Emma K. Frow
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Emma K. Frow has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adrian Mackenzie
Department of Sociology, Lancaster University, Lancaster, UK
1 shared publication Alexandra Richey
School of Biological & Health Systems Engineering, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA
1 shared publicationAnna Dale
Arizona State University
1 shared publicationAnna Muldoon
School for the Future of Innovation in Society, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ 85287, USA
1 shared publicationAshley Pritchett
College of Health Solutions, Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ 85004, USA
1 shared publicationAvery Brewer
Arizona State University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 13 December 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Current Opinion in Microbiology
- Vol. 89, 102685
Emerging governance considerations for the deployment of genetically engineered microbes
- 13 December 2025
- Published by Elsevier in Current Opinion in Microbiology
- Vol. 89, 102685
Open AccessEmerging governance considerations for the deployment of genetically engineered microbes
- Open Access
- 21 April 2025
- Published by Wiley
Opening up "containment": Technological and social dimensions of biocontainment for genetically engineered organisms designed for deliberate release
Advances in engineering biology, together with growing interest and investment in supporting a bio-based economy in the US, are fueling research and development efforts into genetically engineering organisms for all kinds of different applications. While many of these applications involve using genetically engineered microorganisms in contained, bioreactor-like environments, there is also increasing interest in designing organisms (microbes, plants, insects, animals) for release and deployment in the open environments. This includes genetically modified crops, as well as direct-to-consumer probiotics and organisms designed for environmental remediation. Historically, examples of genetically engineered organisms released in open environments in the US remain limited, aside from GM crops. Industry enthusiasm for releasing genetically engineered microorganisms in particular waned at least partly in response to public controversy surrounding the field testing of Frostban “ice-minus” bacteria on strawberry crops in 1987. Development of living engineered products, together with publicly funded research on environmental transport and fate of engineered microorganisms in open environments, stalled. As a result, our approach to managing engineered microorganisms over the past 40 years has largely defaulted to the biosafety framework for genetic engineering in laboratory contexts, which emerged from the storied 1975 Asilomar meeting. This biosafety framework focuses on technological containment , a framing that prioritizes separation between genetically engineered organisms and the wider world. In this report, we argue that technological containment is insufficient for robust discussion and evaluation of genetically engineered organisms in open, complex environments. We introduce and make the case for a broader lens—which we call social containment —to be included alongside discussions of technological containment. Social containment directs our attention to how the cultural, environmental and political context around a genetically engineered organism (the sociotechnical system) is held together or challenged through its development and commercialization process. In this report, we use the lens of social containment to tell the stories of 11 genetically engineered organisms designed for deliberate release in the US. The cases cover historical and contemporary examples, genetically engineered microbes, plants and animals, and different application contexts. Through these stories, we show how technological, social, economic, legal, spatiotemporal and environmental considerations interact to smooth or disrupt the development process. We argue that this more holistic approach to understanding the relationships between genetically engineered organisms and the world is important in the context of recent, renewed interest in pursuing deliberate release applications. High-level findings emerging across the case studies include: 1) Development and commercialization pathways can look very different across genetically engineered organisms. There isn’t one, single factor that systematically emerges as the most important in determining the fate of a product. Some products have faced significant disruption in their developmental trajectories from different combinations of factors, while others have been more smoothly managed. Across the case studies, we identify factors that can work together to enable or constrain product trajectories. 2) The presence or absence of explicit, technological biocontainment strategies is not a reliable indicator of a successful product. Arguably, the absence of engineered biocontainment has resulted in more successful commercializations across our case studies than products with genetic biocontainment strategies engineered into them. 3) Public and stakeholder views on genetically engineered organisms are highly context-specific. We observe that public trust varies substantially across the case studies in this report, and should not necessarily be seen as a disruptive factor. Sensitivity to existing cultural norms and power dynamics is a key part of successful product development. Through this set of stories, we hope to open up ways for researchers and policy practitioners to think about containment as more than a simple technological concern. We encourage others to use our proposed framework to study their own genetically engineered organisms of interest—historical or contemporary, US-based or international—and we invite reflection on the variety of technological AND social processes by which genetically engineered organisms are controlled and managed in our society.
- 21 April 2025
- Published by Wiley
Open AccessOpening up "containment": Technological and social dimensions of biocontainment for genetically engineered organisms designed for deliberate release
Advances in engineering biology, together with growing interest and investment in supporting a bio-based economy in the US, are fueling research and development efforts into genetically engineering organisms for all kinds of different applications. While many of these applications involve using genetically engineered microorganisms in contained, bioreactor-like environments, there is also increasing interest in designing organisms (microbes, plants, insects, animals) for release and deployment in the open environments. This includes genetically modified crops, as well as direct-to-consumer probiotics and organisms designed for environmental remediation. Historically, examples of genetically engineered organisms released in open environments in the US remain limited, aside from GM crops. Industry enthusiasm for releasing genetically engineered microorganisms in particular waned at least partly in response to public controversy surrounding the field testing of Frostban “ice-minus” bacteria on strawberry crops in 1987. Development of living engineered products, together with publicly funded research on environmental transport and fate of engineered microorganisms in open environments, stalled. As a result, our approach to managing engineered microorganisms over the past 40 years has largely defaulted to the biosafety framework for genetic engineering in laboratory contexts, which emerged from the storied 1975 Asilomar meeting. This biosafety framework focuses on technological containment , a framing that prioritizes separation between genetically engineered organisms and the wider world. In this report, we argue that technological containment is insufficient for robust discussion and evaluation of genetically engineered organisms in open, complex environments. We introduce and make the case for a broader lens—which we call social containment —to be included alongside discussions of technological containment. Social containment directs our attention to how the cultural, environmental and political context around a genetically engineered organism (the sociotechnical system) is held together or challenged through its development and commercialization process. In this report, we use the lens of social containment to tell the stories of 11 genetically engineered organisms designed for deliberate release in the US. The cases cover historical and contemporary examples, genetically engineered microbes, plants and animals, and different application contexts. Through these stories, we show how technological, social, economic, legal, spatiotemporal and environmental considerations interact to smooth or disrupt the development process. We argue that this more holistic approach to understanding the relationships between genetically engineered organisms and the world is important in the context of recent, renewed interest in pursuing deliberate release applications. High-level findings emerging across the case studies include: 1) Development and commercialization pathways can look very different across genetically engineered organisms. There isn’t one, single factor that systematically emerges as the most important in determining the fate of a product. Some products have faced significant disruption in their developmental trajectories from different combinations of factors, while others have been more smoothly managed. Across the case studies, we identify factors that can work together to enable or constrain product trajectories. 2) The presence or absence of explicit, technological biocontainment strategies is not a reliable indicator of a successful product. Arguably, the absence of engineered biocontainment has resulted in more successful commercializations across our case studies than products with genetic biocontainment strategies engineered into them. 3) Public and stakeholder views on genetically engineered organisms are highly context-specific. We observe that public trust varies substantially across the case studies in this report, and should not necessarily be seen as a disruptive factor. Sensitivity to existing cultural norms and power dynamics is a key part of successful product development. Through this set of stories, we hope to open up ways for researchers and policy practitioners to think about containment as more than a simple technological concern. We encourage others to use our proposed framework to study their own genetically engineered organisms of interest—historical or contemporary, US-based or international—and we invite reflection on the variety of technological AND social processes by which genetically engineered organisms are controlled and managed in our society.
- Open Access
- 20 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-5
A bumpy road ahead for genetic biocontainment
While the research community continues to develop novel proposals for intrinsic biocontainment of genetically engineered organisms, translation to real-world deployment faces several challenges.
- 20 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Nature Communications
- Vol. 15 (1) , 1-5
Open AccessA bumpy road ahead for genetic biocontainment
While the research community continues to develop novel proposals for intrinsic biocontainment of genetically engineered organisms, translation to real-world deployment faces several challenges.
- Open Access
- 11 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Stem Cell Reports
- Vol. 16 (12) , 2852-2860
Weighing up the evidence used by direct-to-consumer stem cell businesses
- 11 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Stem Cell Reports
- Vol. 16 (12) , 2852-2860
Open AccessWeighing up the evidence used by direct-to-consumer stem cell businesses
- Open Access
- 17 September 2021
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 16 (9) , e0257327
Exploring presentations of sustainability by US synthetic biology companies
The field of synthetic biology is increasingly being positioned as a key driver of a more sustainable, bio-based economy, and has seen rapid industry growth over the past 15 years. In this paper we undertake an exploratory investigation of the relationship between sustainability and synthetic biology, identifying and analyzing sustainability-related language on the public websites of 24, US-based synthetic biology companies. We observe that sustainability is a visible part of the self-presentation of the nascent synthetic biology industry, explicitly mentioned by 18 of the 24 companies. The dominant framing of sustainability on these company websites emphasizes environmental gains and “free-market” approaches to sustainability, with little explicit mention of social dimensions of sustainability such as access, justice or intergenerational equity. Furthermore, the model of sustainability presented focuses on incremental transition towards environmental sustainability through direct substitution of products and processes using bioengineered alternatives (n = 16 companies), with no change in societal consumption or policy frameworks required in order to see sustainability gains. One-third of the companies analyzed (n = 8) mention “nature” on their websites, variously framing it as a resource to be managed or as a source of inspiration; whether the latter signals a potentially more complex relationship with nature than advanced free-market models of sustainability remains to be seen. As the synthetic biology industry begins to grow in size and visibility, we suggest this is an opportune time for the community to engage in explicit deliberation about its approach to sustainability.
- 17 September 2021
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 16 (9) , e0257327
Open AccessExploring presentations of sustainability by US synthetic biology companies
The field of synthetic biology is increasingly being positioned as a key driver of a more sustainable, bio-based economy, and has seen rapid industry growth over the past 15 years. In this paper we undertake an exploratory investigation of the relationship between sustainability and synthetic biology, identifying and analyzing sustainability-related language on the public websites of 24, US-based synthetic biology companies. We observe that sustainability is a visible part of the self-presentation of the nascent synthetic biology industry, explicitly mentioned by 18 of the 24 companies. The dominant framing of sustainability on these company websites emphasizes environmental gains and “free-market” approaches to sustainability, with little explicit mention of social dimensions of sustainability such as access, justice or intergenerational equity. Furthermore, the model of sustainability presented focuses on incremental transition towards environmental sustainability through direct substitution of products and processes using bioengineered alternatives (n = 16 companies), with no change in societal consumption or policy frameworks required in order to see sustainability gains. One-third of the companies analyzed (n = 8) mention “nature” on their websites, variously framing it as a resource to be managed or as a source of inspiration; whether the latter signals a potentially more complex relationship with nature than advanced free-market models of sustainability remains to be seen. As the synthetic biology industry begins to grow in size and visibility, we suggest this is an opportune time for the community to engage in explicit deliberation about its approach to sustainability.
- Open Access
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Stem Cell Reports
- Vol. 13 (2) , 247-253
Characterizing Direct-to-Consumer Stem Cell Businesses in the Southwest United States
- 1 August 2019
- Published by Elsevier in Stem Cell Reports
- Vol. 13 (2) , 247-253
Open AccessCharacterizing Direct-to-Consumer Stem Cell Businesses in the Southwest United States
- 25 October 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Science, Technology, & Human Values
- Vol. 45 (6) , 1038-1064
From “Experiments of Concern” to “Groups of Concern”: Constructing and Containing Citizens in Synthetic Biology
Synthetic biology represents a recent and explicit attempt to make biology easier to engineer, and through this to open up the design space of genetic engineering to a wider range of practitioners (including, but not limited to, engineers). Proponents of this approach emphasize the standardization of practices as key to successful biological engineering; yet, meaningful transatlantic differences are emerging with respect to the constitution of key concerns and the governance of synthetic biology in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). In this article, I tease out how national approaches to governing synthetic biology are being framed against different salient past experiences with recombinant DNA technology. In the US, the governance of synthetic biology is consistently articulated in relation to the early days of recombinant DNA technology and the self-governance mechanisms pioneered in response to Asilomar. In the UK, more recent experiences with genetically modified crops provide the overarching imaginary against which governance initiatives are being proposed. I suggest that these differing sociotechnical imaginaries have implications for how new “groups of concern” are being defined in relation to synthetic biology and how measures to contain perceived risks are being pursued in the US and Britain.
