Stephen Herzog
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Stephen Herzog has a total of 16 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David M. Allison
Department of Political Science and Nuclear Security Program, Yale University, New Haven
5 shared publications - Lauren Sukin
University of Oxford
5 shared publications - J. Luis Rodriguez
Schar School of Policy and Government, George Mason University
3 shared publications Jonathon Baron
Yale University - Department of Political Science
3 shared publicationsRebecca Davis Gibbons
University of Southern Maine
3 shared publications- Rebecca Davis Gibbons
University of Southern Maine
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- p. 1-4
Rethinking the Deterrence-Disarmament Dichotomy: The Complex Landscape of Global Nuclear Weapons Preferences – CORRIGENDUM
- 20 July 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- p. 1-4
Open AccessRethinking the Deterrence-Disarmament Dichotomy: The Complex Landscape of Global Nuclear Weapons Preferences – CORRIGENDUM
- Open Access
- 16 March 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 63 (4) , 690-704
Too brutal for war: comparing rationales for weapon taboos
What makes a weapon too horrific to use? This study investigates public attitudes toward the use of different weapon types using a conjoint survey experiment fielded on a U.S. sample. By randomly varying key attributes of military strikes—expected civilian casualties, operational effectiveness, and weapon type—we isolate the causal effects of each on public support. Casualty estimates exert the strongest influence, and effectiveness also matters. But we find that respondents rely heavily on powerful categorical heuristics about weapon types. These preferences persist even when other strike characteristics are held constant. The results reveal a robust hierarchy: cyber attacks were most favored, followed by conventional strikes, then cluster munitions over chemical, biological, and finally nuclear weapons. In fact, military operations using more favored weapons were often supported over more effective, or less lethal, ones employing disfavored armaments. These patterns reflect public intuitions about which weapons are perceived as brutal, indiscriminate, or illegitimate. Our study therefore has broad theoretical implications for understanding how weapon taboos interact with instrumental factors. It offers vital insights into the complex interplay of public preferences for military operations, weapon transfers, and arms control.
- 16 March 2026
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Journal of Peace Research
- Vol. 63 (4) , 690-704
Open AccessToo brutal for war: comparing rationales for weapon taboos
What makes a weapon too horrific to use? This study investigates public attitudes toward the use of different weapon types using a conjoint survey experiment fielded on a U.S. sample. By randomly varying key attributes of military strikes—expected civilian casualties, operational effectiveness, and weapon type—we isolate the causal effects of each on public support. Casualty estimates exert the strongest influence, and effectiveness also matters. But we find that respondents rely heavily on powerful categorical heuristics about weapon types. These preferences persist even when other strike characteristics are held constant. The results reveal a robust hierarchy: cyber attacks were most favored, followed by conventional strikes, then cluster munitions over chemical, biological, and finally nuclear weapons. In fact, military operations using more favored weapons were often supported over more effective, or less lethal, ones employing disfavored armaments. These patterns reflect public intuitions about which weapons are perceived as brutal, indiscriminate, or illegitimate. Our study therefore has broad theoretical implications for understanding how weapon taboos interact with instrumental factors. It offers vital insights into the complex interplay of public preferences for military operations, weapon transfers, and arms control.
- Open Access
- 28 January 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- p. 1-21
Rethinking the Deterrence-Disarmament Dichotomy: The Complex Landscape of Global Nuclear Weapons Preferences
Backers of nuclear deterrence are thought to use strategic logic, while nuclear disarmament advocates are believed to embrace moral reasoning. Yet policy makers and diverse publics may hold both—ostensibly contradictory—preferences. Recent studies find that publics in Western democratic countries support the nuclear strikes underpinning long-standing conceptions of deterrence policy. But other scholarship indicates that these very same publics want to abolish nuclear arsenals. A lack of comparative analyses across the Global North and the Global South limits the generalizability of these claims. Does a categorical dichotomy between nuclear deterrence and disarmament really reflect global public views on the bomb? What explains a multitude of seemingly inconsistent scholarly results? In this reflection essay, we argue that deterrence and disarmament are not necessarily incompatible tools for reducing nuclear dangers. We point to several ways that individuals might simultaneously accommodate both pro- and antinuclear weapons policy positions. To investigate this proposition, we offer a new observational dataset on global nuclear attitudes from a survey we conducted in 24 countries on six continents ( N = 27,250). Unlike isolated studies of these phenomena, our data strongly confirm that publics do not subscribe to categorical views of nuclear weapons. This headline finding and novel dataset open new possibilities for studying nuclear politics.
