Rhys Crilley
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Rhys Crilley has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Precious N. Chatterje-Doody
The Open University
5 shared publications Marie Gillespie
The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK
4 shared publicationsAlistair Willis
The Open University, Milton Keynes, UK
3 shared publications- Ilan Manor
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Israel
3 shared publications Ilan Manor
University of Oxford
2 shared publications- Andrea Schneiker
University of Siegen
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 26 July 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
- Vol. 27 (2) , 566-572
Should we be writing at a time like this? Reflections on abolition, political science, and international relations
Should we be writing at a time like this? In this short reflection for the 25th anniversary of the British Journal of Politics and International Relations, I argue that for the journal to remain relevant in an age of perma-crisis, those of us who read and publish in it need to adopt an abolitionist approach to our research, teaching, and praxis. I outline the contours of an abolitionist approach to political science and international relations, and argue that if we are a community who aims to understand, explain, and address the issues and crises that face Britain and the globe today, then our disciplines of political science and international relations may themselves not be up to the scale and seriousness of the challenges we face. Instead, abolition can provide a pathway to overcoming harms and injustices, and offers us a future of care, community, and public safety.
- 26 July 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
- Vol. 27 (2) , 566-572
Open AccessShould we be writing at a time like this? Reflections on abolition, political science, and international relations
Should we be writing at a time like this? In this short reflection for the 25th anniversary of the British Journal of Politics and International Relations, I argue that for the journal to remain relevant in an age of perma-crisis, those of us who read and publish in it need to adopt an abolitionist approach to our research, teaching, and praxis. I outline the contours of an abolitionist approach to political science and international relations, and argue that if we are a community who aims to understand, explain, and address the issues and crises that face Britain and the globe today, then our disciplines of political science and international relations may themselves not be up to the scale and seriousness of the challenges we face. Instead, abolition can provide a pathway to overcoming harms and injustices, and offers us a future of care, community, and public safety.
- Open Access
- 27 May 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
- Vol. 24 (1) , 136-152
‘Russia isn’t a country of Putins!’: How RT bridged the credibility gap in Russian public diplomacy during the 2018 FIFA World Cup
In the context of deteriorating relations with ‘Western’ states, Russia’s state-funded international broadcasters are often understood as malign propaganda rather than as agents of soft power. Subsequently, there is a major credibility gap between how Russian state media represents itself to the world and how it is actually perceived by overseas publics. However, based on the study of RT’s coverage of the Russian hosted FIFA 2018 World Cup and the audience reactions this prompted, we find that this credibility gap was partially bridged. By analysing over 700 articles published by RT, alongside social media and focus group research, we find that RT’s World Cup coverage created an unusually positive vision of Russia that appealed to international audiences. Our study demonstrates how state-funded international broadcaster coverage of sports mega-events can generate a soft power effect with audiences, even when the host state – such as Russia – has a poor international reputation.
- 27 May 2021
- Published by SAGE Publications in The British Journal of Politics and International Relations
- Vol. 24 (1) , 136-152
Open Access‘Russia isn’t a country of Putins!’: How RT bridged the credibility gap in Russian public diplomacy during the 2018 FIFA World Cup
In the context of deteriorating relations with ‘Western’ states, Russia’s state-funded international broadcasters are often understood as malign propaganda rather than as agents of soft power. Subsequently, there is a major credibility gap between how Russian state media represents itself to the world and how it is actually perceived by overseas publics. However, based on the study of RT’s coverage of the Russian hosted FIFA 2018 World Cup and the audience reactions this prompted, we find that this credibility gap was partially bridged. By analysing over 700 articles published by RT, alongside social media and focus group research, we find that RT’s World Cup coverage created an unusually positive vision of Russia that appealed to international audiences. Our study demonstrates how state-funded international broadcaster coverage of sports mega-events can generate a soft power effect with audiences, even when the host state – such as Russia – has a poor international reputation.
- 18 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Intelligence and National Security
- Vol. 36 (4) , 599-614
‘No, we don’t know where Tupac is’: critical intelligence studies and the CIA on social media
Since joining Twitter in 2014, the CIA has used social media to show an uncharacteristically humorous side to an institution more commonly associated with espionage and secrecy. In light of this representation, we analyse the CIA’s tweets and public responses to them by building upon recent work on critical intelligence studies. We argue that the CIA’s use of social media is a continuation of the CIA’s intervention in popular culture that is vital to the legitimation of the Agency’s actions. In doing so we demonstrate the contribution that discourse analysis can make to intelligence studies in the digital age.
