Daria Pelech
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Daria Pelech has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Jing Guo
Jing Guo, Congressional Budget Office
1 shared publicationJoyce Shin
Joyce Shin, Congressional Budget Office
1 shared publication- Karen Stockley
Congressional Budget Office, Ford House Office Building Washington District of Columbia USA
1 shared publication - Karen Stockley
Principal Analyst, Health Analysis Division, U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC, USA
1 shared publication Michael Cohen
Principal Analyst, Health Analysis Division, U.S. Congressional Budget Office, Washington, DC, USA
1 shared publicationRu Ding
Ru Ding, Congressional Budget Office
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 October 2025
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 44 (10) , 1256-1265
Favorable Selection Among Dually Enrolled Beneficiaries In Private Medicare Plans
Medicare-Medicaid dual enrollees accounted for roughly a third of those programs' spending but less than 20 percent of enrollment in 2021. Policy makers have responded to dual enrollees' high levels of spending by encouraging their enrollment in private Medicare plans. However, assessing plans' impact on spending is complicated by favorable selection, in which healthier people prefer private plans to Medicare fee-for-service. We tested for selection into Medicare plans among dual enrollees, using linked Medicaid-Medicare claims data from the period 2017-22. We tracked people transitioning from Medicaid to dual enrollment and compared their pre-dual enrollment spending among Medicare plan choices. We found evidence of favorable selection. After adjustment for for beneficiary characteristics, a 1 percent increase in medical spending reduced beneficiaries' probability of enrolling in private plans by 1 percentage point (2.3 percent). The effects were driven by the highest-spending beneficiaries, who were 11 percentage points (25 percent) less likely to enroll in private plans. Selection appeared to be stronger among unintegrated plans (which cover Medicare but not Medicaid benefits), although higher spending on long-term services and supports reduced enrollment in all plan types. These findings highlight the need for researchers to control for underlying health status when evaluating health or spending outcomes in private plans.
- 1 October 2025
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 44 (10) , 1256-1265
Favorable Selection Among Dually Enrolled Beneficiaries In Private Medicare Plans
Medicare-Medicaid dual enrollees accounted for roughly a third of those programs' spending but less than 20 percent of enrollment in 2021. Policy makers have responded to dual enrollees' high levels of spending by encouraging their enrollment in private Medicare plans. However, assessing plans' impact on spending is complicated by favorable selection, in which healthier people prefer private plans to Medicare fee-for-service. We tested for selection into Medicare plans among dual enrollees, using linked Medicaid-Medicare claims data from the period 2017-22. We tracked people transitioning from Medicaid to dual enrollment and compared their pre-dual enrollment spending among Medicare plan choices. We found evidence of favorable selection. After adjustment for for beneficiary characteristics, a 1 percent increase in medical spending reduced beneficiaries' probability of enrolling in private plans by 1 percentage point (2.3 percent). The effects were driven by the highest-spending beneficiaries, who were 11 percentage points (25 percent) less likely to enroll in private plans. