Charles P. Davis
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Charles P. Davis has a total of 699 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Eiling Yee
Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
14 shared publications - Gerry T. M. Altmann
Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA; CT Institute for the Brain and Cognitive Sciences, University of Connecticut, Storrs, CT, USA
5 shared publications Gitte H. Joergensen
3 shared publications- Adrian I. Onicas
TBI and Concussion Center, Department of Neurology, University of Utah School of Medicine, Salt Lake City
2 shared publications - Andrea Leo
IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca, Lucca, Italy
2 shared publications Caitlin Dowling
Department of Psychological Sciences, University of Connecticut
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in MetaArXiv
Investigating the analytical robustness of the social and behavioural sciences
The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science1–3. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts’ choices. We examined a stratified random sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018, where for one claim per study, at least five re-analysts independently re-analysed the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the re-analyses was assessed in peer evaluations, and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. We found that 34% of the independent re-analyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of +/- 0.05 Cohen’s d) as the original report; with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator rose to 57%. Regarding the conclusions drawn, 74% of analyses were reported to arrive at the same conclusion as in the original investigation; 24% to no effects/inconclusive result, and 2% to the opposite effect as in the original investigation. This exploratory study suggests that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research should not simply be assumed to be robust to alternative analyses4. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty.
- 31 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in MetaArXiv
Open AccessInvestigating the analytical robustness of the social and behavioural sciences
The same dataset can be analysed in different justifiable ways to answer the same research question, potentially challenging the robustness of empirical science1–3. In this crowd initiative, we investigated the degree to which research findings in the social and behavioural sciences are contingent on analysts’ choices. We examined a stratified random sample of 100 studies published between 2009 and 2018, where for one claim per study, at least five re-analysts independently re-analysed the original data. The statistical appropriateness of the re-analyses was assessed in peer evaluations, and the robustness indicators were inspected along a range of research characteristics and study designs. We found that 34% of the independent re-analyses yielded the same result (within a tolerance region of +/- 0.05 Cohen’s d) as the original report; with a four times broader tolerance region, this indicator rose to 57%. Regarding the conclusions drawn, 74% of analyses were reported to arrive at the same conclusion as in the original investigation; 24% to no effects/inconclusive result, and 2% to the opposite effect as in the original investigation. This exploratory study suggests that the common single-path analyses in social and behavioural research should not simply be assumed to be robust to alternative analyses4. Therefore, we recommend the development and use of practices to explore and communicate this neglected source of uncertainty.
- 1 September 2025
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition
- Vol. 14 (3) , 340-354
Pictures are not always worth a thousand words: Nonprobative pictures did not increase the effectiveness of misinformation corrections.
Much research has focused on the language used for debunking false beliefs: communications should lead with facts, label misinformation as false, and reinforce true information. Pictures are used in debunking messages, but it remains unclear whether they matter, and what content they should depict. Six experiments explored these issues, focusing on correcting science misconceptions. There were no effects of non-probative pictures on correcting misinformation beyond the effects of corrective text alone. This was true regardless of whether the image depicted the misconception (Exps. 1, 3-6) or the correct referent (Exps. 2, 3, 5, 6), whether a symbol reinforcing truth or falseness (red X or green checkmark) accompanied the image (Exps. 1-6), whether belief was assessed immediately or after a delay (Exps. 4-6), and in an exploratory last experiment, whether belief in real-world health issues was targeted. Simple messages yielded robust correction, but non-probative pictorial aids did not increase their potency.
- 1 September 2025
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Applied Research in Memory and Cognition
- Vol. 14 (3) , 340-354
Pictures are not always worth a thousand words: Nonprobative pictures did not increase the effectiveness of misinformation corrections.
Much research has focused on the language used for debunking false beliefs: communications should lead with facts, label misinformation as false, and reinforce true information. Pictures are used in debunking messages, but it remains unclear whether they matter, and what content they should depict. Six experiments explored these issues, focusing on correcting science misconceptions. There were no effects of non-probative pictures on correcting misinformation beyond the effects of corrective text alone. This was true regardless of whether the image depicted the misconception (Exps. 1, 3-6) or the correct referent (Exps. 2, 3, 5, 6), whether a symbol reinforcing truth or falseness (red X or green checkmark) accompanied the image (Exps. 1-6), whether belief was assessed immediately or after a delay (Exps. 4-6), and in an exploratory last experiment, whether belief in real-world health issues was targeted. Simple messages yielded robust correction, but non-probative pictorial aids did not increase their potency.
