CDCharles P. Davis

Charles P. Davis

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Charles P. Davis has a total of 699 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Investigating the analytical robustness of the social and behavioural sciences

    by Balazs Aczel, Barnabas Szaszi, Harry T Clelland, Marton Kovacs, Felix Holzmeister, Don van Ravenzwaaij, Hannah Schulz-Kümpel, Sabine Hoffmann, Gustav Nilsonne, Livia Kósa, et al.

    The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science1–3. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts’ choices. We examined a stratified random sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018, where for one claim per study, at least five re-analysts independently re-analysed the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the re-analyses was assessed in peer evaluations, and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. We found that 34% of the independent re-analyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of +/- 0.05 Cohen’s d) as the original report; with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator rose to 57%. Regarding the conclusions drawn, 74% of analyses were reported to arrive at the same conclusion as in the original investigation; 24% to no effects/inconclusive result, and 2% to the opposite effect as in the original investigation. This exploratory study suggests that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research should not simply be assumed to be robust to alternative analyses4. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty.

  • Pictures are not always worth a thousand words: Nonprobative pictures did not increase the effectiveness of misinformation corrections.

    by Peter S. Whitehead, Charles P. Davis, Joyce S. Park, Elizabeth J. Marsh

    Much research has focused on the language used for debunking false beliefs: communications should lead with facts, label misinformation as false, and reinforce true information. Pictures are used in debunking messages, but it remains unclear whether they matter, and what content they should depict. Six experiments explored these issues, focusing on correcting science misconceptions. There were no effects of non-probative pictures on correcting misinformation beyond the effects of corrective text alone. This was true regardless of whether the image depicted the misconception (Exps. 1, 3-6) or the correct referent (Exps. 2, 3, 5, 6), whether a symbol reinforcing truth or falseness (red X or green checkmark) accompanied the image (Exps. 1-6), whether belief was assessed immediately or after a delay (Exps. 4-6), and in an exploratory last experiment, whether belief in real-world health issues was targeted. Simple messages yielded robust correction, but non-probative pictorial aids did not increase their potency.


  • Open Access

    Early Production of Imperceptible Words by Infants and Toddlers Born Deaf or Blind

    by Erin E. Campbell, Charles P. Davis, Martin Zettersten, Molly Cooke, Derek Houston, Naomi Caselli, Elika Bergelson

    We investigate the roles of linguistic and sensory experience in the early-produced visual, auditory, and abstract words of congenitally-blind toddlers, deaf toddlers, and typically-sighted/hearing peers. We also assess the role of language access by comparing early word production in children learning English or American Sign Language (ASL) from birth, versus at a delay. Using parental report data on child word production from the MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventory, we found evidence that while children produced words referring to imperceptible referents before age 2, such words were less likely to be produced relative to words with perceptible referents. For instance, blind (vs. sighted) children said fewer highly visual words like “blue” or “see”; deaf signing (vs. hearing) children produced fewer auditory signs like hear. Additionally, in spoken English and ASL, children who received delayed language access were less likely to produce words overall. These results demonstrate and begin to quantify how linguistic and sensory access may influence which words young children produce.


  • Open Access

    Is time an embodied property of concepts?

    by Charles P. Davis, Eiling Yee

    A haircut usually lasts under an hour. But how long does it take to recognize that something is an instance of a haircut? And is this “time-to-perceive” a part of the representation of concepts like haircut? Across three experiments testing lexical decision, word recognition, and semantic decision, we show that the amount of time people say it takes to perceive a concept in the world (e.g., haircut, dandelion, or merit) predicts how long it takes for them to respond to a word referring to that thing, over and above the effects of other lexical-semantic variables (e.g., word frequency, concreteness) and other variables related to conceptual complexity (e.g., how confusable a concept is with other, similar concepts, or the diversity of the contexts in which a concept appears). These results suggest that our experience of how long it takes to recognize an instance of a concept can become a part of its representation, and that we simulate this information when reading words. Consequently, we suggest that time may be an embodied property of concepts.


  • Open Access

    Is time an embodied property of concepts?

    by Charles P. Davis, Eiling Yee

    A haircut usually lasts under an hour. But how long does it take to recognize that something is an instance of a haircut? And is this “time-to-perceive” a part of the representation of haircuts? Across three experiments testing semantic decision, word recognition, and lexical decision, we show that the amount of time people say it takes to perceive something in the world (e.g., haircut, dandelion, or merit) predicts how long it takes for them to respond to a word referring to that thing, over and above the effects of other lexical-semantic variables (e.g., word frequency, concreteness) and other variables related to conceptual complexity (e.g., how much physical space is required to perceive a concept, or the diversity of the contexts in which a concept appears). These results suggest that our experience of how long it takes to recognize an instance of something can become a part of its representation, and that we simulate this information when we read a word referring to it. Consequently, we suggest that time may be an embodied property of concepts.