- 25 October 2017
- Published by SAGE Publications in Science, Technology, & Human Values
- Vol. 45 (6) , 1038-1064
From “Experiments of Concern” to “Groups of Concern”: Constructing and Containing Citizens in Synthetic Biology
Synthetic biology represents a recent and explicit attempt to make biology easier to engineer, and through this to open up the design space of genetic engineering to a wider range of practitioners (including, but not limited to, engineers). Proponents of this approach emphasize the standardization of practices as key to successful biological engineering; yet, meaningful transatlantic differences are emerging with respect to the constitution of key concerns and the governance of synthetic biology in the United States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK). In this article, I tease out how national approaches to governing synthetic biology are being framed against different salient past experiences with recombinant DNA technology. In the US, the governance of synthetic biology is consistently articulated in relation to the early days of recombinant DNA technology and the self-governance mechanisms pioneered in response to Asilomar. In the UK, more recent experiences with genetically modified crops provide the overarching imaginary against which governance initiatives are being proposed. I suggest that these differing sociotechnical imaginaries have implications for how new “groups of concern” are being defined in relation to synthetic biology and how measures to contain perceived risks are being pursued in the US and Britain.
- 18 June 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Responsible Innovation
- Vol. 5 (1) , 117-121
Governing citizen use of brain stimulation technologies: what role for scientists?
- 18 June 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Journal of Responsible Innovation
- Vol. 5 (1) , 117-121
Governing citizen use of brain stimulation technologies: what role for scientists?
- 11 June 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Science, Technology, & Human Values
- Vol. 38 (5) , 701-722
Classifying, Constructing, and Identifying Life
Recent accounts of “the biological” emphasize its thoroughgoing transformation. Accounts of biomedicalization, biotechnology, biopower, biocapital, and bioeconomy tend to agree that twentieth- and twenty-first-century life sciences transform the object of biology, the biological. Amidst so much transformation, we explore attempts to stabilize the biological through standards. We ask: how do standards handle the biological in transformation? Based on ethnographic research, the article discusses three contemporary postgenomic standards that classify, construct, or identify biological forms: the Barcoding of Life Initiative, the BioBricks Assembly Standard, and the Proteomics Standards Initiative. We rely on recent critical analyses of standardization to suggest that any attempt to attribute a fixed property to the biological actually multiplies dependencies between values, materials, and human and nonhuman agents. We highlight ways in which these biological standards cross-validate life forms with forms of life such as publics, infrastructures, and forms of disciplinary compromise. Attempts to standardize the biological, we suggest, offer a good way to see how a life form is always also a form of life.
- 11 June 2013
- Published by SAGE Publications in Science, Technology, & Human Values
- Vol. 38 (5) , 701-722
Classifying, Constructing, and Identifying Life
Recent accounts of “the biological” emphasize its thoroughgoing transformation. Accounts of biomedicalization, biotechnology, biopower, biocapital, and bioeconomy tend to agree that twentieth- and twenty-first-century life sciences transform the object of biology, the biological. Amidst so much transformation, we explore attempts to stabilize the biological through standards. We ask: how do standards handle the biological in transformation? Based on ethnographic research, the article discusses three contemporary postgenomic standards that classify, construct, or identify biological forms: the Barcoding of Life Initiative, the BioBricks Assembly Standard, and the Proteomics Standards Initiative. We rely on recent critical analyses of standardization to suggest that any attempt to attribute a fixed property to the biological actually multiplies dependencies between values, materials, and human and nonhuman agents. We highlight ways in which these biological standards cross-validate life forms with forms of life such as publics, infrastructures, and forms of disciplinary compromise. Attempts to standardize the biological, we suggest, offer a good way to see how a life form is always also a form of life.