Kui Geng
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Kui Geng has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fenghua Li
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
5 shared publications - Wenlong Kou
Chinese Academy of Sciences
3 shared publications - Yunchuan Guo
Chinese Academy of Sciences
3 shared publications - Zhen Wang
School of Cybersecurity, Northwestern Polytechnical University, Xi'an, China
2 shared publications - Ben Niu
Shenzhen University
1 shared publication - Chao Guo
Chinese Academy of Sciences
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 22 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 485-496
Rule Generation for Anomalous Behaviors Detection in Enterprises: A Few-Shot Learning Approach via Chain-of-Thoughts
- 22 July 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 485-496
Rule Generation for Anomalous Behaviors Detection in Enterprises: A Few-Shot Learning Approach via Chain-of-Thoughts
- 20 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 284-301
A Certificateless Conditional Anonymous Authentication Scheme for Satellite Internet of Things
- 20 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 284-301
A Certificateless Conditional Anonymous Authentication Scheme for Satellite Internet of Things
- 20 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 179-196
On-Demand Allocation of Cryptographic Computing Resource with Load Prediction
- 20 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 179-196
On-Demand Allocation of Cryptographic Computing Resource with Load Prediction
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 97
Dynamic countermeasures selection for multi-path attacks
- 1 October 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Computers & Security
- Vol. 97
Dynamic countermeasures selection for multi-path attacks
- Open Access
A Stackelberg Security Game for Adversarial Outbreak Detection in the Internet of Things
With limited computing resources and a lack of physical lines of defense, the Internet of Things (IoT) has become a focus of cyberattacks. In recent years, outbreak propagation attacks against the IoT have occurred frequently, and these attacks are often strategical. In order to detect the outbreak propagation as soon as possible, t embedded Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are widely deployed in the IoT. This paper tackles the problem of outbreak detection in adversarial environment in the IoT. A dynamic scheduling strategy based on specific IDSs monitoring of IoT devices is proposed to avoid strategic attacks. Firstly, we formulate the interaction between the defender and attacker as a Stackelberg game in which the defender first chooses a set of device nodes to activate, and then the attacker selects one seed (one device node) to spread the worms. This yields an extremely complex bilevel optimization problem. Our approach is to build a modified Column Generation framework for computing the optimal strategy effectively. The optimal response of the defender’s problem is expressed as mixed-integer linear programming (MILPs). It is proved that the solution of the defender’s optimal response is a NP-hard problem. Moreover, the optimal response of defenders is improved by an approximate algorithm--a greedy algorithm. Finally, the proposed scheme is tested on some randomly generated instances. The experimental results show that the scheme is effective for monitoring optimal scheduling.
Open AccessA Stackelberg Security Game for Adversarial Outbreak Detection in the Internet of Things
With limited computing resources and a lack of physical lines of defense, the Internet of Things (IoT) has become a focus of cyberattacks. In recent years, outbreak propagation attacks against the IoT have occurred frequently, and these attacks are often strategical. In order to detect the outbreak propagation as soon as possible, t embedded Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are widely deployed in the IoT. This paper tackles the problem of outbreak detection in adversarial environment in the IoT. A dynamic scheduling strategy based on specific IDSs monitoring of IoT devices is proposed to avoid strategic attacks. Firstly, we formulate the interaction between the defender and attacker as a Stackelberg game in which the defender first chooses a set of device nodes to activate, and then the attacker selects one seed (one device node) to spread the worms. This yields an extremely complex bilevel optimization problem. Our approach is to build a modified Column Generation framework for computing the optimal strategy effectively. The optimal response of the defender’s problem is expressed as mixed-integer linear programming (MILPs). It is proved that the solution of the defender’s optimal response is a NP-hard problem. Moreover, the optimal response of defenders is improved by an approximate algorithm--a greedy algorithm. Finally, the proposed scheme is tested on some randomly generated instances. The experimental results show that the scheme is effective for monitoring optimal scheduling.
- 8 June 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 590-603
Incentive Mechanism for Cooperative Intrusion Response: A Dynamic Game Approach
- 8 June 2019
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 590-603
Incentive Mechanism for Cooperative Intrusion Response: A Dynamic Game Approach
- 27 May 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 406-418
Pricing Privacy Leakage in Location-Based Services