Gabriel Jiménez
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Gabriel Jiménez has a total of 22 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jesús Saurina
Banco de España
4 shared publications Banco de España
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco Jesús Saurina Banco de España
3 shared publicationsFederal Reserve Bank Of San Francisco
3 shared publications- Jose A. Lopez
Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, San Francisco, California 94105
3 shared publications - Marcel Jansen
Universidad Autónoma de Madrid
2 shared publications - Samuel Bentolila
Cemfi, Madrid, Spain
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 16 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 240
Who truly bears (bank) taxes? Evidence from only shifting statutory incidence
- 16 November 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 240
Who truly bears (bank) taxes? Evidence from only shifting statutory incidence
- Open Access
- 20 November 2023
- Published by Banco de Espana
Individual and sectoral analysis framework for the impact of economic and financial risks
The Banco de España uses various microeconomic models, mostly of an empirical nature, to support its decision-making in relation to the analysis of economic and financial risks and economic policy advice. These models, which complement those of a macroeconomic nature, seeks to identify the potentially heterogeneous impact on different groups of agents of certain economic, financial or public policy scenarios. This analysis covers many areas, including the study of the behaviour of households and non-financial corporations, the internal credit rating of companies, the study of the demand for and supply of bank credit, top-down bank stress tests, supervisory review and evaluation processes (SREP) and the study of non-bank financial intermediaries. This paper shows how these models have been applied to analyse two recent crisis events, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, illustrating their practical utility and the need for their development and continuous adaptation.
- 20 November 2023
- Published by Banco de Espana
Open AccessIndividual and sectoral analysis framework for the impact of economic and financial risks
The Banco de España uses various microeconomic models, mostly of an empirical nature, to support its decision-making in relation to the analysis of economic and financial risks and economic policy advice. These models, which complement those of a macroeconomic nature, seeks to identify the potentially heterogeneous impact on different groups of agents of certain economic, financial or public policy scenarios. This analysis covers many areas, including the study of the behaviour of households and non-financial corporations, the internal credit rating of companies, the study of the demand for and supply of bank credit, top-down bank stress tests, supervisory review and evaluation processes (SREP) and the study of non-bank financial intermediaries. This paper shows how these models have been applied to analyse two recent crisis events, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine, illustrating their practical utility and the need for their development and continuous adaptation.
- Open Access
- 8 September 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 16 (2) , 560
Erratum: When Credit Dries Up: Job Losses in the Great Recession
The originally published version of this article (10.1093/jeea/jvx021) incorrectly included Table 5 twice, the second occurrence in place of the correct Table 7. This has now been corrected. OUP apologises for this error.
- 8 September 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 16 (2) , 560
Open AccessErratum: When Credit Dries Up: Job Losses in the Great Recession
The originally published version of this article (10.1093/jeea/jvx021) incorrectly included Table 5 twice, the second occurrence in place of the correct Table 7. This has now been corrected. OUP apologises for this error.
- Top Cited Papers
- 17 August 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 16 (3) , 650-695
When Credit Dries Up: Job Losses in the Great Recession
We study whether the solvency problems of Spain's weakest banks in the Great Recession have caused employment losses outside the financial sector. Our analysis focuses on the set of banks that were bailed out by the Spanish authorities. Data from the credit register of the Bank of Spain indicate that these banks curtailed lending well in advance of their bailout. We show the existence of a credit supply shock, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity through firm fixed effects, and assess its impact on employment. To this aim, we compare the changes in employment between 2006 and 2010 at client firms of weak banks to those at comparable firms with no significant precrisis relationship to weak banks. Our estimates imply that around 24% of job losses at firms attached to weak banks in our sample are due to this exposure. This accounts for one-half of the employment losses at firms that survived and one-third of employment losses at those that closed down.
- 17 August 2017
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of the European Economic Association
- Vol. 16 (3) , 650-695
Top Cited PapersWhen Credit Dries Up: Job Losses in the Great Recession
We study whether the solvency problems of Spain's weakest banks in the Great Recession have caused employment losses outside the financial sector. Our analysis focuses on the set of banks that were bailed out by the Spanish authorities. Data from the credit register of the Bank of Spain indicate that these banks curtailed lending well in advance of their bailout. We show the existence of a credit supply shock, controlling for unobserved heterogeneity through firm fixed effects, and assess its impact on employment. To this aim, we compare the changes in employment between 2006 and 2010 at client firms of weak banks to those at comparable firms with no significant precrisis relationship to weak banks. Our estimates imply that around 24% of job losses at firms attached to weak banks in our sample are due to this exposure. This accounts for one-half of the employment losses at firms that survived and one-third of employment losses at those that closed down.
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 82 (2) , 463-505
Hazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking?
We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking with an exhaustive credit register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and quality, and the volume of demand. We employ a two-stage model that analyzes the granting of loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time-varying, firm and bank heterogeneity through time*firm and time*bank fixed effects. We find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms and to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to these firms, yet with a higher ex post likelihood of default. A lower long-term interest rate and other relevant macroeconomic variables have no such effects
- 1 January 2014
- Published by The Econometric Society in Econometrica
- Vol. 82 (2) , 463-505
Top Cited PapersHazardous Times for Monetary Policy: What Do Twenty-Three Million Bank Loans Say About the Effects of Monetary Policy on Credit Risk-Taking?