- 28 January 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Perspectives on Politics
- p. 1-21
Open AccessRethinking the Deterrence-Disarmament Dichotomy: The Complex Landscape of Global Nuclear Weapons Preferences
Backers of nuclear deterrence are thought to use strategic logic, while nuclear disarmament advocates are believed to embrace moral reasoning. Yet policy makers and diverse publics may hold both—ostensibly contradictory—preferences. Recent studies find that publics in Western democratic countries support the nuclear strikes underpinning long-standing conceptions of deterrence policy. But other scholarship indicates that these very same publics want to abolish nuclear arsenals. A lack of comparative analyses across the Global North and the Global South limits the generalizability of these claims. Does a categorical dichotomy between nuclear deterrence and disarmament really reflect global public views on the bomb? What explains a multitude of seemingly inconsistent scholarly results? In this reflection essay, we argue that deterrence and disarmament are not necessarily incompatible tools for reducing nuclear dangers. We point to several ways that individuals might simultaneously accommodate both pro- and antinuclear weapons policy positions. To investigate this proposition, we offer a new observational dataset on global nuclear attitudes from a survey we conducted in 24 countries on six continents ( N = 27,250). Unlike isolated studies of these phenomena, our data strongly confirm that publics do not subscribe to categorical views of nuclear weapons. This headline finding and novel dataset open new possibilities for studying nuclear politics.
- Open Access
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Scandinavian Military Studies in Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies
- Vol. 9 (1) , 519-538
NATO’s Nuclear Types: Vulnerability, Defense Investment, and Alliance Strategy Preferences
Members of nuclear alliances face myriad and complex demands. They must ensure that their nuclear-armed patron maintains adequate capabilities and resolve, while avoiding entrapment and entanglement. How, then, do states manage these competing needs? To address this question, we develop a typological theory of nuclear alliance members. We argue that a state’s vulnerability to a nuclear adversary and relative military spending/capacity ultimately determine its position within security alliances. This heterogeneity affects which deterrence and assurance needs various states will prioritize. Consequently, based on their type, alliance members will choose different strategies for managing their nuclear threat environment. Such choices range from hedging between their nuclear-armed patron and their adversary to seeking independent capabilities to influence their patron’s posture. We test these arguments using a public opinion survey conducted in ten current NATO member countries, fielded during a period of heightened nuclear salience in the Russo–Ukrainian War. The results reveal strong cross-national variation in public preferences regarding nuclear alliance management, thereby demonstrating the value of our typology in understanding dynamics within NATO.
- 14 January 2026
- Published by Scandinavian Military Studies in Scandinavian Journal of Military Studies
- Vol. 9 (1) , 519-538
Open AccessNATO’s Nuclear Types: Vulnerability, Defense Investment, and Alliance Strategy Preferences
Members of nuclear alliances face myriad and complex demands. They must ensure that their nuclear-armed patron maintains adequate capabilities and resolve, while avoiding entrapment and entanglement. How, then, do states manage these competing needs? To address this question, we develop a typological theory of nuclear alliance members. We argue that a state’s vulnerability to a nuclear adversary and relative military spending/capacity ultimately determine its position within security alliances. This heterogeneity affects which deterrence and assurance needs various states will prioritize. Consequently, based on their type, alliance members will choose different strategies for managing their nuclear threat environment. Such choices range from hedging between their nuclear-armed patron and their adversary to seeking independent capabilities to influence their patron’s posture. We test these arguments using a public opinion survey conducted in ten current NATO member countries, fielded during a period of heightened nuclear salience in the Russo–Ukrainian War. The results reveal strong cross-national variation in public preferences regarding nuclear alliance management, thereby demonstrating the value of our typology in understanding dynamics within NATO.
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Nonproliferation Review
- Vol. 33 (1-3) , 3-24
From proliferation to restraint: a process-based approach to artificial intelligence and weapons of mass destruction
Just a decade ago, it might have been nearly unfathomable to imagine that studying nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons would require a working knowledge of artificial intelligence (AI). AI was...
