Jiang Cheng

This paper investigates the relationship between female CEOs and insolvency risk of US property‐casualty insurance companies. We show that female CEOs are associated with lower insurer insolvency propensity, higher z‐score, and lower standard deviation of return on assets. These findings are robust to alternative econometric specifications to address potential endogeneity concerns and self‐selection issues, including propensity score matching, the instrumental variable approach, and the difference‐in‐difference approach. Furthermore, we find that the impact of female CEOs on insurer insolvency risk is moderated by firm capitalization, the presence of female directors, and political conservatism of insurers' home states.

This paper investigates the relationship between female CEOs and insolvency risk of U.S. property-casualty insurance companies. We show that female CEOs are associated with lower insurer insolvency propensity, higher z-score, and lower standard deviation of return on assets. These findings are robust to alternative econometric specifications to address potential endogeneity concerns and self-selection issues, including propensity score matching, the instrumental variable approach, and the difference-in-difference approach. Furthermore, we find that the impact of female CEOs on insurer insolvency risk is moderated by firm capitalization, presence of female directors, and political conservatism of insurers’ home states.

Pay-as-you-drive (PAYD) insurance is an exciting innovation. We develop a dynamic model to study PAYD insurance from the policyholder’s utility maximization perspective. We demonstrate that PAYD insurance does benefit the policyholder by reducing premium paid and increasing the total utility derived from auto usage and wealth. PAYD insurance may also improve overall social welfare by incentivizing customers to drive less. We illustrate that PAYD insurance is more efficient than fuel tax in reducing mileage due to the concavity relation of premium and driving distance. Finally, we derive a cut-off value of mileage below which policyholders who drive with traditional insurance should switch to a PAYD policy. Our research proposes a reliable theoretical framework, and confirms that PAYD insurance benefits both individual customers and society as a whole.

Little is known about the effects of accounting regulation on private insurers. In this paper, we examine the uniqueness of the tax deductibility of insurers' loss accruals. We find that private insurers' overstatement of loss accruals in tax planning significantly decreases after adoption of the Statement of Statutory Accounting Principles (SSAP) 101, which mandates that insurance companies recognize and measure tax contingencies. Relative to public insurers' loss reserve errors, those of private insurers decrease by an estimated 0.8%–1.1% of total assets, implying a forfeited tax benefit of $1.79–$4.4 million per firm, per year. We also find that the decrease is mitigated for insurers with lower IRS monitoring or in states where the insurance industry comprises a greater part of state employment. Additionally, insurers with independent boards, or those with independent, external actuaries are more responsive to the adoption of SSAP 101.

We document a substantial customer complaint gap between stock and mutual financial firms. To assess whether this 21% per year complaint gap stems from complaint-prone customers in stock insurers, we examine state-adjudicated complaint success. To further delineate between customer selection or treatment explanations, we exploit within insurer complaints around random claims (natural disasters) and attention shocks (media scrutiny). Further tests reveal the complaint gap widens with greater competition, near insolvency thresholds, and with more price regulation. Overall, the results are inconsistent with the hypothesis that mutual financial firms exhibit low customer satisfaction, suggesting customers find this a beneficial organizational structure.