MKMuhammad Taimoor Khan

Muhammad Taimoor Khan

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Muhammad Taimoor Khan has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    An Open Source, Extensible Malware Analysis Platform

    by P. Michalopoulos, V. Ieronymakis, M.T. Khan, D. Serpanos

    A malware (such as viruses, ransomware) is the main source of bringing serious security threats to the IT systems and their users now-adays. In order to protect the systems and their legitimate users from these threats, anti-malware applications are developed as a defense against malware. However, most of these applications detect malware based on signatures or heuristics that are still created manually and are error prune. Some recent applications employ data mining and machine learning techniques to detect malware automatically. However, such applications fail to classify them appropriately mainly because they suffer from high rate of false alarms on the one hand and being retrospective, fail to detect new unknown threats and variants of known malware on the other hand. Since anti-malware vendors receive a huge number of malware samples every day, there is an urgent need for malware analysis tools that can automatically detect malware rigorously, i.e. eliminating false alarms. To address these issues and challenges of current malware detection and analysis approaches, we propose a novel, open source and extensible platform (based on set of tools) that allows to combine various malware detection techniques to automatically detect/classify a malware more rigorously. The developed platform can be fed with malware samples from different providers and will enable the development of effective classification schemes and methods, which are not sufficiently effective without collaboration and the related sample aggregation. Furthermore, such collaborative platforms in cybersecurity enable efficient sharing of information (e.g., about new identified threats) to all collaborators and sharing of appropriate defences against them, if such defences exist.


  • ARMET: Behavior-Based Secure and Resilient Industrial Control Systems

    by Muhammad Taimoor Khan, Dimitrios Serpanos, Howard Shrobe

    In this paper, we introduce a design methodology to develop reliable and secure industrial control systems (ICSs) based on the behavior of their computational resources (i.e., process/application) and underlying physical resources (e.g., the controlled plant). The methodology has three independent, but complementary, components that employ novel approaches and techniques in the design of reliable and secure ICSs. First, we introduce reliable-and-secure-by-design development of secure industrial control applications through stepwise sound refinement of an executable specification, employing deductive synthesis to enforce functional and nonfunctional (e.g., security and safety) properties of ICS applications. Second, we present a runtime security monitor at the middleware level of ICSs that protects ICS operation in the field through comparison of the application execution and the application specification execution in real time; the runtime security monitor can be synthesized from the executable specification. Finally, based on the specification, we perform a vulnerability analysis for false data injection (FDI) attacks, which leads to ICS application designs that are resilient to this type of attacks. We demonstrate the methodology through its application to a basic and typical ICS example application, describing all the tools used and ARMET, the middleware monitor that constitutes the core component of the methodology.


  • Open Access

    A Formally Reliable Cognitive Middleware for the Security of Industrial Control Systems

    by Muhammad Taimoor Khan, Dimitrios Serpanos, Howard Shrobe

    In this paper, we present our results on the formal reliability analysis of the behavioral correctness of our cognitive middleware ARMET. The formally assured behavioral correctness of a software system is a fundamental prerequisite for the system’s security. Therefore, the goal of this study is to, first, formalize the behavioral semantics of the middleware and, second, to prove its behavioral correctness. In this study, we focus only on the core and critical component of the middleware: the execution monitor. The execution monitor identifies inconsistencies between runtime observations of an industrial control system (ICS) application and predictions of the specification of the application. As a starting point, we have defined the formal (denotational) semantics of the observations (produced by the application at run-time), and predictions (produced by the executable specification of the application). Then, based on the formal semantices, we have formalized the behavior of the execution monitor. Finally, based on the semantics, we have proved soundness (absence of false alarms) and completeness (detection of arbitrary attacks) to assure the behavioral correctness of the monitor.