- 18 March 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Intelligence and National Security
- Vol. 36 (4) , 599-614
‘No, we don’t know where Tupac is’: critical intelligence studies and the CIA on social media
Since joining Twitter in 2014, the CIA has used social media to show an uncharacteristically humorous side to an institution more commonly associated with espionage and secrecy. In light of this representation, we analyse the CIA’s tweets and public responses to them by building upon recent work on critical intelligence studies. We argue that the CIA’s use of social media is a continuation of the CIA’s intervention in popular culture that is vital to the legitimation of the Agency’s actions. In doing so we demonstrate the contribution that discourse analysis can make to intelligence studies in the digital age.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 16 December 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in The International Journal of Press/Politics
- Vol. 27 (1) , 220-242
Understanding RT’s Audiences: Exposure Not Endorsement for Twitter Followers of Russian State-Sponsored Media
The Russian state-funded international broadcaster RT (formerly Russia Today) has attracted much attention as a purveyor of Russian propaganda. To date, most studies of RT have focused on its broadcast, website, and social media content, with little research on its audiences. Through a data-driven application of network science and other computational methods, we address this gap to provide insight into the demographics and interests of RT’s Twitter followers, as well as how they engage with RT. Building upon recent studies of Russian state-sponsored media, we report three main results. First, we find that most of RT’s Twitter followers only very rarely engage with its content and tend to be exposed to RT’s content alongside other mainstream news channels. This indicates that RT is not a central part of their online news media environment. Second, using probabilistic computational methods, we show that followers of RT are slightly more likely to be older and male than average Twitter users, and they are far more likely to be bots. Third, we identify thirty-five distinct audience segments, which vary in terms of their nationality, languages, and interests. This audience segmentation reveals the considerable heterogeneity of RT’s Twitter followers. Accordingly, we conclude that generalizations about RT’s audience based on analyses of RT’s media content, or on vocal minorities among its wider audiences, are unhelpful and limit our understanding of RT and its appeal to international audiences.
- 16 December 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in The International Journal of Press/Politics
- Vol. 27 (1) , 220-242
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessUnderstanding RT’s Audiences: Exposure Not Endorsement for Twitter Followers of Russian State-Sponsored Media
The Russian state-funded international broadcaster RT (formerly Russia Today) has attracted much attention as a purveyor of Russian propaganda. To date, most studies of RT have focused on its broadcast, website, and social media content, with little research on its audiences. Through a data-driven application of network science and other computational methods, we address this gap to provide insight into the demographics and interests of RT’s Twitter followers, as well as how they engage with RT. Building upon recent studies of Russian state-sponsored media, we report three main results. First, we find that most of RT’s Twitter followers only very rarely engage with its content and tend to be exposed to RT’s content alongside other mainstream news channels. This indicates that RT is not a central part of their online news media environment. Second, using probabilistic computational methods, we show that followers of RT are slightly more likely to be older and male than average Twitter users, and they are far more likely to be bots. Third, we identify thirty-five distinct audience segments, which vary in terms of their nationality, languages, and interests. This audience segmentation reveals the considerable heterogeneity of RT’s Twitter followers. Accordingly, we conclude that generalizations about RT’s audience based on analyses of RT’s media content, or on vocal minorities among its wider audiences, are unhelpful and limit our understanding of RT and its appeal to international audiences.
- Top Cited Papers
- 18 November 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Global Society
- Vol. 35 (2) , 269-288
From Russia with Lols: Humour, RT, and the Legitimation of Russian Foreign Policy
The Russian state-funded international broadcaster RT is often accused of pedalling misinformation and claiming legitimacy for nefarious Russian activities. Whilst studies have so far analysed the content of RT's media reports, they have yet to interrogate how Russian legitimation claims are often expressed on RT through a blurring of news reporting and comedy. This paper addresses this gap and places humour at the centre of analysis, arguing that comedy and satire are fundamental to how RT claims legitimacy for Russian foreign policy. We begin by introducing theories of legitimation to studies of comedy in global politics, before then examining RT's social media outputs and audience responses to those. In doing so, we demonstrate that humour is central to how RT claims legitimacy for Russian foreign policy. From military intervention in Syria, to the poisoning of the Skripals in Salisbury, humour shapes how RT's legitimation claims are interpreted by their audiences.
