Mainack Mondal
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Mainack Mondal has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Aniket Kate
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA
2 shared publications - Krishna P. Gummadi
Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Saarbrücken, Germany
2 shared publications - Mohsen Minaei
Purdue University
2 shared publications - Patrick Loiseau
Inria, FairPlay team, Palaiseau, France
2 shared publications Denzil Correa
Max Planck Institute for Software Systems, Saarbrücken, Germany
1 shared publicationFabrício Benevenuto
Department of Computer Science, Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Belo Horizonte, Brazil
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 24 December 2018
- Published by Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium Advisory Board in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
- Vol. 2019 (1) , 206-226
Lethe: Conceal Content Deletion from Persistent Observers
Most social platforms offer mechanisms allowing users to delete their posts, and a significant fraction of users exercise this right to be forgotten. However, ironically, users’ attempt to reduce attention to sensitive posts via deletion, in practice, attracts unwanted attention from stalkers specifically to those (deleted) posts. Thus, deletions may leave users more vulnerable to attacks on their privacy in general. Users hoping to make their posts forgotten face a “damned if I do, damned if I don’t” dilemma. Many are shifting towards ephemeral social platform like Snapchat, which will deprive us of important user-data archival. In the form of intermittent withdrawals, we present, Lethe, a novel solution to this problem of (really) forgetting the forgotten. If the next-generation social platforms are willing to give up the uninterrupted availability of non-deleted posts by a very small fraction, Lethe provides privacy to the deleted posts over long durations. In presence of Lethe, an adversarial observer becomes unsure if some posts are permanently deleted or just temporarily withdrawn by Lethe; at the same time, the adversarial observer is overwhelmed by a large number of falsely flagged undeleted posts. To demonstrate the feasibility and performance of Lethe, we analyze large-scale real data about users’ deletion over Twitter and thoroughly investigate how to choose time duration distributions for alternating between temporary withdrawals and resurrections of non-deleted posts. We find a favorable trade-off between privacy, availability and adversarial overhead in different settings for users exercising their right to delete. We show that, even against an ultimate adversary with an uninterrupted access to the entire platform, Lethe offers deletion privacy for up to 3 months from the time of deletion, while maintaining content availability as high as 95% and keeping the adversarial precision to 20%.
- 24 December 2018
- Published by Privacy Enhancing Technologies Symposium Advisory Board in Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
- Vol. 2019 (1) , 206-226
Open AccessLethe: Conceal Content Deletion from Persistent Observers
Most social platforms offer mechanisms allowing users to delete their posts, and a significant fraction of users exercise this right to be forgotten. However, ironically, users’ attempt to reduce attention to sensitive posts via deletion, in practice, attracts unwanted attention from stalkers specifically to those (deleted) posts. Thus, deletions may leave users more vulnerable to attacks on their privacy in general. Users hoping to make their posts forgotten face a “damned if I do, damned if I don’t” dilemma. Many are shifting towards ephemeral social platform like Snapchat, which will deprive us of important user-data archival. In the form of intermittent withdrawals, we present, Lethe, a novel solution to this problem of (really) forgetting the forgotten. If the next-generation social platforms are willing to give up the uninterrupted availability of non-deleted posts by a very small fraction, Lethe provides privacy to the deleted posts over long durations. In presence of Lethe, an adversarial observer becomes unsure if some posts are permanently deleted or just temporarily withdrawn by Lethe; at the same time, the adversarial observer is overwhelmed by a large number of falsely flagged undeleted posts. To demonstrate the feasibility and performance of Lethe, we analyze large-scale real data about users’ deletion over Twitter and thoroughly investigate how to choose time duration distributions for alternating between temporary withdrawals and resurrections of non-deleted posts. We find a favorable trade-off between privacy, availability and adversarial overhead in different settings for users exercising their right to delete. We show that, even against an ultimate adversary with an uninterrupted access to the entire platform, Lethe offers deletion privacy for up to 3 months from the time of deletion, while maintaining content availability as high as 95% and keeping the adversarial precision to 20%.
