, enquanto Eugen Bleuler a entende como cisão dessas faculdades (Spaltung). Eugène Minkowski, por sua vez, considera que o trouble générateur do transtorno é o autismo; ele entende a esquizofrenia como perda do contato vital com a realidade, em que há falta de sintonia com o ambiente. Ludwig Binswanger também dá destaque ao autismo, ainda que não o considere exclusivo da esquizofrenia; ele fala da inadequação à rede de referências constituídas intersubjetivamente, o que caracteriza a excentricidade esquizofrênica.
- 1 June 2023
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Psicopatologia Fenomeno-Estrutural in Revista Psicopatologia Fenomenológica Contemporânea
- Vol. 12 (1) , 52-73
Open AccessEsquizofrenia em Eugène Minkowski e Ludwig Binswanger
A proposta do presente artigo é discutir a contribuição de Eugène Minkowski e Ludwig Binswanger para se pensar a entidade nosológica “esquizofrenia”. Para isso, é realizada uma reconstrução histórica a respeito de sua essência: Emil Kraepelin a considera uma deterioração das faculdades psíquicas, enquanto Eugen Bleuler a entende como cisão dessas faculdades (Spaltung). Eugène Minkowski, por sua vez, considera que o trouble générateur do transtorno é o autismo; ele entende a esquizofrenia como perda do contato vital com a realidade, em que há falta de sintonia com o ambiente. Ludwig Binswanger também dá destaque ao autismo, ainda que não o considere exclusivo da esquizofrenia; ele fala da inadequação à rede de referências constituídas intersubjetivamente, o que caracteriza a excentricidade esquizofrênica.