Roland Gemayel
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Roland Gemayel has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alex Preda
King’s College London
3 shared publications Alex Preda
1 shared publicationJames Bowden
1 shared publication- Tatiana Franus1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 5 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
- Vol. 91
Herding in the cryptocurrency market: A transaction-level analysis
- 5 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money
- Vol. 91
Herding in the cryptocurrency market: A transaction-level analysis
- 5 May 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 228
Price discovery between Bitcoin spot markets and exchange traded products
- 5 May 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Economics Letters
- Vol. 228
Price discovery between Bitcoin spot markets and exchange traded products
- 1 October 2021
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Financial Analysis
- Vol. 77
Performance and learning in an ambiguous environment: A study of cryptocurrency traders
- 1 October 2021
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Financial Analysis
- Vol. 77
Performance and learning in an ambiguous environment: A study of cryptocurrency traders
- Open Access
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 154, 175-190
Does a scopic regime erode the disposition effect? Evidence from a social trading platform
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 154, 175-190
Open AccessDoes a scopic regime erode the disposition effect? Evidence from a social trading platform
- 4 December 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Journal of Finance
- Vol. 24 (14) , 1144-1175
Does a scopic regime produce conformism? Herding behavior among trade leaders on social trading platforms
Social trading platforms (STPs) are transparent online markets governed by a scopic regime, where order flow is publicly disclosed and participants are subject to constant reciprocal scrutiny. Participants on STPs can be categorized into trade leaders and copiers, where the former execute unique trades and manage the funds allocated to them by the latter in return for compensation. Given limited individual capacity and the competition to attract copiers, we investigate whether the scopic regime produces excess and perpetual conformism among trade leaders. Using data from a popular STP, and from an anonymous traditional foreign exchange broker, we show that the scopic regime produces excess levels of herding. Under the scopic environment, we find that herding is high when market information is scarce, which is evidence of herding due to informational cascades. We find herding to be relatively low among risk-seeking trade leaders, which may be a sign of overconfidence. Herding is high for larger trades, suggesting that traders herd to avoid the disappointment associated with underperforming on large positions. Finally, we show that herding in the scopic environment persists at much higher levels compared to traditional environments. Our findings indicate that exposure to a scopic information-rich environment augments the limitations and personal biases of individual traders, thus producing excess and perpetual herding.
- 4 December 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The European Journal of Finance
- Vol. 24 (14) , 1144-1175
Does a scopic regime produce conformism? Herding behavior among trade leaders on social trading platforms
Social trading platforms (STPs) are transparent online markets governed by a scopic regime, where order flow is publicly disclosed and participants are subject to constant reciprocal scrutiny. Participants on STPs can be categorized into trade leaders and copiers, where the former execute unique trades and manage the funds allocated to them by the latter in return for compensation. Given limited individual capacity and the competition to attract copiers, we investigate whether the scopic regime produces excess and perpetual conformism among trade leaders. Using data from a popular STP, and from an anonymous traditional foreign exchange broker, we show that the scopic regime produces excess levels of herding. Under the scopic environment, we find that herding is high when market information is scarce, which is evidence of herding due to informational cascades. We find herding to be relatively low among risk-seeking trade leaders, which may be a sign of overconfidence. Herding is high for larger trades, suggesting that traders herd to avoid the disappointment associated with underperforming on large positions. Finally, we show that herding in the scopic environment persists at much higher levels compared to traditional environments. Our findings indicate that exposure to a scopic information-rich environment augments the limitations and personal biases of individual traders, thus producing excess and perpetual herding.