Daiqiang Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Daiqiang Zhang has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Cong Li
Shanghai Univ Finance & Econ, Sch Econ, 777 Guoding Rd, Shanghai 200433, Peoples R China
1 shared publication- Jeffrey S. Racine
Department of Economics and Graduate Program in Statistics, McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada
1 shared publication - Qi Li
Texas A&M University
1 shared publication - Yonghong An
Texas A&M University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 13 October 2020
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 62 (2) , 723-767
TESTING PASSIVE VERSUS SYMMETRIC BELIEFS IN CONTRACTING WITH EXTERNALITIES
This article provides identification and estimation methods for a model of contracting with externalities and imperfect information. In this model, one principal offers a contract of trade quantity to each of multiple agents, and the negotiated payment for each agent is determined via Nash bargaining. Beliefs matter due to the privacy of bilateral contracting and the externalities from the dependence of each agent's payoff on all agents' trade quantities. We provide a test to determine whether passive or symmetric beliefs fit a given data set better. The empirical results suggest the relevance of adopting the correct beliefs for policy evaluations.
- 13 October 2020
- Published by Wiley in International Economic Review
- Vol. 62 (2) , 723-767
TESTING PASSIVE VERSUS SYMMETRIC BELIEFS IN CONTRACTING WITH EXTERNALITIES
This article provides identification and estimation methods for a model of contracting with externalities and imperfect information. In this model, one principal offers a contract of trade quantity to each of multiple agents, and the negotiated payment for each agent is determined via Nash bargaining. Beliefs matter due to the privacy of bilateral contracting and the externalities from the dependence of each agent's payoff on all agents' trade quantities. We provide a test to determine whether passive or symmetric beliefs fit a given data set better. The empirical results suggest the relevance of adopting the correct beliefs for policy evaluations.
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Statistica Sinica (Institute of Statistical Science) in Statistica Sinica
- Vol. 28 (4) , 2795-2809
OPTIMAL MODEL AVERAGING OF VARYING COEFFICIENT MODELS
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Statistica Sinica (Institute of Statistical Science) in Statistica Sinica
- Vol. 28 (4) , 2795-2809
OPTIMAL MODEL AVERAGING OF VARYING COEFFICIENT MODELS
- 23 April 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 20 (5) , 742-756
Simple menus of cost‐based contracts with monotone optimal effort
This paper extends the fixed‐price cost‐reimbursement (FPCR) menu by allowing the agent's cost‐reducing optimal effort to be monotone in the agent's cost type. We show that the performance of the optimal FPCR menu relies crucially on the monotonicity of optimal effort. In particular, in an optimal FPCR menu, if the optimal effort is increasing in type and only a portion of cost types are induced to exert effort, the performance of the optimal FPCR menu can be very poor relative to the fully optimal contract. Our results suggest that in designing an optimal FPCR menu it is important for the principal to take into account the cost structure or, more exactly, the monotonicity of optimal effort in type.
- 23 April 2018
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Public Economic Theory
- Vol. 20 (5) , 742-756
Simple menus of cost‐based contracts with monotone optimal effort
This paper extends the fixed‐price cost‐reimbursement (FPCR) menu by allowing the agent's cost‐reducing optimal effort to be monotone in the agent's cost type. We show that the performance of the optimal FPCR menu relies crucially on the monotonicity of optimal effort. In particular, in an optimal FPCR menu, if the optimal effort is increasing in type and only a portion of cost types are induced to exert effort, the performance of the optimal FPCR menu can be very poor relative to the fully optimal contract. Our results suggest that in designing an optimal FPCR menu it is important for the principal to take into account the cost structure or, more exactly, the monotonicity of optimal effort in type.