MSMatthew Smith

Matthew Smith

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Matthew Smith has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Wireless Air Traffic Communications Security

    by Matthew Smith, Martin Strohmeier, Ivan Martinovic

  • Open Access

    Understanding realistic attacks on airborne collision avoidance systems

    by Matthew Smith, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic

    Airborne collision avoidance systems provide an onboard safety net should normal air traffic control procedures fail to keep aircraft separated. These systems are widely deployed and have been constantly refined over the past three decades, usually in response to near misses or mid-air collisions. Recent years have seen security research increasingly focus on aviation, identifying that key wireless links—some of which are used in collision avoidance—are vulnerable to attack. In this paper, we go one step further to understand whether an attacker can remotely trigger false collision avoidance alarms. Primarily considering the next-generation Airborne Collision Avoidance System X (ACAS X), we adopt a smodelling approach to extract attacker constraints from technical standards before simulating collision avoidance attacks against standardized ACAS X code. We find that in 44% of cases, an attacker can successfully trigger a collision avoidance alert which on average results in a 590 ft altitude deviation; when the aircraft is at lower altitudes, this success rate rises considerably to 79%. Furthermore, we show how our simulation approach can be used to help defend against attacks by identifying where attackers are most likely to be successful.


  • Open Access

    Classi-Fly: Inferring Aircraft Categories from Open Data

    by Martin Strohmeier, Matthew Smith, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic

    In recent years, air traffic communication data has become easy to access, enabling novel research in many fields. Exploiting this new data source, a wide range of applications have emerged, from weather forecasting to stock market prediction, or the collection of intelligence about military and government movements. Typically, these applications require knowledge about the metadata of the aircraft, specifically its operator and the aircraft category.armasuisse Science + Technology, the R&D agency for the Swiss Armed Forces, has been developing Classi-Fly, a novel approach to obtain metadata about aircraft based on their movement patterns. We validate Classi-Fly using several hundred thousand flights collected through open source means, in conjunction with ground truth from publicly available aircraft registries containing more than 2 million aircraft. We show that we can obtain the correct aircraft category with an accuracy of greater than 88%. In cases, where no metadata is available, this approach can be used to create the data necessary for applications working with air traffic communication. Finally, we show that it is feasible to automatically detect particular sensitive aircraft such as police and surveillance aircraft using this method.


  • Wireless Air Traffic Communications Security

    by Matthew Smith, Martin Strohmeier, Ivan Martinovic

  • Open Access

    Undermining Privacy in the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS)

    by Matthew Smith, Daniel Moser, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic

    Despite the Aircraft Communications, Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) being widely deployed for over twenty years, little scrutiny has been applied to it outside of the aviation community. Whilst originally utilized by commercial airlines to track their flights and provide automated timekeeping on crew, today it serves as a multi-purpose air-ground data link for many aviation stakeholders including private jet owners, state actors and military. Such a change has caused ACARS to be used far beyond its original mandate; to date no work has been undertaken to assess the extent of this especially with regard to privacy and the various stakeholder groups which use it. In this paper, we present an analysis of ACARS usage by privacy sensitive actors-military, government and business. We conduct this using data from the VHF (both traditional ACARS, and VDL mode 2) and satellite communications subnetworks. Based on more than two million ACARS messages collected over the course of 16 months, we demonstrate that current ACARS usage systematically breaches location privacy for all examined aviation stakeholder groups, explaining the types of messages used to cause this problem.We illustrate the challenges with three case studies-one for each stakeholder group-to show how much privacy sensitive information can be constructed with a handful of ACARS messages. We contextualize our findings with opinions on the issue of privacy in ACARS from 40 aviation industry professionals. From this, we explore recommendations for how to address these issues, including use of encryption and policy measures.


  • Economy Class Crypto: Exploring Weak Cipher Usage in Avionic Communications via ACARS

    by Matthew Smith, Daniel Moser, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic


  • Open Access

    Analyzing Privacy Breaches in the Aircraft Communications Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS)

    by Matthew Smith, Daniel Moser, Martin Strohmeier, Vincent Lenders, Ivan Martinovic

    The manner in which Aircraft Communications, Addressing and Reporting System (ACARS) is being used has significantly changed over time. Whilst originally used by commercial airliners to track their flights and provide automated timekeeping on crew, today it serves as a multi-purpose air-ground data link for many aviation stakeholders including private jet owners, state actors and military. Since ACARS messages are still mostly sent in the clear over a wireless channel, any sensitive information sent with ACARS can potentially lead to a privacy breach for users. Naturally, different stakeholders consider different types of data sensitive. In this paper we propose a privacy framework matching aviation stakeholders to a range of sensitive information types and assess the impact for each. Based on more than one million ACARS messages, collected over several months, we then demonstrate that current ACARS usage systematically breaches privacy for all stakeholder groups. We further support our findings with a number of cases of significant privacy issues for each group and analyze the impact of such leaks. While it is well-known that ACARS messages are susceptible to eavesdropping attacks, this work is the first to quantify the extent and impact of privacy leakage in the real world for the relevant aviation stakeholders.