- Open Access
Early Production of Imperceptible Words by Infants and Toddlers Born Deaf or Blind
We investigate the roles of linguistic and sensory experience in the early-produced visual, auditory, and abstract words of congenitally-blind toddlers, deaf toddlers, and typically-sighted/hearing peers. We also assess the role of language access by comparing early word production in children learning English or American Sign Language (ASL) from birth, versus at a delay. Using parental report data on child word production from the MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventory, we found evidence that while children produced words referring to imperceptible referents before age 2, such words were less likely to be produced relative to words with perceptible referents. For instance, blind (vs. sighted) children said fewer highly visual words like “blue” or “see”; deaf signing (vs. hearing) children produced fewer auditory signs like hear. Additionally, in spoken English and ASL, children who received delayed language access were less likely to produce words overall. These results demonstrate and begin to quantify how linguistic and sensory access may influence which words young children produce.
Open AccessEarly Production of Imperceptible Words by Infants and Toddlers Born Deaf or Blind
We investigate the roles of linguistic and sensory experience in the early-produced visual, auditory, and abstract words of congenitally-blind toddlers, deaf toddlers, and typically-sighted/hearing peers. We also assess the role of language access by comparing early word production in children learning English or American Sign Language (ASL) from birth, versus at a delay. Using parental report data on child word production from the MacArthur-Bates Communicative Development Inventory, we found evidence that while children produced words referring to imperceptible referents before age 2, such words were less likely to be produced relative to words with perceptible referents. For instance, blind (vs. sighted) children said fewer highly visual words like “blue” or “see”; deaf signing (vs. hearing) children produced fewer auditory signs like hear. Additionally, in spoken English and ASL, children who received delayed language access were less likely to produce words overall. These results demonstrate and begin to quantify how linguistic and sensory access may influence which words young children produce.
- Open Access
- 5 September 2023
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 18 (9) , e0290997
Is time an embodied property of concepts?
A haircut usually lasts under an hour. But how long does it take to recognize that something is an instance of a haircut? And is this “time-to-perceive” a part of the representation of concepts like haircut? Across three experiments testing lexical decision, word recognition, and semantic decision, we show that the amount of time people say it takes to perceive a concept in the world (e.g., haircut, dandelion, or merit) predicts how long it takes for them to respond to a word referring to that thing, over and above the effects of other lexical-semantic variables (e.g., word frequency, concreteness) and other variables related to conceptual complexity (e.g., how confusable a concept is with other, similar concepts, or the diversity of the contexts in which a concept appears). These results suggest that our experience of how long it takes to recognize an instance of a concept can become a part of its representation, and that we simulate this information when reading words. Consequently, we suggest that time may be an embodied property of concepts.
- 5 September 2023
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 18 (9) , e0290997
Open AccessIs time an embodied property of concepts?
A haircut usually lasts under an hour. But how long does it take to recognize that something is an instance of a haircut? And is this “time-to-perceive” a part of the representation of concepts like haircut? Across three experiments testing lexical decision, word recognition, and semantic decision, we show that the amount of time people say it takes to perceive a concept in the world (e.g., haircut, dandelion, or merit) predicts how long it takes for them to respond to a word referring to that thing, over and above the effects of other lexical-semantic variables (e.g., word frequency, concreteness) and other variables related to conceptual complexity (e.g., how confusable a concept is with other, similar concepts, or the diversity of the contexts in which a concept appears). These results suggest that our experience of how long it takes to recognize an instance of a concept can become a part of its representation, and that we simulate this information when reading words. Consequently, we suggest that time may be an embodied property of concepts.
- Open Access
- 24 February 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Is time an embodied property of concepts?
A haircut usually lasts under an hour. But how long does it take to recognize that something is an instance of a haircut? And is this “time-to-perceive” a part of the representation of haircuts? Across three experiments testing semantic decision, word recognition, and lexical decision, we show that the amount of time people say it takes to perceive something in the world (e.g., haircut, dandelion, or merit) predicts how long it takes for them to respond to a word referring to that thing, over and above the effects of other lexical-semantic variables (e.g., word frequency, concreteness) and other variables related to conceptual complexity (e.g., how much physical space is required to perceive a concept, or the diversity of the contexts in which a concept appears). These results suggest that our experience of how long it takes to recognize an instance of something can become a part of its representation, and that we simulate this information when we read a word referring to it. Consequently, we suggest that time may be an embodied property of concepts.
- 24 February 2023
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessIs time an embodied property of concepts?
A haircut usually lasts under an hour. But how long does it take to recognize that something is an instance of a haircut? And is this “time-to-perceive” a part of the representation of haircuts? Across three experiments testing semantic decision, word recognition, and lexical decision, we show that the amount of time people say it takes to perceive something in the world (e.g., haircut, dandelion, or merit) predicts how long it takes for them to respond to a word referring to that thing, over and above the effects of other lexical-semantic variables (e.g., word frequency, concreteness) and other variables related to conceptual complexity (e.g., how much physical space is required to perceive a concept, or the diversity of the contexts in which a concept appears). These results suggest that our experience of how long it takes to recognize an instance of something can become a part of its representation, and that we simulate this information when we read a word referring to it. Consequently, we suggest that time may be an embodied property of concepts.
