Nasser Mohammed Al-Fannah
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Nasser Mohammed Al-Fannah has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Chris Mitchell
Royal Holloway, University of London
1 shared publication Wanpeng Li
Manchester Metropolitan University
1 shared publication- Wanpeng Li
School of Mathematics Computer Science and Engineering City Information Security Group Royal Holloway University of London University of London
1 shared publication - Wanpeng Li
University of Liverpool
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Not All Browsers Are Created Equal: Comparing Web Browser Fingerprintability
Browsers and their users can be tracked even in the absence of a persistent IP address or cookie. Unique and hence identifying pieces of information, making up what is known as a fingerprint, can be collected from browsers by a visited website, e.g. using JavaScript. However, browsers vary in precisely what information they make available, and hence their fingerprintability may also vary. In this paper, we report on the results of experiments examining the fingerprintable attributes made available by a range of modern browsers. We tested the most widely used browsers for both desktop and mobile platforms. The results reveal significant differences between browsers in terms of their fingerprinting potential, meaning that the choice of browser has significant privacy implications.
Open AccessNot All Browsers Are Created Equal: Comparing Web Browser Fingerprintability
Browsers and their users can be tracked even in the absence of a persistent IP address or cookie. Unique and hence identifying pieces of information, making up what is known as a fingerprint, can be collected from browsers by a visited website, e.g. using JavaScript. However, browsers vary in precisely what information they make available, and hence their fingerprintability may also vary. In this paper, we report on the results of experiments examining the fingerprintable attributes made available by a range of modern browsers. We tested the most widely used browsers for both desktop and mobile platforms. The results reveal significant differences between browsers in terms of their fingerprinting potential, meaning that the choice of browser has significant privacy implications.
- 15 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 481-501
Beyond Cookie Monster Amnesia: Real World Persistent Online Tracking
- 15 August 2018
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 481-501
Beyond Cookie Monster Amnesia: Real World Persistent Online Tracking
- 27 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 105-120
Not All Browsers are Created Equal: Comparing Web Browser Fingerprintability
- 27 July 2017
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 105-120
Not All Browsers are Created Equal: Comparing Web Browser Fingerprintability
- Open Access
Making Defeating CAPTCHAs Harder for Bots
For a number of years, many websites have used CAPTCHAs to filter out interactions by bots. However, attackers have found ways to circumvent CAPTCHAs by programming bots to solve or bypass them, or even relay them for humans to solve. In order to reduce the chances of success of such attacks, CAPTCHAs can be strengthened by the addition of certain safeguards. In this paper, we discuss seven existing safeguards as well as five novel safeguards designed to make circumventing CAPTCHAs harder. These safeguards are not mutually exclusive and can add multiple layers of protection to a CAPTCHA. We further provide a high-level comparison of their effectiveness in addressing the threat posed by CAPTCHA-defeating techniques. In order to focus on safeguards that are usable, we restrict our attention to those which have minimal adverse effect on the user experience.
Open AccessMaking Defeating CAPTCHAs Harder for Bots
For a number of years, many websites have used CAPTCHAs to filter out interactions by bots. However, attackers have found ways to circumvent CAPTCHAs by programming bots to solve or bypass them, or even relay them for humans to solve. In order to reduce the chances of success of such attacks, CAPTCHAs can be strengthened by the addition of certain safeguards. In this paper, we discuss seven existing safeguards as well as five novel safeguards designed to make circumventing CAPTCHAs harder. These safeguards are not mutually exclusive and can add multiple layers of protection to a CAPTCHA. We further provide a high-level comparison of their effectiveness in addressing the threat posed by CAPTCHA-defeating techniques. In order to focus on safeguards that are usable, we restrict our attention to those which have minimal adverse effect on the user experience.