  • A context-sensitive and non-linguistic approach to abstract concepts

    by Peter Langland-Hassan, Charles P. Davis

    Despite the recent upsurge in research on abstract concepts, there remain puzzles at the foundation of their empirical study. These are most evident when we consider what is required to assess a person's abstract conceptual abilities without using language as a prompt or requiring it as a response—as in classic non-verbal categorization tasks, which are standardly considered tests of conceptual understanding. After distinguishing two divergent strands in the most common conception of what it is for a concept to be abstract, we argue that neither reliably captures the kind of abstraction required to successfully categorize in non-verbal tasks. We then present a new conception of concept abstractness—termed 'trial concreteness'—that is keyed to individual categorization trials. It has advantages in capturing the context-relativity of the degree of abstraction required for the application of a concept and fittingly correlates with participant success in recent experiments. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences’.


  • Open Access

    Autism-spectrum traits in neurotypicals predict the embodiment of manipulation knowledge about object concepts: Evidence from eyetracking

    by Charles P. Davis, Inge-Marie Eigsti, Roisin Healy, Gitte H. Joergensen, Eiling Yee

    Sensorimotor-based theories of cognition predict that even subtle developmental motor differences, such as those characterizing autism spectrum disorder (ASD), impact how we represent the meaning of manipulable objects (e.g., faucet). Here, we test 85 neurotypical participants, who varied widely on the Adult Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ), a measure intended to capture variability in ASD characteristics in the general adult population (participant scores were all below the clinical threshold for autism). Participants completed a visual world eyetracking task designed to assess the activation of conceptual representations of manipulable objects. Participants heard words referring to manually manipulable objects (e.g., faucet) while we recorded their eye movements to arrays of four objects: the named object, a related object typically manipulated similarly (e.g., jar), and two unrelated objects. Consistent with prior work, we observed more looks to the related object than to the unrelated ones (i.e., a manipulation-relatedness effect). This effect likely reflects the overlapping conceptual representations of objects sharing manipulation characteristics (e.g., faucet and jar), due to embodied sensorimotor properties being part of their representations. Critically, we observed—among typically developed young adults—that as AQ scores increased, manipulation-relatedness effects decreased. In contrast, in a visual control condition, in which a target object was paired with related objects of a similar shape (e.g., snake and rope), relatedness effects increased with AQ scores. The results show that AQ scores can predict variation in how object-concept representations are activated for typically developed individuals. More speculatively, they are consistent with the hypothesis that in individuals with ASD, differences in object-concept representations emerge at least in part via differences in sensorimotor experience.


  • Open Access

    Encoding and inhibition of arbitrary episodic context with abstract concepts

    by Charles P. Davis, Pedro M. Paz-Alonso, Gerry T. M. Altmann, Eiling Yee

    Context is critical for conceptual processing, but the mechanism underpinning its encoding and reinstantiation during abstract concept processing is unclea


  • Psychology of cleansing through the prism of intersecting object histories

    by Zachary Ekves, Yanina Prystauka, Charles P. Davis, Eiling Yee, Gerry T. M. Altmann

    We link cleansing effects to contemporary cognitive theories via an account of event representation (intersecting object histories) that provides an explicit, neurally plausible mechanism for encoding objects (e.g., the self) and their associations (with other entities) across time. It explains separation as resulting from weakening associations between the self in the present and the self in the past.

  • Building semantic memory from embodied and distributional language experience

    by Charles P. Davis, Eiling Yee

    Humans seamlessly make sense of a rapidly changing environment, using a seemingly limitless knowledgebase to recognize and adapt to most situations we encounter. This knowledgebase is called semantic memory. Embodied cognition theories suggest that we represent this knowledge through simulation: understanding the meaning of coffee entails reinstantiating the neural states involved in touching, smelling, seeing, and drinking coffee. Distributional semantic theories suggest that we are sensitive to statistical regularities in natural language, and that a cognitive mechanism picks up on these regularities and transforms them into usable semantic representations reflecting the contextual usage of language. These appear to present contrasting views on semantic memory, but do they? Recent years have seen a push toward combining these approaches under a common framework. These hybrid approaches augment our understanding of semantic memory in important ways, but current versions remain unsatisfactory in part because they treat sensory‐perceptual and distributional‐linguistic data as interacting but distinct types of data that must be combined. We synthesize several approaches which, taken together, suggest that linguistic and embodied experience should instead be considered as inseparably entangled: just as sensory and perceptual systems are reactivated to understand meaning, so are experience‐based representations endemic to linguistic processing; further, sensory‐perceptual experience is susceptible to the same distributional principles as language experience. This conclusion produces a characterization of semantic memory that accounts for the interdependencies between linguistic and embodied data that arise across multiple timescales, giving rise to concept representations that reflect our shared and unique experiences.This article is categorized under: Psychology > Language Neuroscience > Cognition Linguistics > Language in Mind and Brain