- 18 November 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Global Society
- Vol. 35 (2) , 269-288
Top Cited PapersFrom Russia with Lols: Humour, RT, and the Legitimation of Russian Foreign Policy
The Russian state-funded international broadcaster RT is often accused of pedalling misinformation and claiming legitimacy for nefarious Russian activities. Whilst studies have so far analysed the content of RT's media reports, they have yet to interrogate how Russian legitimation claims are often expressed on RT through a blurring of news reporting and comedy. This paper addresses this gap and places humour at the centre of analysis, arguing that comedy and satire are fundamental to how RT claims legitimacy for Russian foreign policy. We begin by introducing theories of legitimation to studies of comedy in global politics, before then examining RT's social media outputs and audience responses to those. In doing so, we demonstrate that humour is central to how RT claims legitimacy for Russian foreign policy. From military intervention in Syria, to the poisoning of the Skripals in Salisbury, humour shapes how RT's legitimation claims are interpreted by their audiences.
- Open Access
- 16 July 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journalism
- Vol. 22 (12) , 2971-2990
Mediatization and journalistic agency: Russian television coverage of the Skripal poisonings
The 2018 Skripal poisonings prompted the heavy securitisation of UK-Russian relations. Despite the ensuing tight coordination between the Russian government and state-aligned television, this article argues that in today’s mediatised environment – in which social and political activities fuse inextricably with their own mediation – even non-democracies must cope with the shaping of global communications by media logics and related market imperatives. With a range of media actors responding to events, and to each other, on multiple digital platforms, no state could assert full narrative control over the Skripal incident. Counterintuitively, Russian journalists’ journalistic agency was enhanced by mediatisation processes: their state sponsors, seeking to instrumentalise reporting, delegated agency to journalists more attuned to such processes; yet commercial imperatives obliged them to perform independence and professional credibility. These competing forms of agency clashed with one another, and with that of the audiences engaging in real time with the journalists’ outputs, ultimately undermining the Russian state’s efforts to harness news coverage to its political and security goals. The article concludes that in today’s global communications environment, mediatisation substantially constrains the ability of non-democracies to micro-manage journalists’ treatment of major events relating to national security.
- 16 July 2020
- Published by SAGE Publications in Journalism
- Vol. 22 (12) , 2971-2990
Open AccessMediatization and journalistic agency: Russian television coverage of the Skripal poisonings
The 2018 Skripal poisonings prompted the heavy securitisation of UK-Russian relations. Despite the ensuing tight coordination between the Russian government and state-aligned television, this article argues that in today’s mediatised environment – in which social and political activities fuse inextricably with their own mediation – even non-democracies must cope with the shaping of global communications by media logics and related market imperatives. With a range of media actors responding to events, and to each other, on multiple digital platforms, no state could assert full narrative control over the Skripal incident. Counterintuitively, Russian journalists’ journalistic agency was enhanced by mediatisation processes: their state sponsors, seeking to instrumentalise reporting, delegated agency to journalists more attuned to such processes; yet commercial imperatives obliged them to perform independence and professional credibility. These competing forms of agency clashed with one another, and with that of the audiences engaging in real time with the journalists’ outputs, ultimately undermining the Russian state’s efforts to harness news coverage to its political and security goals. The article concludes that in today’s global communications environment, mediatisation substantially constrains the ability of non-democracies to micro-manage journalists’ treatment of major events relating to national security.
- 12 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 137-160
Un-nation Branding: The Cities of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in Israeli Soft Power
- 12 July 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 137-160
Un-nation Branding: The Cities of Tel Aviv and Jerusalem in Israeli Soft Power
- Open Access
- 2 July 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Review
- Vol. 23 (3) , 1046-1071
Forum: Militarization 2.0: Communication and the Normalization of Political Violence in the Digital Age
Scholars of international relations frequently explore how states normalize the use of military force through processes of militarization, yet few have analyzed how new information and communication technologies impact on these processes. The essays in this forum address this gap, and consider the political significance of new technologies, new actors, and new practices that shape “Militarization 2.0” and normalize political violence in the digital age. The authors in this forum rely, to varying degrees, on common militarized tropes and dichotomies (such as authenticity, belonging, and (de)humanizing framings) that are key to militarization, including those devices that rest on gender, race/ethnicity, and heteronormativity. Moving beyond a military-centered approach to militarization, the authors’ questions cover ministries of foreign affairs; the embodied performances of celebrity leaders and insurgency groups; arms producers, the military video game industry, and private military and security companies; and violence entrepreneurs. The forum closes with reflections from Cynthia Enloe.