- 26 December 2022
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 378 (1870) , 20210355
A context-sensitive and non-linguistic approach to abstract concepts
Despite the recent upsurge in research on abstract concepts, there remain puzzles at the foundation of their empirical study. These are most evident when we consider what is required to assess a person's abstract conceptual abilities without using language as a prompt or requiring it as a response—as in classic non-verbal categorization tasks, which are standardly considered tests of conceptual understanding. After distinguishing two divergent strands in the most common conception of what it is for a concept to be abstract, we argue that neither reliably captures the kind of abstraction required to successfully categorize in non-verbal tasks. We then present a new conception of concept abstractness—termed 'trial concreteness'—that is keyed to individual categorization trials. It has advantages in capturing the context-relativity of the degree of abstraction required for the application of a concept and fittingly correlates with participant success in recent experiments. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences’.
- 26 December 2022
- Published by The Royal Society in Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences
- Vol. 378 (1870) , 20210355
A context-sensitive and non-linguistic approach to abstract concepts
Despite the recent upsurge in research on abstract concepts, there remain puzzles at the foundation of their empirical study. These are most evident when we consider what is required to assess a person's abstract conceptual abilities without using language as a prompt or requiring it as a response—as in classic non-verbal categorization tasks, which are standardly considered tests of conceptual understanding. After distinguishing two divergent strands in the most common conception of what it is for a concept to be abstract, we argue that neither reliably captures the kind of abstraction required to successfully categorize in non-verbal tasks. We then present a new conception of concept abstractness—termed 'trial concreteness'—that is keyed to individual categorization trials. It has advantages in capturing the context-relativity of the degree of abstraction required for the application of a concept and fittingly correlates with participant success in recent experiments. This article is part of the theme issue ‘Concepts in interaction: social engagement and inner experiences’.
- Open Access
- 25 July 2022
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 17 (7) , e0268069
Autism-spectrum traits in neurotypicals predict the embodiment of manipulation knowledge about object concepts: Evidence from eyetracking
Sensorimotor-based theories of cognition predict that even subtle developmental motor differences, such as those characterizing autism spectrum disorder (ASD), impact how we represent the meaning of manipulable objects (e.g., faucet). Here, we test 85 neurotypical participants, who varied widely on the Adult Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ), a measure intended to capture variability in ASD characteristics in the general adult population (participant scores were all below the clinical threshold for autism). Participants completed a visual world eyetracking task designed to assess the activation of conceptual representations of manipulable objects. Participants heard words referring to manually manipulable objects (e.g., faucet) while we recorded their eye movements to arrays of four objects: the named object, a related object typically manipulated similarly (e.g., jar), and two unrelated objects. Consistent with prior work, we observed more looks to the related object than to the unrelated ones (i.e., a manipulation-relatedness effect). This effect likely reflects the overlapping conceptual representations of objects sharing manipulation characteristics (e.g., faucet and jar), due to embodied sensorimotor properties being part of their representations. Critically, we observed—among typically developed young adults—that as AQ scores increased, manipulation-relatedness effects decreased. In contrast, in a visual control condition, in which a target object was paired with related objects of a similar shape (e.g., snake and rope), relatedness effects increased with AQ scores. The results show that AQ scores can predict variation in how object-concept representations are activated for typically developed individuals. More speculatively, they are consistent with the hypothesis that in individuals with ASD, differences in object-concept representations emerge at least in part via differences in sensorimotor experience.
- 25 July 2022
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 17 (7) , e0268069
Open AccessAutism-spectrum traits in neurotypicals predict the embodiment of manipulation knowledge about object concepts: Evidence from eyetracking
Sensorimotor-based theories of cognition predict that even subtle developmental motor differences, such as those characterizing autism spectrum disorder (ASD), impact how we represent the meaning of manipulable objects (e.g., faucet). Here, we test 85 neurotypical participants, who varied widely on the Adult Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ), a measure intended to capture variability in ASD characteristics in the general adult population (participant scores were all below the clinical threshold for autism). Participants completed a visual world eyetracking task designed to assess the activation of conceptual representations of manipulable objects. Participants heard words referring to manually manipulable objects (e.g., faucet) while we recorded their eye movements to arrays of four objects: the named object, a related object typically manipulated similarly (e.g., jar), and two unrelated objects. Consistent with prior work, we observed more looks to the related object than to the unrelated ones (i.e., a manipulation-relatedness effect). This effect likely reflects the overlapping conceptual representations of objects sharing manipulation characteristics (e.g., faucet and jar), due to embodied sensorimotor properties being part of their representations. Critically, we observed—among typically developed young adults—that as AQ scores increased, manipulation-relatedness effects decreased. In contrast, in a visual control condition, in which a target object was paired with related objects of a similar shape (e.g., snake and rope), relatedness effects increased with AQ scores. The results show that AQ scores can predict variation in how object-concept representations are activated for typically developed individuals. More speculatively, they are consistent with the hypothesis that in individuals with ASD, differences in object-concept representations emerge at least in part via differences in sensorimotor experience.
