RHRosalie Arcala Hall

Rosalie Arcala Hall

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Rosalie Arcala Hall has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    National–Local Synergies for Development: How a Local Political Machine Delivered Infrastructure Results in Iloilo City

    by Rosalie Arcala Hall

    The upsurge in big-ticket infrastructure projects in Iloilo City for the past two decades owes much to the developmental alliance amongst Senator Franklin Drilon as the national government benefactor, multi-term city mayors, and the local business sector. These government officials’ prolonged tenure in office afforded a stable political leadership that ensured long-term planning around key infrastructure projects and continued access to national government funding. Robust institutional and informal ties between political and economic elites enabled consensus-building on the virtues of market-driven growth for which infrastructure is key. The Drilon political machine orchestrated a diverse but astutely networked group of local businesses by involving them in formal participatory planning processes, thereby facilitating approval of big-ticket items, and by influencing bureaucrats from national government agencies to approve the projects.


  • Camouflage in the Streets: Emergency Powers, the Military, and the Philippines’ COVID-19 Pandemic Response

    by Rosalie Arcala Hall

    With emergency powers, President Rodrigo Duterte mobilized and deployed military and police to enforce lockdown measures in Metro Manila and Cebu City. For several months in 2020, the deployed forces ran quarantine control points in borders and city wards, and enforced curfew and liquor bans. This article examines how said deployment affected civilian control by the President and local civil-military dynamics. The heightened visibility of uniformed personnel in these urban spaces, and subsequent arrests and detention of quarantine violators came under heavy criticism. Against the backdrop of ex-military dominated national Inter Agency Task Force for Infectious Diseases (IATF), the militarized lockdown failed to stem the virus’ spread and expanded the military’s reach into civilian domain. Its involvement in law enforcement operations alongside the police poses dangers to local civil-military balance and to democracy. President Duterte’s reliance on the state’s coercive apparatus to carry out the pandemic response enabled him to assert control over local governments and to repress dissent.


  • Open Access

    Between legal and legit: local security arrangements between state security actors and irregular forces in Bangsamoro region, Philippines

    by Rosalie Arcala Hall

    Gaps in state reach and historical challenges to state assertion of authority in Philippine peripheries account for the multiplicity of irregular forces. Rebel groups, private armies, militias, vigilantes, and criminal gangs crisscross legal and shadow spaces, and engage co-located military and police units. They are rooted in traditional social structures in terms of membership and legitimation source. They are pragmatically contracted by the state for local security provisioning and counterinsurgency, shoring up the decentralized power structure where local oligarchs and strongmen act as political brokers between the state and the communities. Negotiated peace agreements with two rebel groups and government-initiated reconfiguring of private armies into auxiliaries portend to a pathway of more formal integration or linkage between these irregular forces and the state security apparatus.


  • Open Access

    Introduction

    by Atsushi Yasutomi, Rosalie Arcala Hall, Saya Kiba

    This book analyzes irregular forces in the new democracies in Southeast Asia. Irregular forces—pro-government militias, anti-government militias, vigilante groups, gang groups, etc., as will be defined in the subsequent chapters—are often understood to be nefarious actors of democratic transitions and post-conflict peacebuilding processes. Irregular forces are thus often characterized as spoilers. True. Even after peace negotiations are concluded in the post-conflict settings, irregular forces manage to retain weapons and use them for extortion to exert political influence on the political opposition. In countries undergoing democratic transitions, irregular forces traffic weapons, humans, and drugs to benefit from illegal businesses that use violence and illegitimate money transactions. Others continue to violate human rights against the local population. These activities by no means represent opposite directions toward the transition to democracy. They may well be spoilers in many parts of Southeast Asia. Many scholars and practitioners in this field agree that these malignant actions thwart ongoing efforts to gain peace and stability.

