Fanghui Zheng

Fiscal capacity is a core dimension of state capacity. Effective oversight of public expenditure is therefore essential for fiscal sustainability, a foundational element of sustainable development. As local government debt has steadily increased in China, participatory budgeting has emerged as an innovative mechanism for citizens to exercise such oversight and influence fiscal decisions. Our paper examines the effect of participatory budgeting on local government debt in China. Using a panel dataset covering 242 Chinese cities from 2013 to 2022, we examine the effect of participatory budgeting adoption on the scale of explicit government debt. Our results show that adopting participatory budgeting moderately reduces local government debt levels. Further mechanism analysis indicates that participatory budgeting operates through two channels. First, by enhancing budgetary transparency, it strengthens public scrutiny, which in turn disciplines government borrowing. Second, it redirects public spending toward welfare sectors like education and health, thereby crowding out large, debt-financed investment projects. Our findings contribute to the literature on participatory budgeting, fiscal democracy, and bottom-up accountability in public finance. The results suggest that participatory budgeting can be an effective policy tool for improving fiscal discipline and curbing government debt risks, ultimately fostering more sustainable and equitable local governance.

Building a law-based government is a central element of the comprehensive framework for promoting the rule of law in China, while using evaluation to catalyze growth is in line with the incentive principle of management studies. Since China started to implement reform and opening up over thirty years ago, rule of law development and organizational evaluation have gone through several stages, each with different characteristics. Efforts to build a law-based government have met with success, but what the country now has is essentially still goal-oriented assessment. At present, this suffers from the lack of a clear goal orientation or definition of functions, an imperfect technical system and unsound motivation mechanisms, not to mention the practical problems of each government department going its own way, duplicating evaluations or being left rudderless. Drawing on a combination of value rationality and instrumental rationality and using government performance evaluation to promote the building of a law-based government not only conforms to the spirit of the rule of law and value rationality in government performance, but also strengthens the role of evaluation as an instrument for organizational management. Therefore, we need to create new evaluation theories, expand public participation, introducing diversified evaluating entities, improve technical systems, strengthen institutional buildup, and foster a performance-based culture. In addition, replacing goal-oriented assessment with performance evaluation will help the emergence of a new discipline—the performance evaluation of rule of law government, thus promoting multidisciplinary efforts to integrate and create new public administration theories in China.