- Open Access
- 18 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 50 (3) , 546-563
Encoding and inhibition of arbitrary episodic context with abstract concepts
Context is critical for conceptual processing, but the mechanism underpinning its encoding and reinstantiation during abstract concept processing is unclea
- 18 August 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Memory & Cognition
- Vol. 50 (3) , 546-563
Open AccessEncoding and inhibition of arbitrary episodic context with abstract concepts
Context is critical for conceptual processing, but the mechanism underpinning its encoding and reinstantiation during abstract concept processing is unclea
- 18 February 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 44, e4
Psychology of cleansing through the prism of intersecting object histories
We link cleansing effects to contemporary cognitive theories via an account of event representation (intersecting object histories) that provides an explicit, neurally plausible mechanism for encoding objects (e.g., the self) and their associations (with other entities) across time. It explains separation as resulting from weakening associations between the self in the present and the self in the past.
- 18 February 2021
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 44, e4
Psychology of cleansing through the prism of intersecting object histories
We link cleansing effects to contemporary cognitive theories via an account of event representation (intersecting object histories) that provides an explicit, neurally plausible mechanism for encoding objects (e.g., the self) and their associations (with other entities) across time. It explains separation as resulting from weakening associations between the self in the present and the self in the past.
- 2 February 2021
- Published by Wiley in WIREs Cognitive Science
- Vol. 12 (5) , e1555
Building semantic memory from embodied and distributional language experience
Humans seamlessly make sense of a rapidly changing environment, using a seemingly limitless knowledgebase to recognize and adapt to most situations we encounter. This knowledgebase is called semantic memory. Embodied cognition theories suggest that we represent this knowledge through simulation: understanding the meaning of coffee entails reinstantiating the neural states involved in touching, smelling, seeing, and drinking coffee. Distributional semantic theories suggest that we are sensitive to statistical regularities in natural language, and that a cognitive mechanism picks up on these regularities and transforms them into usable semantic representations reflecting the contextual usage of language. These appear to present contrasting views on semantic memory, but do they? Recent years have seen a push toward combining these approaches under a common framework. These hybrid approaches augment our understanding of semantic memory in important ways, but current versions remain unsatisfactory in part because they treat sensory‐perceptual and distributional‐linguistic data as interacting but distinct types of data that must be combined. We synthesize several approaches which, taken together, suggest that linguistic and embodied experience should instead be considered as inseparably entangled: just as sensory and perceptual systems are reactivated to understand meaning, so are experience‐based representations endemic to linguistic processing; further, sensory‐perceptual experience is susceptible to the same distributional principles as language experience. This conclusion produces a characterization of semantic memory that accounts for the interdependencies between linguistic and embodied data that arise across multiple timescales, giving rise to concept representations that reflect our shared and unique experiences.This article is categorized under: Psychology > Language Neuroscience > Cognition Linguistics > Language in Mind and Brain
- 2 February 2021
- Published by Wiley in WIREs Cognitive Science
- Vol. 12 (5) , e1555
Building semantic memory from embodied and distributional language experience
Humans seamlessly make sense of a rapidly changing environment, using a seemingly limitless knowledgebase to recognize and adapt to most situations we encounter. This knowledgebase is called semantic memory. Embodied cognition theories suggest that we represent this knowledge through simulation: understanding the meaning of coffee entails reinstantiating the neural states involved in touching, smelling, seeing, and drinking coffee. Distributional semantic theories suggest that we are sensitive to statistical regularities in natural language, and that a cognitive mechanism picks up on these regularities and transforms them into usable semantic representations reflecting the contextual usage of language. These appear to present contrasting views on semantic memory, but do they? Recent years have seen a push toward combining these approaches under a common framework. These hybrid approaches augment our understanding of semantic memory in important ways, but current versions remain unsatisfactory in part because they treat sensory‐perceptual and distributional‐linguistic data as interacting but distinct types of data that must be combined. We synthesize several approaches which, taken together, suggest that linguistic and embodied experience should instead be considered as inseparably entangled: just as sensory and perceptual systems are reactivated to understand meaning, so are experience‐based representations endemic to linguistic processing; further, sensory‐perceptual experience is susceptible to the same distributional principles as language experience. This conclusion produces a characterization of semantic memory that accounts for the interdependencies between linguistic and embodied data that arise across multiple timescales, giving rise to concept representations that reflect our shared and unique experiences.This article is categorized under: Psychology > Language Neuroscience > Cognition Linguistics > Language in Mind and Brain