HMHeikki Mansikka

Heikki Mansikka

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Heikki Mansikka has a total of 19 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Communicating Commander's Intent in a Chain of Command With Multi‐Criteria Decision Analysis—An Experiment in Air Combat

    by Kai Virtanen, Heikki Mansikka, Mikko Kankaisto, Raimo P. Hämäläinen

    Decision making in a chain of command with a rapid time frame is typical in military and emergency contexts, and yet the topic has received almost no attention in the MCDA literature. The commander's intent regarding the implementation of an operation is expressed at the top level of the command chain. Before the intent is put into practice, it must be passed through different levels of the chain. Typically, the intention statement does not provide exact guidance on how the operation should be planned and executed on the lower levels. As a result, behavioural effects and biases can distort the interpretations of the intent at the lower levels. The contribution of this paper is an approach for using MCDA to support communication, planning and decision making in the chain of command. In this approach, criteria weights of an MCDA model are determined on the highest level by the commander. Then, the commander's intent is communicated so that the message from the top level also contains these weights, and the MCDA model is utilised on the lower levels. The approach was evaluated in an air force test case. Two air force commanders expressed their intents and corresponding criteria weights for two defensive counter air operations. The criteria were related to the survival of own aircraft, the destruction of enemy aircraft and the expenditure of missiles. The commanders used five weighting methods, that is, SMARTER, Direct, Swing, SMART and AHP. They preferred the Direct and Swing methods. Air force staff officers planned the air operations by following the standard and MCDA‐supported planning procedures. The simulation of these operations revealed that the MCDA‐supported ones were in better compliance with the commanders' original intent statements. Thus, the MCDA approach appeared to support the integrity of the command chain as the intent was conveyed through it.

  • Comparison of In-Flight and Post-Flight Use of NASA-TLX

    by Heikki Mansikka, Kai Virtanen, Don Harris

    The objective of this study was to evaluate the feasibility of airborne assignment of NASA-TLX scores. A total of 21 participants flew two simulated flying missions. In both missions, the participants’ task was to fly an instrument landing system (ILS) approach, followed by a stabilized climbing turn maneuver. In one mission, the participants evaluated their mental workload on the ILS approach and assigned the NASA-TLX scores during the climbing turn maneuver. In the other mission, the same tasks were conducted after the simulated flying task. The participants’ NASA-TLX scores and flying performance between missions were compared. There was no significant difference in the participants’ flying performance between missions. There were no significant differences in either NASA-TLX scores or overall indices between two missions.


  • Open Access

    Improving pilots’ tactical decisions in air combat training using the critical decision method

    by H. Mansikka, K. Virtanen, T. Lipponen, D. Harris

    In fighter pilot training, much of upgrade pilots’ (UPs’) learning takes place during mission debriefs. A debrief provides instructor pilots (IPs) the opportunity to correct situation awareness (SA) upon which the UPs base their tactical decisions. Unless the debrief is conducted with proper depth and breadth, the IPs’ feedback on UPs’ SA and tactical decision-making may be incomplete or false, resulting in poor, or even negative learning. In this study, a new debrief protocol based on the Critical Decision Method (CDM) is introduced. The protocol specifically addresses the SA of UPs. An evaluation was conducted to examine if a short CDM training programme to IPs would enhance their ability to provide performance feedback to UPs regarding their SA and tactical decision-making. The IPs were qualified flying instructors and the UPs were air force cadets completing their air combat training with BAe Hawk jet trainer aircraft. The impact of the training intervention was evaluated using Kirkpatrick’s four-level model. The first three levels of evaluation (Reactions, Learning and Behaviour) focused on the IPs, whereas the fourth level (Results) focused on the UPs. The training intervention had a positive impact on the Reactions, Learning and debrief Behaviour of the IPs. In air combat training missions, the UPs whose debriefs were based on the CDM protocol, had superior SA and overall performance compared to a control group.


