Jamie Carlin Watson
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Jamie Carlin Watson has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Charles Lowry Barnes
Department of Orthopaedic Surgery, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Little Rock, Arkansas
1 shared publication - Kristie B. Hadden
Associate Professor, College of Medicine, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Little Rock, Arkansas, USA
1 shared publication - Latrina Y. Prince
Graduate School, University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Little Rock, AR, United States
1 shared publication Laura Guidry-Grimes
University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences
1 shared publication- Marty K. Bushmiaer
University of Arkansas for Medical Sciences, Department of Orthpaedic Surgery, Little Rock, AR 72205, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 26 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 21 (6) , 34-36
Navigating Contested Harms and Competing Metaphysics: Humility and Ethics Consultation
Baby A1 was born prematurely with severe encephalopathy, injured brainstem, and a potentially injured spinal cord. He had no response to pain or other external stimuli. The neonatal team unanimousl...
- 26 May 2021
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 21 (6) , 34-36
Navigating Contested Harms and Competing Metaphysics: Humility and Ethics Consultation
Baby A1 was born prematurely with severe encephalopathy, injured brainstem, and a potentially injured spinal cord. He had no response to pain or other external stimuli. The neonatal team unanimousl...
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Project MUSE in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
- Vol. 63 (3) , 570-588
The Advent of the Professional Ethicist: Moral Expertise and Health-Care Ethics Certification
With the Healthcare Ethics Consultant Certification (HEC-C) offered through the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH), the practice of clinical ethics has taken a decisive step into professionalization. But without an unambiguous sense of what clinical ethicists can contribute to the clinical environment, it is unclear what the HEC-C ensures clinical ethicists can do. Though the ASBH enumerates a set of core competencies, many disagree over what role those competencies empower ethicists to serve. Two recent publications are notable for advocating conflicting positions on the question of ethicists’ competence: “Ethics Expertise: What It Is, How to Get It, and What to Do with It” by Christopher Meyers (2018) and Rethinking Health Care Ethics by Stephen Scher and Kasia Kozlowska (2018). In response to Scher and Kozlowska’s argument that the primary role of ethicists is to create space to engage clinician’s moral intuitions, this analysis follows Meyers in contending that ethicists can also contribute a kind of moral expertise. However, acquiring moral expertise is no easy task, and it is unlikely to be substantiated by a certification exam. This analysis draws on research from the psychology of expertise to outline the sort of training needed to cultivate and enhance moral expertise.
- 1 January 2020
- Published by Project MUSE in Perspectives in Biology and Medicine
- Vol. 63 (3) , 570-588
The Advent of the Professional Ethicist: Moral Expertise and Health-Care Ethics Certification
With the Healthcare Ethics Consultant Certification (HEC-C) offered through the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities (ASBH), the practice of clinical ethics has taken a decisive step into professionalization. But without an unambiguous sense of what clinical ethicists can contribute to the clinical environment, it is unclear what the HEC-C ensures clinical ethicists can do. Though the ASBH enumerates a set of core competencies, many disagree over what role those competencies empower ethicists to serve. Two recent publications are notable for advocating conflicting positions on the question of ethicists’ competence: “Ethics Expertise: What It Is, How to Get It, and What to Do with It” by Christopher Meyers (2018) and Rethinking Health Care Ethics by Stephen Scher and Kasia Kozlowska (2018). In response to Scher and Kozlowska’s argument that the primary role of ethicists is to create space to engage clinician’s moral intuitions, this analysis follows Meyers in contending that ethicists can also contribute a kind of moral expertise. However, acquiring moral expertise is no easy task, and it is unlikely to be substantiated by a certification exam. This analysis draws on research from the psychology of expertise to outline the sort of training needed to cultivate and enhance moral expertise.
- 24 October 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 19 (11) , 80-82
Ethics Expertise Demystified: Using the Brummett/Salter Taxonomy
(2019). Ethics Expertise Demystified: Using the Brummett/Salter Taxonomy. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 19, No. 11, pp. 80-82.
- 24 October 2019
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 19 (11) , 80-82
Ethics Expertise Demystified: Using the Brummett/Salter Taxonomy
(2019). Ethics Expertise Demystified: Using the Brummett/Salter Taxonomy. The American Journal of Bioethics: Vol. 19, No. 11, pp. 80-82.
- 9 December 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 33 (1) , 74-87
What Experts Could Not Be
A common philosophical account of expertise contends that (a) the good of expertise lies in the fact that it is grounded in reliably true beliefs or knowledge in a domain and (b) rejecting this truth-linked view threatens the authority of experts and opens one to epistemic relativism. I argue that both of these claims are implausible, and I show how epistemic authority and objectivity can be grounded in the current state of understanding and skill in a domain. Further, I argue that what I call a ‘cognitive systems’ approach is consistent with this domain-linked account of expert authority, is empirically supported, and provides a philosophical foundation for both empirical and conceptual work on the nature and scope of expertise.
- 9 December 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Social Epistemology
- Vol. 33 (1) , 74-87
What Experts Could Not Be
A common philosophical account of expertise contends that (a) the good of expertise lies in the fact that it is grounded in reliably true beliefs or knowledge in a domain and (b) rejecting this truth-linked view threatens the authority of experts and opens one to epistemic relativism. I argue that both of these claims are implausible, and I show how epistemic authority and objectivity can be grounded in the current state of understanding and skill in a domain. Further, I argue that what I call a ‘cognitive systems’ approach is consistent with this domain-linked account of expert authority, is empirically supported, and provides a philosophical foundation for both empirical and conceptual work on the nature and scope of expertise.
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Patient Education and Counseling
- Vol. 101 (10) , 1823-1827
Health literacy and surgery expectations in total hip and knee arthroplasty patients
- 1 October 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Patient Education and Counseling
- Vol. 101 (10) , 1823-1827
Health literacy and surgery expectations in total hip and knee arthroplasty patients