- Open Access
Forgetting the Forgotten with Letheia, Concealing Content Deletion from Persistent Observers
Most social platforms offer mechanisms allowing users to delete their posts, and a significant fraction of users exercise this right to be forgotten. However, ironically, users' attempt to reduce attention to sensitive posts via deletion, in practice, attracts unwanted attention from stalkers specifically to those posts. Thus, deletions may leave users more vulnerable to attacks on their privacy in general. Users hoping to make their posts forgotten face a "damned if I do, damned if I don't" dilemma. Many are shifting towards ephemeral social platform like Snapchat, which will deprive us of important user-data archival. In the form of intermittent withdrawals, we present, Lethe, a novel solution to this problem of forgetting the forgotten. If the next-generation social platforms are willing to give up the uninterrupted availability of non-deleted posts by a very small fraction, Lethe provides privacy to the deleted posts over long durations. In presence of Lethe, an adversarial observer becomes unsure if some posts are permanently deleted or just temporarily withdrawn by Lethe; at the same time, the adversarial observer is overwhelmed by a large number of falsely flagged undeleted posts. To demonstrate the feasibility and performance of Lethe, we analyze large-scale real data about users' deletion over Twitter and thoroughly investigate how to choose time duration distributions for alternating between temporary withdrawals and resurrections of non-deleted posts. We find a favorable trade-off between privacy, availability and adversarial overhead in different settings for users exercising their right to delete. We show that, even against an ultimate adversary with an uninterrupted access to the entire platform, Lethe offers deletion privacy for up to 3 months from the time of deletion, while maintaining content availability as high as 95% and keeping the adversarial precision to 20%.
Open AccessForgetting the Forgotten with Letheia, Concealing Content Deletion from Persistent Observers
Most social platforms offer mechanisms allowing users to delete their posts, and a significant fraction of users exercise this right to be forgotten. However, ironically, users' attempt to reduce attention to sensitive posts via deletion, in practice, attracts unwanted attention from stalkers specifically to those posts. Thus, deletions may leave users more vulnerable to attacks on their privacy in general. Users hoping to make their posts forgotten face a "damned if I do, damned if I don't" dilemma. Many are shifting towards ephemeral social platform like Snapchat, which will deprive us of important user-data archival. In the form of intermittent withdrawals, we present, Lethe, a novel solution to this problem of forgetting the forgotten. If the next-generation social platforms are willing to give up the uninterrupted availability of non-deleted posts by a very small fraction, Lethe provides privacy to the deleted posts over long durations. In presence of Lethe, an adversarial observer becomes unsure if some posts are permanently deleted or just temporarily withdrawn by Lethe; at the same time, the adversarial observer is overwhelmed by a large number of falsely flagged undeleted posts. To demonstrate the feasibility and performance of Lethe, we analyze large-scale real data about users' deletion over Twitter and thoroughly investigate how to choose time duration distributions for alternating between temporary withdrawals and resurrections of non-deleted posts. We find a favorable trade-off between privacy, availability and adversarial overhead in different settings for users exercising their right to delete. We show that, even against an ultimate adversary with an uninterrupted access to the entire platform, Lethe offers deletion privacy for up to 3 months from the time of deletion, while maintaining content availability as high as 95% and keeping the adversarial precision to 20%.
- 3 April 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Review of Hypermedia and Multimedia
- Vol. 24 (2) , 110-130
Characterizing usage of explicit hate expressions in social media
Social media platforms provide an inexpensive communication medium that allows anyone to publish content and anyone interested in the content can obtain it. However, this same potential of social media provide space for discourses that are harmful to certain groups of people. Examples of these discourses include bullying, offensive content, and hate speech. Out of these discourses hate speech is rapidly recognized as a serious problem by authorities of many countries. In this paper, we provide the first of a kind systematic large-scale measurement and analysis study of explicit expressions of hate speech in online social media. We aim to understand the abundance of hate speech in online social media, the most common hate expressions, the effect of anonymity on hate speech, the sensitivity of hate speech and the most hated groups across regions. In order to achieve our objectives, we gather traces from two social media systems: Whisper and Twitter. We then develop and validate a methodology to identify hate speech on both of these systems. Our results identify hate speech forms and unveil a set of important patterns, providing not only a broader understanding of online hate speech, but also offering directions for detection and prevention approaches.
- 3 April 2018
- Published by Taylor & Francis in New Review of Hypermedia and Multimedia
- Vol. 24 (2) , 110-130
Characterizing usage of explicit hate expressions in social media
Social media platforms provide an inexpensive communication medium that allows anyone to publish content and anyone interested in the content can obtain it. However, this same potential of social media provide space for discourses that are harmful to certain groups of people. Examples of these discourses include bullying, offensive content, and hate speech. Out of these discourses hate speech is rapidly recognized as a serious problem by authorities of many countries. In this paper, we provide the first of a kind systematic large-scale measurement and analysis study of explicit expressions of hate speech in online social media. We aim to understand the abundance of hate speech in online social media, the most common hate expressions, the effect of anonymity on hate speech, the sensitivity of hate speech and the most hated groups across regions. In order to achieve our objectives, we gather traces from two social media systems: Whisper and Twitter. We then develop and validate a methodology to identify hate speech on both of these systems. Our results identify hate speech forms and unveil a set of important patterns, providing not only a broader understanding of online hate speech, but also offering directions for detection and prevention approaches.