Laura Caponetto
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Laura Caponetto has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Bianca Cepollaro
Vita-Salute San Raffaele University, Milan, Italy
3 shared publications - Giorgio Venturi
Dipartimento di Civilità e Forme de Sapere, Università di Pisa, Pisa, Italy
1 shared publication - Luca San Mauro
University of Bari
1 shared publication - Neri Marsili
Department of Philosophy and Education Sciences, University of Turin, Turin, Italy
1 shared publication - Paolo Labinaz
Department of Humanities , University of Trieste , Trieste , Italy
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 5 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 119-138
“Actually, Scratch That!”: A Tour into the Illocutionary Fabric of Retraction
- 5 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 119-138
“Actually, Scratch That!”: A Tour into the Illocutionary Fabric of Retraction
- 2 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 103 (2) , 397-415
Counterevidentials
- 2 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Australasian Journal of Philosophy
- Vol. 103 (2) , 397-415
Counterevidentials
- 24 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 50-66
The Philosophy of Counter Language
This chapter provides an opinionated survey of a number of counterspeech strategies that have been variously discussed in contemporary philosophy of language. Each of the discussed strategies is promising under certain circumstances and unpromising, and even liable to backfire, under others. When it comes to countering toxic speech, there is no one-size-fits-all solution, and to decide on a particular strategy one has to factor in a number of contextual variables – including the linguistic form of the toxic utterance (e.g., whether it is explicitly toxic or conveys a toxic message implicitly) and the counterspeaker’s social role. Overall, the chapter uncovers how tools from philosophy of language can illuminate the workings of toxic speech and help us devise tailor-made strategies to counter it. It thus sketches the foundations of a philosophy of counter-language.
- 24 November 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis
- p. 50-66
The Philosophy of Counter Language
This chapter provides an opinionated survey of a number of counterspeech strategies that have been variously discussed in contemporary philosophy of language. Each of the discussed strategies is promising under certain circumstances and unpromising, and even liable to backfire, under others. When it comes to countering toxic speech, there is no one-size-fits-all solution, and to decide on a particular strategy one has to factor in a number of contextual variables – including the linguistic form of the toxic utterance (e.g., whether it is explicitly toxic or conveys a toxic message implicitly) and the counterspeaker’s social role. Overall, the chapter uncovers how tools from philosophy of language can illuminate the workings of toxic speech and help us devise tailor-made strategies to counter it. It thus sketches the foundations of a philosophy of counter-language.
- Open Access
- 17 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (5) , 1-16
How to make (mathematical) assertions with directives
It is prima facie uncontroversial that the justification of an assertion amounts to a collection of other (inferentially related) assertions. In this paper, we point at a class of assertions, i.e. mathematical assertions, that appear to systematically flout this principle. To justify a mathematical assertion (e.g. a theorem) is to provide a proof—and proofs are sequences of directives. The claim is backed up by linguistic data on the use of imperatives in proofs, and by a pragmatic analysis of theorems and their proofs. Proofs, we argue, are sequences of instructions whose performance inevitably gets one to truth. It follows that a felicitous theorem, i.e. a theorem that has been correctly proven, is a persuasive theorem. When it comes to mathematical assertions, there is no sharp distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary success.
- 17 October 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 202 (5) , 1-16
Open AccessHow to make (mathematical) assertions with directives
It is prima facie uncontroversial that the justification of an assertion amounts to a collection of other (inferentially related) assertions. In this paper, we point at a class of assertions, i.e. mathematical assertions, that appear to systematically flout this principle. To justify a mathematical assertion (e.g. a theorem) is to provide a proof—and proofs are sequences of directives. The claim is backed up by linguistic data on the use of imperatives in proofs, and by a pragmatic analysis of theorems and their proofs. Proofs, we argue, are sequences of instructions whose performance inevitably gets one to truth. It follows that a felicitous theorem, i.e. a theorem that has been correctly proven, is a persuasive theorem. When it comes to mathematical assertions, there is no sharp distinction between illocutionary and perlocutionary success.