- 2 July 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Review
- Vol. 23 (3) , 1046-1071
Open AccessForum: Militarization 2.0: Communication and the Normalization of Political Violence in the Digital Age
Scholars of international relations frequently explore how states normalize the use of military force through processes of militarization, yet few have analyzed how new information and communication technologies impact on these processes. The essays in this forum address this gap, and consider the political significance of new technologies, new actors, and new practices that shape “Militarization 2.0” and normalize political violence in the digital age. The authors in this forum rely, to varying degrees, on common militarized tropes and dichotomies (such as authenticity, belonging, and (de)humanizing framings) that are key to militarization, including those devices that rest on gender, race/ethnicity, and heteronormativity. Moving beyond a military-centered approach to militarization, the authors’ questions cover ministries of foreign affairs; the embodied performances of celebrity leaders and insurgency groups; arms producers, the military video game industry, and private military and security companies; and violence entrepreneurs. The forum closes with reflections from Cynthia Enloe.
- Open Access
- 23 May 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Review
- Vol. 23 (1) , 164-180
Where We At? New Directions for Research on Popular Culture and World Politics
A decade ago, scholars of international relations articulated a research agenda for the study of popular culture and world politics (PCWP), and since then a burgeoning literature has grown in this area. This article critically reflects on the research agenda put forward by Grayson, Davies, and Philpott and explores how recent scholarship has furthered the study of PCWP. In doing so, this article identifies four limitations of current research and suggests that if PCWP scholarship is to remain committed to understanding how power, identities, ideologies, and actions are made commonsense and legitimate, while also problematizing global inequalities and injustices, then it needs to pay greater attention to the analysis of four areas. These are (1) race, colonialism, and intersectionality in PCWP; (2) the impact of digital technology on PCWP; (3) the audience interpretation of PCWP; and (4) practices of making and producing PCWP.
- 23 May 2020
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Studies Review
- Vol. 23 (1) , 164-180
Open AccessWhere We At? New Directions for Research on Popular Culture and World Politics
A decade ago, scholars of international relations articulated a research agenda for the study of popular culture and world politics (PCWP), and since then a burgeoning literature has grown in this area. This article critically reflects on the research agenda put forward by Grayson, Davies, and Philpott and explores how recent scholarship has furthered the study of PCWP. In doing so, this article identifies four limitations of current research and suggests that if PCWP scholarship is to remain committed to understanding how power, identities, ideologies, and actions are made commonsense and legitimate, while also problematizing global inequalities and injustices, then it needs to pay greater attention to the analysis of four areas. These are (1) race, colonialism, and intersectionality in PCWP; (2) the impact of digital technology on PCWP; (3) the audience interpretation of PCWP; and (4) practices of making and producing PCWP.
- Top Cited Papers
- 13 March 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Cambridge Review of International Affairs
- Vol. 33 (5) , 713-733
Emotions and war on YouTube: affective investments in RT’s visual narratives of the conflict in Syria
Recent scholarship claims that narratives and images of war have political effects, not simply because of their content and ‘form’, but because of their affective and emotional ‘forces’. Yet, International Relations scholars rarely explore how audiences respond to narratives and images of war in their research. Addressing this gap, this paper combines discourse analysis of RT (formerly Russia Today) ‘breaking news’ YouTube videos of Russian military intervention in Syria with analysis of 750 comments and social media interactions on those videos. Our findings demonstrate how RT layers moral and legal justifications for Russian intervention in multiple audio-visual formats, within a visual narrative of the conflict that relies on affective representations of key actors and events. Viewers largely approve of the content, replicate its core narratives and express emotions coherent with RT’s affective representation of the Syrian conflict. Audiences’ responses to these narratives and images of war were shaped by their affective investments in the identities and events portrayed on-screen. These affective investments are therefore crucial in understanding the political significance of images of armed conflict.
- 13 March 2020
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Cambridge Review of International Affairs
- Vol. 33 (5) , 713-733
Top Cited PapersEmotions and war on YouTube: affective investments in RT’s visual narratives of the conflict in Syria
Recent scholarship claims that narratives and images of war have political effects, not simply because of their content and ‘form’, but because of their affective and emotional ‘forces’. Yet, International Relations scholars rarely explore how audiences respond to narratives and images of war in their research. Addressing this gap, this paper combines discourse analysis of RT (formerly Russia Today) ‘breaking news’ YouTube videos of Russian military intervention in Syria with analysis of 750 comments and social media interactions on those videos. Our findings demonstrate how RT layers moral and legal justifications for Russian intervention in multiple audio-visual formats, within a visual narrative of the conflict that relies on affective representations of key actors and events. Viewers largely approve of the content, replicate its core narratives and express emotions coherent with RT’s affective representation of the Syrian conflict. Audiences’ responses to these narratives and images of war were shaped by their affective investments in the identities and events portrayed on-screen. These affective investments are therefore crucial in understanding the political significance of images of armed conflict.