HDHong Kim Duong

Hong Kim Duong

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Hong Kim Duong has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Behavioural Accounting Research

    by Stephen B. Salter, Hong Kim Duong

    This chapter reviews summaries and analyses articles published from 1996 to 2023 in cross-cultural behavioural accounting research. It is limited to the 85 articles published in Australian Business Dean’s Council journals ranked B and above. It begins with an extensive discussion of the main trends in cultural research. Where it is useful, we provide an update to the literature since the last edition in 2017. This chapter finds that despite criticism and new studies, the ideas of Geert Hofstede (1980 through 2021) still dominate the research studies. It notes several updated measures of cultural values and shifts in the values of some countries (Minkov 2018). The articles reviewed covered a disparate range of topics, including interpreting financial regulation, external and internal auditing, budgeting, knowledge sharing, decision biases, and the form of management control systems. In all of the articles, cultural values have some degree of explanatory power. The chapter concludes that there is still a great deal of research to be done.

  • Open Access

    Managers’ staging of earnings conference calls around actual share repurchases

    by Hong Kim Duong, Chuong Do, Huy N. Do

    We use earnings call transcripts to examine whether managers strategically change their disclosure behaviors before an actual share repurchase. Our findings suggest that managers use tone management to strategically portray a more negative outlook for the firm in the earnings call before an actual repurchase. In addition, we find that managers of repurchasing firms “cast” the call with more unfavorable analysts even when more favorable analysts are available. These disclosure strategies aim to influence the information flows to the market and allow repurchasing firms to repurchase their shares at a discounted price. We further show that insiders of repurchasing firms adjust their subsequent stock trading accordingly. Following more negative conference calls, insiders exhibit a tendency to increase share repurchases or reduce sales of company shares. Our findings underscore the increasingly sophisticated disclosure strategies employed by managers to wield influence over information dynamics in the market leading up to share repurchases.


  • Open Access

    Real Earnings Management during Economic Downturns

    by Hong Kim Duong

    This study examines the impact of economic downturns on real earnings management activities in an international setting. Using a sample of 27 countries between 1988 and 2016, I find that the extent of real earnings management increases and that the substitution relation between real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management becomes stronger during economic downturns. Managers tend to rely on real earnings management to avoid the threat of greater scrutiny during economic downturns. The effect of an economic downturn on real earnings management is stronger for firms with high earnings management incentives, such as to avoid reporting earnings decreases and losses, to just meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, and to facilitate the success of seasonal equity offerings. The findings suggest that real earnings management comes at a high cost. Firms sacrifice future performance when engaging in real earnings management. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: G14; G28; G39; M41.


  • Open Access

    Real Earnings Management During Economic Downturns

    by Hong Kim Duong

    This study examines the impact of economic downturns on real earnings management activities in an international setting. Using a sample of 27 countries between 1988 and 2016, I find that the extent of real earnings management increases and that the substitution relation between real earnings management and accrual-based earnings management becomes stronger during economic downturns. Managers tend to rely on real earnings management to avoid the threat of greater scrutiny during economic downturns. The effect of an economic downturn on real earnings management is stronger for firms with high earnings management incentives, such as to avoid reporting earnings decreases and losses, to just meet or beat analysts’ earnings forecasts, and to facilitate the success of seasonal equity offerings. The findings suggest that real earnings management comes at a high cost. Firms sacrifice future performance when engaging in real earnings management.


  • Open Access

    Can Whistleblowing Improve Organizational Effectiveness? Evidence from Financial Reporting Misconduct

    by Hong Kim Duong, Sadok El Ghoul, Omrane Guedhami, Emmanuel Sequeira, Zuobao Wei

    The theory of prosocial organizational behavior predicts that target firms’ responsiveness can influence how whistleblowers perceive organizational justice. This responsiveness also affects whistleblowers’ willingness to undertake what is referred to as “extra-role” citizenship behavior. In this study, we examine whether target firms respond to external whistleblowing reports by adjusting their investment in organizational capital, generally defined as investment in employee welfare, operational processes, and communications. Insufficient organizational capital can lead to lax internal controls and low worker morale, which increases the odds of financial misconduct and subsequent whistleblowing. We collect a sample of employee external whistleblowing cases related to financial reporting misconduct, obtained via a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request and a hand-collected sample from public media over the 1990-2018 period. Our results show strong evidence that whistleblowing target firms increase investment in organizational capital following the allegations. Further, we find that whistleblowing target firms with increased organizational capital become more productive and have a higher firm value in the post-allegation period. Our findings have important policy and managerial implications.

  • Open Access

    Code of Ethics Quality and Audit Fees

    by Hong Kim Duong, Giorgio Gotti, Michael T. Stein, Anthony Chen

    Using a sample of U.S. firms from 2003 to 2018, we examine the effect of an audit client’s code of ethics quality on audit fees. We find that clients with a lower code of ethics quality pay significantly higher audit fees, suggesting that auditors perceive such clients as riskier and charge greater risk premiums. We also find that such clients have higher litigation risk and auditors spend greater effort when auditing such clients. Our study is among the first to demonstrate the role of a client’s code of ethics quality in audit pricing. Overall, our findings are consistent with codes of ethics being useful to auditors in assessing managers’ financial representations and providing value to firms.

  • The joint effect of internal and external governance on earnings management and firm performance

    by Hong Kim Duong, Helen Kang, Stephen B. Salter

    This study examines whether shareholders use internal governance mechanisms (i.e., manager compensation, shareholder rights protection at firm level) to substitute for weak external governance (i.e., investor protection mechanisms at country level) in restricting earnings management. We find that the impacts of internal governance on earnings management are stronger in countries with weak external governance. Examining the consequence of earnings management on firm performance, we find that internal governance restricts earnings management more efficiently than external governance. This study extends prior literature by quantifying the impacts of internal and external governance on earnings management and firm performance. Our findings suggest that investors should pay more attention to internal governance than to external governance in controlling for earnings management.


  • Open Access

    Living up to your codes? Corporate codes of ethics and the cost of equity capital

    by Hong Kim Duong, Marco Fasan, Giorgio Gotti

    Purpose: Previous literature provides mixed evidence about the effectiveness of a code of ethics in limiting managerial opportunism. While some studies find that code of ethics is merely window-dressing, others find that they do influence managers' behavior. The present study investigates whether the quality of a code of ethics decreases the cost of equity by limiting managerial opportunism.Design/methodology/approach: In order to test the hypothesis, the authors perform an empirical analysis on a sample of US companies in the 2004–2012 period. The results are robust to a battery of robustness analyses that the authors performed in order to take care of endogeneity.Findings: Empirical results indicate that a higher quality code of ethics is associated with a lower cost of equity. In other words, firms with a more comprehensive code of ethics and better-designed implementation procedures limit managerial opportunism and pay a lower cost of equity because they are perceived by investors to be less risky.Research limitations/implications: Practical implications: Social implications: Originality/value: The authors contribute to the literature in two ways. First, by looking at the market reaction to the code of ethics, thus capturing all its indirect possible benefits and second, by measuring not only the existence but also the quality of a code of ethics. Based on the results, policymakers may choose to further promote codes of ethics as an effective corporate governance mechanism.