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Nonproliferation Review
- Vol. 33 (1-3) , 3-24
From proliferation to restraint: a process-based approach to artificial intelligence and weapons of mass destruction
Just a decade ago, it might have been nearly unfathomable to imagine that studying nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons would require a working knowledge of artificial intelligence (AI). AI was...
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Nonproliferation Review
- Vol. 33 (1-3) , 1
From the editor
You are now reading our special issue on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which opens the 2026 volume of The Nonproliferation Review. It features an introduction ...
- 2 January 2026
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Nonproliferation Review
- Vol. 33 (1-3) , 1
From the editor
You are now reading our special issue on Artificial Intelligence (AI) and Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), which opens the 2026 volume of The Nonproliferation Review. It features an introduction ...
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 33-49
Why States Join Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Treaties
- 20 November 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 33-49
Why States Join Multilateral Nuclear Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Treaties
- Open Access
- 11 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of International Security
- Vol. 11 (4) , 707-727
Atomic responsiveness: How public opinion shapes elite beliefs and preferences on nuclear weapon use
A recent wave of survey experiments has advanced scholarly understanding of public attitudes towards the use of nuclear weapons. In this article, we address the central question: can public opinion influence decision-makers’ views on nuclear weapon use? We bridge this critical gap in the literature with a survey experiment conducted on samples of UK parliamentarians and US and UK government employees in official policy roles. We varied public support for nuclear strikes in realistic scenarios to examine participants’ responsiveness to public preferences when considering nuclear first use, nuclear retaliation, and third-party nuclear threats. We show that high public support notably increases willingness to endorse nuclear first use against non-nuclear adversaries. Furthermore, public backing shapes beliefs about national leaders’ willingness to order nuclear strikes. However, the effect of public opinion is weaker in nuclear retaliation contexts, suggesting that different considerations become prominent when the ‘nuclear taboo’ has been breached. Importantly, sympathetic public opinion strongly influences perceptions of the credibility of third-party nuclear threats, carrying implications for the practice of nuclear deterrence. Our findings highlight the role of public opinion as both an enabling and constraining force on nuclear use and provide new theoretical and empirical insights into elite decision-making in nuclear politics.
- 11 November 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of International Security
- Vol. 11 (4) , 707-727
Open AccessAtomic responsiveness: How public opinion shapes elite beliefs and preferences on nuclear weapon use
A recent wave of survey experiments has advanced scholarly understanding of public attitudes towards the use of nuclear weapons. In this article, we address the central question: can public opinion influence decision-makers’ views on nuclear weapon use? We bridge this critical gap in the literature with a survey experiment conducted on samples of UK parliamentarians and US and UK government employees in official policy roles. We varied public support for nuclear strikes in realistic scenarios to examine participants’ responsiveness to public preferences when considering nuclear first use, nuclear retaliation, and third-party nuclear threats. We show that high public support notably increases willingness to endorse nuclear first use against non-nuclear adversaries. Furthermore, public backing shapes beliefs about national leaders’ willingness to order nuclear strikes. However, the effect of public opinion is weaker in nuclear retaliation contexts, suggesting that different considerations become prominent when the ‘nuclear taboo’ has been breached. Importantly, sympathetic public opinion strongly influences perceptions of the credibility of third-party nuclear threats, carrying implications for the practice of nuclear deterrence. Our findings highlight the role of public opinion as both an enabling and constraining force on nuclear use and provide new theoretical and empirical insights into elite decision-making in nuclear politics.
- Open Access
- 25 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 45 (11) , 3839-3859
Artificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: The Technological Arms Race for (In)visibility
A robust nonproliferation regime has contained the spread of nuclear weapons to just nine states. Yet, emerging and disruptive technologies are reshaping the landscape of nuclear risks, presenting a critical juncture for decision makers. This article lays out the contours of an overlooked but intensifying technological arms race for nuclear (in)visibility, driven by the interplay between proliferation‐enabling technologies (PETs) and detection‐enhancing technologies (DETs). We argue that the strategic pattern of proliferation will be increasingly shaped by the innovation pace in these domains. Artificial intelligence (AI) introduces unprecedented complexity to this equation, as its rapid scaling and knowledge substitution capabilities accelerate PET development and challenge traditional monitoring and verification methods. To analyze this dynamic, we develop a formal model centered on a Relative Advantage Index (RAI), quantifying the shifting balance between PETs and DETs. Our model explores how asymmetric technological advancement, particularly logistic AI‐driven PET growth versus stepwise DET improvements, expands the band of uncertainty surrounding proliferation detectability. Through replicable scenario‐based simulations, we evaluate the impact of varying PET growth rates and DET investment strategies on cumulative nuclear breakout risk. We identify a strategic fork ahead, where detection may no longer suffice without broader PET governance. Governments and international organizations should accordingly invest in policies and tools agile enough to keep pace with tomorrow's technology.