We identify the effects of monetary policy on credit risk-taking with an exhaustive credit register of loan applications and contracts. We separate the changes in the composition of the supply of credit from the concurrent changes in the volume of supply and quality, and the volume of demand. We employ a two-stage model that analyzes the granting of loan applications in the first stage and loan outcomes for the applications granted in the second stage, and that controls for both observed and unobserved, time-varying, firm and bank heterogeneity through time*firm and time*bank fixed effects. We find that a lower overnight interest rate induces lowly capitalized banks to grant more loan applications to ex ante risky firms and to commit larger loan volumes with fewer collateral requirements to these firms, yet with a higher ex post likelihood of default. A lower long-term interest rate and other relevant macroeconomic variables have no such effects
- Open Access
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
- p. 1.000-51.000
EAD Calibration for Corporate Credit Lines
Managing the credit risk inherent to a corporate credit line is similar to that of a term loan, but with one key difference. For both instruments, the bank should know the borrower's probability of default (PD) and the facility's loss given default (LGD). However, since a credit line allows the borrowers to draw down the committed funds according to their own needs, the bank must also have a measure of the line's exposure at default (EAD). Our study, which is based on a census of all corporate lending within Spain over the last 20 years, provides the most comprehensive overview of corporate credit line use and EAD calculations to date. Our analysis shows that defaulting firms have significantly higher credit line usage rates and EAD values up to five years prior to their actual default. Furthermore, we find that there are important variations in EAD values due to credit line size, collateralization, and maturity. While our results are derived from data for a single country, they should provide useful benchmarks for further academic, business and policy research into this underdeveloped area of credit risk management.
- 1 January 2009
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
- p. 1.000-51.000
Open AccessEAD Calibration for Corporate Credit Lines
Managing the credit risk inherent to a corporate credit line is similar to that of a term loan, but with one key difference. For both instruments, the bank should know the borrower's probability of default (PD) and the facility's loss given default (LGD). However, since a credit line allows the borrowers to draw down the committed funds according to their own needs, the bank must also have a measure of the line's exposure at default (EAD). Our study, which is based on a census of all corporate lending within Spain over the last 20 years, provides the most comprehensive overview of corporate credit line use and EAD calculations to date. Our analysis shows that defaulting firms have significantly higher credit line usage rates and EAD values up to five years prior to their actual default. Furthermore, we find that there are important variations in EAD values due to credit line size, collateralization, and maturity. While our results are derived from data for a single country, they should provide useful benchmarks for further academic, business and policy research into this underdeveloped area of credit risk management.
- Open Access
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
- p. 1.000-37.000
How Does Competition Impact Bank Risk-Taking?
A common assumption in the academic literature and in the actual supervision of banking systems worldwide is that franchise value plays a key role in limiting bank risk-taking. As the underlying source of franchise value is assumed to be market power, reduced competition has been considered to promote banking stability. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) propose an alternative view where concentration in the loan market could lead to increased borrower debt loads and a corresponding increase in loan defaults that undermine bank stability. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2007) encompass both approaches by proposing a nonlinear relationship between competition and bank risk-taking. Using unique datasets for the Spanish banking system, we examine the empirical nature of that relationship. After controlling for macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics, we find that standard measures of market concentration do not affect the ratio of non-performing commercial loans (NPL), our measure of bank risk. However, using Lerner indexes based on bank-specific interest rates, we find a negative relationship between loan market power and bank risk. This result provides evidence in favor of the franchise value paradigm.
- 1 September 2007
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
- p. 1.000-37.000
Open AccessHow Does Competition Impact Bank Risk-Taking?
A common assumption in the academic literature and in the actual supervision of banking systems worldwide is that franchise value plays a key role in limiting bank risk-taking. As the underlying source of franchise value is assumed to be market power, reduced competition has been considered to promote banking stability. Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) propose an alternative view where concentration in the loan market could lead to increased borrower debt loads and a corresponding increase in loan defaults that undermine bank stability. Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2007) encompass both approaches by proposing a nonlinear relationship between competition and bank risk-taking. Using unique datasets for the Spanish banking system, we examine the empirical nature of that relationship. After controlling for macroeconomic conditions and bank characteristics, we find that standard measures of market concentration do not affect the ratio of non-performing commercial loans (NPL), our measure of bank risk. However, using Lerner indexes based on bank-specific interest rates, we find a negative relationship between loan market power and bank risk. This result provides evidence in favor of the franchise value paradigm.
- Open Access
- 1 June 2007
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
- p. 1.000-36.000
Empirical Analysis of Corporate Credit Lines
Since bank credit lines are a major source of corporate funding and liquidity, we examine the determinants of credit line usage with a database of Spanish corporate credit lines. A line's default status is the primary factor driving its usage, which increases as a firm approaches default. Several lender characteristics suggest an important role for bank monitoring in firms' usage decisions. Credit line usage is found to be inversely related to macroeconomic conditions. Overall, while several factors influence corporate credit line usage, our analysis suggests that default and supply-side variables are the most important.
- 1 June 2007
- Published by Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
- p. 1.000-36.000
Open AccessEmpirical Analysis of Corporate Credit Lines
Since bank credit lines are a major source of corporate funding and liquidity, we examine the determinants of credit line usage with a database of Spanish corporate credit lines. A line's default status is the primary factor driving its usage, which increases as a firm approaches default. Several lender characteristics suggest an important role for bank monitoring in firms' usage decisions. Credit line usage is found to be inversely related to macroeconomic conditions. Overall, while several factors influence corporate credit line usage, our analysis suggests that default and supply-side variables are the most important.