Luca Ratti
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Luca Ratti has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Alessandro Leonardi
History of International Relations from the University of Florence
2 shared publications- Christopher Kirkey
State University of New York at Plattsburgh
1 shared publication David G. Haglund
Department of Political Studies, Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada
1 shared publication- David Mayers
Department of History, Boston University, Boston, USA
1 shared publication - Gaynor Johnson
University of Kent
1 shared publication - Tony McCulloch
UCL Institute of the Americas, University College London, London, UK
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Transatlantic Studies
- Vol. 24 (1) , 22
Transatlantic studies association roundtable on Tacit Alliance: Franklin Roosevelt and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' before Churchill, 1937-1939
- 23 July 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Transatlantic Studies
- Vol. 24 (1) , 22
Open AccessTransatlantic studies association roundtable on Tacit Alliance: Franklin Roosevelt and the Anglo-American 'Special Relationship' before Churchill, 1937-1939
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Transatlantic Studies
- p. 1-15
Defying old and new warnings about NATO’s impending crisis
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Transatlantic Studies
- p. 1-15
Defying old and new warnings about NATO’s impending crisis
- 20 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International History Review
- Vol. 43 (3) , 614-637
The Anglo-American Special Relationship and West Germany’s Eastern Policy from ‘Bridge-Building’ and Vietnam to Ostpolitik
This paper evaluates the interaction, which developed during the 1960s and early 1970s, between U.S. and British policies towards the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) Neue Ostpolitik and the impact that West German initiatives had on the special relationship in the context of deepening Anglo-American discrepancies over Vietnam and the UK’s East of Suez withdrawal. In the early 1950s the FRG’s integration into NATO had been a joint Anglo-American priority but the U.S. attitude on how to deal with Soviet concerns about Germany was regarded in London as too rigid. Both Conservative and Labour governments long advocated more flexibility in dealing with the East. However, Whitehall’s attempts to foster dialogue with Moscow, such as Winston Churchill’s 1953 Eastern Locarno proposal for great power guarantees of peace and the status quo in Europe, were resisted by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John F. Dulles. It was only in the early 1960s that the White House and the State Department gradually reversed the American view that détente would not be possible without progress on the German question. Building upon the legacy of President Kennedy’s 1963 ‘strategy of peace’ speech, between 1964 and 1968 Johnson’s policy of ‘bridge-building’ replaced the static notion of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with a broader vision of progressive engagement. Now Washington took a more flexible approach and encouraged the FRG to open up its own channels towards the Soviet bloc countries. The change in the American attitude was important also for U.S.-UK relations, as it brought it more into line with Britain’s views at a time when, as American involvement in Vietnam grew deeper, Washington exerted significant economic and political pressure on London to retain its East of Suez commitments. However, for the Americans it was equally important that the FRG’s overtures to the Soviet bloc states did not endanger Western cohesion and transatlantic unity. After Nixon’s victory in the 1968 Presidential election, the White House began to worry about the implications of some of the FRG’s initiatives. U.S. apprehensions were now partly shared in London, although new conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, like Wilson, continued to pursue cooperation with the FRG, seeking to ease the UK’s admission into the European Economic Community (EEC).
- 20 July 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International History Review
- Vol. 43 (3) , 614-637
The Anglo-American Special Relationship and West Germany’s Eastern Policy from ‘Bridge-Building’ and Vietnam to Ostpolitik
This paper evaluates the interaction, which developed during the 1960s and early 1970s, between U.S. and British policies towards the Federal Republic of Germany’s (FRG) Neue Ostpolitik and the impact that West German initiatives had on the special relationship in the context of deepening Anglo-American discrepancies over Vietnam and the UK’s East of Suez withdrawal. In the early 1950s the FRG’s integration into NATO had been a joint Anglo-American priority but the U.S. attitude on how to deal with Soviet concerns about Germany was regarded in London as too rigid. Both Conservative and Labour governments long advocated more flexibility in dealing with the East. However, Whitehall’s attempts to foster dialogue with Moscow, such as Winston Churchill’s 1953 Eastern Locarno proposal for great power guarantees of peace and the status quo in Europe, were resisted by U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his Secretary of State John F. Dulles. It was only in the early 1960s that the White House and the State Department gradually reversed the American view that détente would not be possible without progress on the German question. Building upon the legacy of President Kennedy’s 1963 ‘strategy of peace’ speech, between 1964 and 1968 Johnson’s policy of ‘bridge-building’ replaced the static notion of ‘peaceful coexistence’ with a broader vision of progressive engagement. Now Washington took a more flexible approach and encouraged the FRG to open up its own channels towards the Soviet bloc countries. The change in the American attitude was important also for U.S.-UK relations, as it brought it more into line with Britain’s views at a time when, as American involvement in Vietnam grew deeper, Washington exerted significant economic and political pressure on London to retain its East of Suez commitments. However, for the Americans it was equally important that the FRG’s overtures to the Soviet bloc states did not endanger Western cohesion and transatlantic unity. After Nixon’s victory in the 1968 Presidential election, the White House began to worry about the implications of some of the FRG’s initiatives. U.S. apprehensions were now partly shared in London, although new conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath, like Wilson, continued to pursue cooperation with the FRG, seeking to ease the UK’s admission into the European Economic Community (EEC).
- 3 April 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
- Vol. 32 (2) , 135-158
Reviving Flexible Response: An Assessment of NATO’s Russian Strategy on the Alliance’s 70th Anniversary
This article reviews NATO’s embrace of a new political and military strategy toward the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1960s and seeks to determine whether the tools that were singled out then in the debate over strategy could help overcome the current stalemate between the Alliance and the Russian Federation. Between 1967 and 1969, NATO adopted the Harmel Report and embraced the doctrine of ‘flexible response’ to retain relevance in a rapidly transforming international system. At 70, the dynamics faced by the Alliance place NATO at a similarly critical juncture. A rekindled strategy of 'flexible response' might help the Alliance preserve a premier role in Euro-Atlantic security and strike a durable arrangement with Moscow.
- 3 April 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies
- Vol. 32 (2) , 135-158
Reviving Flexible Response: An Assessment of NATO’s Russian Strategy on the Alliance’s 70th Anniversary
This article reviews NATO’s embrace of a new political and military strategy toward the Soviet Union in the second half of the 1960s and seeks to determine whether the tools that were singled out then in the debate over strategy could help overcome the current stalemate between the Alliance and the Russian Federation. Between 1967 and 1969, NATO adopted the Harmel Report and embraced the doctrine of ‘flexible response’ to retain relevance in a rapidly transforming international system. At 70, the dynamics faced by the Alliance place NATO at a similarly critical juncture. A rekindled strategy of 'flexible response' might help the Alliance preserve a premier role in Euro-Atlantic security and strike a durable arrangement with Moscow.
- 24 April 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International History Review
- Vol. 40 (2) , 462-464
How NATO adapts: strategy and organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950, by Seth A. Johnson
(2018). How NATO adapts: strategy and organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950, by Seth A. Johnson. The International History Review: Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 462-464.
- 24 April 2017
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The International History Review
- Vol. 40 (2) , 462-464
How NATO adapts: strategy and organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950, by Seth A. Johnson
(2018). How NATO adapts: strategy and organization in the Atlantic Alliance since 1950, by Seth A. Johnson. The International History Review: Vol. 40, No. 2, pp. 462-464.