- 22 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-26
Marina Sbisà’s Deontic Approach to Speech Actions
- Open Access
- 12 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (6) , 1
Publisher Correction to: The pragmatic structure of refusal
- 12 June 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (6) , 1
Open AccessPublisher Correction to: The pragmatic structure of refusal
- Open Access
- 25 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (6) , 1-19
The pragmatic structure of refusal
This paper sets out to unpack the pragmatic structure of refusal—its illocutionary nature, success conditions, and normative effects. I argue that our ordinary concept of refusal captures a whole family of illocutions, comprising acts such as rejecting, declining, and the like, which share the property of being ‘negative second-turn illocutions’. Only proper refusals (i.e. negative replies to permission requests), I submit, require speaker authority. I construe the ‘refusal family’ as a subclass of the directives-commissives intersection. After defending my view against a number of potential objections, I highlight how a theoretically grounded analysis of refusal is not only of intrinsic value, but may also have significant moral and legal implications.
- 25 May 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Synthese
- Vol. 201 (6) , 1-19
Open AccessThe pragmatic structure of refusal
This paper sets out to unpack the pragmatic structure of refusal—its illocutionary nature, success conditions, and normative effects. I argue that our ordinary concept of refusal captures a whole family of illocutions, comprising acts such as rejecting, declining, and the like, which share the property of being ‘negative second-turn illocutions’. Only proper refusals (i.e. negative replies to permission requests), I submit, require speaker authority. I construe the ‘refusal family’ as a subclass of the directives-commissives intersection. After defending my view against a number of potential objections, I highlight how a theoretically grounded analysis of refusal is not only of intrinsic value, but may also have significant moral and legal implications.
- 12 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-4
Langton, Rae
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 2 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 26 (4) , 577-593
Bending as Counterspeech
In this paper, we identify and examine an overlooked strategy to counter bigoted speech on the spot. Such a strategy we call ‘bending’. To ‘bend’, in our sense, is to deliberately give a distorted response to a speaker’s harmful move – precisely, an ameliorative response, which may turn that move into a different, less harmful, contribution. To substantiate our proposal, we distinguish two ideas of uptake – interpretation and response – and argue for the general claim that a distorted response on the hearer’s part may end up transforming a speaker’s contribution. Patterns of distortion have been analyzed in the literature as unjustly undermining speakers’ agency and exacerbating oppression. Our analysis shows that, under certain circumstances, distortion can be employed to derail bigoted speech and thus serve the purposes of social justice. We close by discussing the virtues and limits of bending vis-à-vis a different, much-discussed, counterspeech strategy, i.e. ‘blocking’ (Langton 2018).
- 2 November 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
- Vol. 26 (4) , 577-593
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessBending as Counterspeech
In this paper, we identify and examine an overlooked strategy to counter bigoted speech on the spot. Such a strategy we call ‘bending’. To ‘bend’, in our sense, is to deliberately give a distorted response to a speaker’s harmful move – precisely, an ameliorative response, which may turn that move into a different, less harmful, contribution. To substantiate our proposal, we distinguish two ideas of uptake – interpretation and response – and argue for the general claim that a distorted response on the hearer’s part may end up transforming a speaker’s contribution. Patterns of distortion have been analyzed in the literature as unjustly undermining speakers’ agency and exacerbating oppression. Our analysis shows that, under certain circumstances, distortion can be employed to derail bigoted speech and thus serve the purposes of social justice. We close by discussing the virtues and limits of bending vis-à-vis a different, much-discussed, counterspeech strategy, i.e. ‘blocking’ (Langton 2018).
- Open Access
- 1 October 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 82 (4) , 682-692
Accommodated authority: Broadening the picture
Words can be used to do a plethora of things. Some such things require that the speaker have authority. Quite clearly, a speaker can have authority formally, in virtue of their institutional role. Authority, however, need not be institutional, and speakers can acquire it informally. To see this, consider the following scenario.
- 1 October 2022
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in Analysis
- Vol. 82 (4) , 682-692
Open AccessAccommodated authority: Broadening the picture
Words can be used to do a plethora of things. Some such things require that the speaker have authority. Quite clearly, a speaker can have authority formally, in virtue of their institutional role. Authority, however, need not be institutional, and speakers can acquire it informally. To see this, consider the following scenario.