Jianzhi Zhao

Restricted funding has become a notable feature of the nonprofit sector in many countries. While its organizational outcomes are widely debated, we know less about why some nonprofits face higher levels of restriction than others. This study examines organizational antecedents using agency and signaling perspectives, asking how nonprofits’ observable financial and organizational features shape their level of restricted funding. Drawing on panel data for charities in England and Wales (2007–2023), we find that higher financial reserves are associated with lower levels of restricted funding, whereas greater service-area breadth and wider beneficiary breadth are associated with higher restriction levels. Administrative cost ratios are not a significant predictor. These findings provide new insights into restricted funding dynamics and offer practical implications for nonprofits seeking to navigate funding constraints.

The World Bank, under the stewardship of the United States, stands out as the global leader among international development organizations. Does China's establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) undermine this status? Examining this question, we focus on the borrowing practices of a special set of countries: the founding members of the AIIB. These founders openly defied the public preference of the United States, arguably to create a potential rival to the World Bank. Using a new causal inference method, Pang, Liu, and Xu's Dynamic Multilevel Latent Factor Model—as well as several well-known estimation models as robustness checks—we document at least a temporary decrease in the number of World Bank infrastructure projects that the developing AIIB founders have entered into. This study presents the first systematic evidence that China's AIIB could unsettle the political influence the United States has enjoyed over developing countries through its leadership of the World Bank. An important set of countries may be parting ways with the World Bank and looking to a Chinese institution for leadership in the world of development.

This manuscript conducts both a narrow and wide replication of Brudney et al. (2005, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 15[3], pp. 393–419), focusing on the scope, perceived effectiveness, and antecedents of contracting out. The replication joins the original study in indicating that state agencies widely used contracting out in service delivery, but their perceived effects on service costs and quality were mixed. The replication coincides with the original study in suggesting that contracting out was an agency‐specific practice driven more by pragmatic factors but reports some divergences in the effects of individual factors. Overall, our replication concurs with the original study in many aspects, but also adds new nuances. There seems to be no single pattern underlying the use of contracting out, and thus no single factor could determine contracting out under all circumstances. Rather, contracting is a dynamic practice used by agencies for certain contingencies.

There is widespread concern that government funding bureaucratizes nonprofits and causes them to be administratively inefficient. This study brings together contrasting streams of literature and hypothesizes a curvilinear relationship between government funding and nonprofits’ administrative efficiency. Using a longitudinal dataset of U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID)-registered nonprofits, we find evidence for this nonlinear effect. In particular, as the proportion of a nonprofit’s government funding increases, its reported administrative expense ratio will initially increase, but after the proportion reaches one third to two thirds of total revenue (depending on the estimation strategy used), further increases in government funding reduce the reported administrative expense ratio. Nonprofits may maintain a favorable level of operating efficiency with either a low level or a high level of dependence on government funding. Our work adds to the literature on government–nonprofit funding relationship and offers practical implications for nonprofit management.

Summary: Under the new governance models, the scope of government funding of nonprofit activities in service delivery and policy implementation is extensive. There is a long‐standing concern that government funding may compromise nonprofit operations and lead to unintended consequences. This research examines the concern by exploring the effect of government funding on nonprofits' spending on programs and services. Existing theories and empirical evidence propose competing arguments concerning the relationship between government funding and nonprofits' program spending. Using a 20‐year panel dataset of international development nonprofits registered with the United States Agency for International Development, we find that nonprofits receiving more government funding spend significantly higher proportions of their organizational resources on development programs. Government funding seems to increase nonprofits' program spending and to make them more focused on their mission‐related activities.