  • Open Access

    Conclusion

    by Rosalie Arcala Hall, Saya Kiba, Atsushi Yasutomi

    Many of the irregular forces covered in this book are local formations, originally existing at the village level in response to local threats or as simple stand-ins for police that are mainly absent in many peripheral areas. The pro-government militias in Thailand's Deep South, the martial arts groups (MAGs)/ritual arts groups (RAGs) in Timor-Leste, and the Pancasila Youth, which were pro-Suharto gangs in Indonesia, were once loose organizations that, over time, gained more robust structure and expanded network as a result of deliberate state efforts. They were either made into auxiliaries of the state army or brought into its ambit for operational collaboration against state enemies. The Pancasila Youth under the Suharto-regime and militias in Indonesian-controlled Timor-Leste were closely linked to the army and were directed against the opposition. Gangs in Indonesia as well as the pro-government militias in Thailand's Deep South were initially utilized to suppress communist groups and suspects employing violence in demonstrations and killings and confiscation of party assets. These groups were later transformed into neighborhood watch associations, acting as informal security guards with strong links to the army command. The MAGs and RAGs in Timor-Leste, which are locality-based, borrow from the same playbook. Composed of university students, elites, and poor youth, they have been organized by the Indonesian occupying authorities as a way to reign in the young population and undertake dirty jobs. In Thailand, the government organized auxiliaries and militias under bureaucratic control of the military and police to subdue a separatist insurgency in the Deep South. In the Philippines, the militias were routinely mobilized against Muslim secessionists and communist rebels.


  • Open Access

    Pathways for irregular forces

    by Rosalie Arcala Hall

    While the use of violent means is the key feature of irregular forces, their transformation can proceed in the direction of more or less violence or nonviolence. Three trajectories are noted for Southeast Asian cases: pathway 1, where they retain their violence portfolio but functioning as an alternative, state-subcontracted, or state-amalgamated security provider; pathway 2, as an institutionalized exit from violent enterprise and individual reintegration into society; and pathway 3, which entails the shift to normal politics of the political party, interest group, and elites. The pathways for Southeast Asian irregular forces are shaped by their linkages with communities from which they derive resources and legitimacy, pragmatic connections with the state, and the negotiated conflict settlements that contain provisions for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration, and security sector reform. Because they are socially embedded structures, these armed groups are diverse and will likely persist in new forms until state capacity for public security is fully met.


  • Open Access

    Pathways for Irregular Forces in Southeast Asia

    by Atsushi Yasutomi, Rosalie Arcala Hall, Saya Kiba

    An exploration of the roles that pro- and anti-government militias, private armed groups, vigilantes, and gangs play in local communities in the new democracies of Southeast Asia. Scholars have typically characterized irregular forces as spoilers and infiltrators in post-conflict peacebuilding processes. The contributors to this book challenge this conventional understanding of irregular forces in Southeast Asia, demonstrating that they often attract solid support from civilians and can be major contributors to the building of local security — a process by which local residents, in the absence of an effective police force, develop, partner or are at least included in the management of community crimes and other violence. They analyze irregular forces’ dealings with political actors at the community level, explaining why and how forces are incorporated in and collaborate with legitimate institutions without using violence against them. Offering a new approach to dealing with irregular forces in Southeast Asia, contributors explore new theoretical frameworks that are better suited for evaluating irregular forces’ relationship to different security providers and the political environments in the region. Specifically, they examine case studies from Indonesia, Timor-Leste, the Philippines, and Thailand. A valuable resource for researchers, students and practitioners in the areas of conflict resolution, peacebuilding, and security governance, especially those with a focus on Southeast Asia. This book will also be of great interest to scholars of the sociology and anthropology of the region.

  • Shifts in the humanitarian space? Examining NGO–military engagements during the 2017 crisis in Marawi, Philippines

    by Rosalie Arcala Hall, Imelda Deinla

    The increase in military deployments for operations other than war, and their co‐location with humanitarian actors prompt an examination of how operational engagements are blurring boundaries between the two. Military‐initiated coordination structures that bridge civilian and military spheres of activities are seen as signs of the securitization of the humanitarian space. Examining the dynamics between deployed Philippine military units and local non‐governmental organizations (NGOs) in the humanitarian response to the 2017 Marawi siege, the former physically separated and subsumed humanitarian actions to kinetic goals. Using data from 48 interviews of commanders, NGO representatives and local government officials in 2018‐2019, military‐NGO interface was limited by military restrictions on mobility and by having a separate coordination platform benefiting soldiers and evacuees, respectively. Humanitarian NGOs are more willing to work with and are differential to the securitized space compared to human rights‐based NGOs.