- 25 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in Risk Analysis
- Vol. 45 (11) , 3839-3859
Open AccessArtificial Intelligence and Nuclear Weapons Proliferation: The Technological Arms Race for (In)visibility
A robust nonproliferation regime has contained the spread of nuclear weapons to just nine states. Yet, emerging and disruptive technologies are reshaping the landscape of nuclear risks, presenting a critical juncture for decision makers. This article lays out the contours of an overlooked but intensifying technological arms race for nuclear (in)visibility, driven by the interplay between proliferation‐enabling technologies (PETs) and detection‐enhancing technologies (DETs). We argue that the strategic pattern of proliferation will be increasingly shaped by the innovation pace in these domains. Artificial intelligence (AI) introduces unprecedented complexity to this equation, as its rapid scaling and knowledge substitution capabilities accelerate PET development and challenge traditional monitoring and verification methods. To analyze this dynamic, we develop a formal model centered on a Relative Advantage Index (RAI), quantifying the shifting balance between PETs and DETs. Our model explores how asymmetric technological advancement, particularly logistic AI‐driven PET growth versus stepwise DET improvements, expands the band of uncertainty surrounding proliferation detectability. Through replicable scenario‐based simulations, we evaluate the impact of varying PET growth rates and DET investment strategies on cumulative nuclear breakout risk. We identify a strategic fork ahead, where detection may no longer suffice without broader PET governance. Governments and international organizations should accordingly invest in policies and tools agile enough to keep pace with tomorrow's technology.
- Open Access
- 12 August 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (4) , 639-665
Winning Hearts and Minds? How the United States Reassured During the Russo-Ukrainian War
Decades of scholarship hold that great powers shore up global confidence during crises with strong demonstrations of resolve. A much smaller literature critiques these assumptions, suggesting that restraint may strengthen confidence. When and why do restraint or resolve reassure, and for whom? In light of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we appraise early U.S. attempts to reassure allies and partners using public opinion surveys in 24 countries on six continents. Our novel data, which cover rarely surveyed publics, illuminates conditions under which restraint or resolve reassure. We introduce theoretical mechanisms that predict individuals’ propensity to be reassured by resolve or restraint: prior beliefs about the use of force and geopolitical positioning. The results challenge dominant scholarly narratives. Respondents worldwide were reassured by restraint. Forgoing direct intervention in the Russo-Ukrainian War strengthened the U.S.-led order, successfully balancing NATO members’ interests with those of U.S. Indo-Pacific and Global South partners.
- 12 August 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journal of Conflict Resolution
- Vol. 70 (4) , 639-665
Open AccessWinning Hearts and Minds? How the United States Reassured During the Russo-Ukrainian War
Decades of scholarship hold that great powers shore up global confidence during crises with strong demonstrations of resolve. A much smaller literature critiques these assumptions, suggesting that restraint may strengthen confidence. When and why do restraint or resolve reassure, and for whom? In light of Russia’s 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, we appraise early U.S. attempts to reassure allies and partners using public opinion surveys in 24 countries on six continents. Our novel data, which cover rarely surveyed publics, illuminates conditions under which restraint or resolve reassure. We introduce theoretical mechanisms that predict individuals’ propensity to be reassured by resolve or restraint: prior beliefs about the use of force and geopolitical positioning. The results challenge dominant scholarly narratives. Respondents worldwide were reassured by restraint. Forgoing direct intervention in the Russo-Ukrainian War strengthened the U.S.-led order, successfully balancing NATO members’ interests with those of U.S. Indo-Pacific and Global South partners.