  • Open Access

    Team Performance in Air Combat: A Teamwork Perspective

    by Heikki Mansikka, Kai Virtanen, Don Harris, Juha Järvinen


  • Accuracy and Similarity of Team Situation Awareness in Simulated Air Combat

    by Heikki Mansikka, Don Harris, Kai Virtanen

    BACKGROUND: Fighter pilots’ Team Situation Awareness (TSA) has been studied from the perspective of TSA accuracy, which represents how closely the pilots’ collective knowledge is aligned with the real world. When TSA accuracy is low, the pilots can have similarly or dissimilarly inaccurate SA. The concept of TSA similarity represents the similarity of team members’ collective knowledge. This paper investigates how TSA accuracy and similarity of F/A-18 pilots are associated with performance.METHOD: Data were extracted from simulated air combat missions. Performance and TSA were investigated in 58 engagements. The accuracy and similarity of pilots’ SA were elicited and performance was evaluated. TSA accuracy and similarity were analyzed with respect to the flights’ performance, and the independent variables were events in which the flights initiated engagements with enemy aircraft versus events in which the flights were engaged by enemy aircraft.RESULTS: With the mentioned events as the main effect, there were statistically significant differences at all levels of TSA accuracy and similarity. With performance as the main effect, there were also significant differences at all levels of TSA accuracy and similarity. TSA accuracy and similarity were superior in offensive engagements and when engagements were successful.DISCUSSION: The main contribution of this paper is the extension of the concept of TSA similarity to air combat: both TSA similarity and accuracy were higher when the flight was engaging the enemy aircraft, compared to situations when the flight itself was being engaged. The results also suggest that low TSA accuracy and similarity have a statistically significantly negative impact on the flights’ performance.Mansikka H, Harris D, Virtanen K. Accuracy and similarity of team situation awareness in simulated air combat. Aerosp Med Hum Perform. 2023; 94(6):429–436.


  • Open Access

    What we got Here, is a Failure to Coordinate: Implicit and Explicit Coordination in Air Combat

    by Heikki Mansikka, Kai Virtanen, Don Harris

    Air combat is the ultimate test for teamwork, as teams of fighter pilot (or flights), must coordinate their actions in a highly complex, hostile, dynamic and time critical environment. Flights can coordinate their actions using communication, that is, explicitly, or by relying on team situation awareness (SA), that is, implicitly. This paper examines how these two forms of coordination are associated with performance when prosecuting or evading an attack in simulated air combat. This was done by investigating the flights’ team SA, number of SA-related communication acts and performance in these two types of critical events during air combat. The results exhibit a quadratic dependence between team SA and communication. The rate of change of SA-related communication frequency with respect to change of team SA was negative: communication was needed to build team SA, but once an appropriate level of team SA was established, fewer communications were required. If, however, team SA deteriorated the number of SA communication acts increased. However, during time critical events, the flights did not always have enough time to coordinate their actions verbally. If the flights’ team SA in such situations was low, the flights’ explicit coordination attempts were not sufficient to avoid poor performance.


  • Open Access

    Weight watchers: NASA-TLX weights revisited

    by Kai Virtanen, Heikki Mansikka, Helmiina Kontio, Don Harris

    National Aeronautics and Space Administration Task Load Index (NASA-TLX) is a popular method to evaluate mental workload. NASA-TLX assesses mental workload across six load dimensions. When the dimensions are not assumed to be approximately equally important, they are weighted by conducting a pairwise comparison for every dimension pair, followed by the normalisation of weights reflecting the importance of the dimensions. This original NASA-TLX weighting method creates some challenges that are difficult to identify when the weights are being assigned. First, the original NASA-TLX weighting does not allow directly expressing two or more dimensions as equally important. Second, if pairwise comparisons are conducted consistently, there exists only one possible importance order for the dimensions. Third, with consistently conducted pairwise comparisons, a weight of 0.33 is artificially forced on the most important dimension. Swing and Analytic Hierarchy Process weighting methods for eliciting the weights of the dimensions are proposed as a solution to these challenges. The advantages of applying these methods in NASA-TLX are introduced theoretically and demonstrated empirically using data from virtual air combat simulations. The objective of this paper is to help scholars and practitioners to use NASA-TLX in mental workload assessments such that the discussed weighting issues are avoided.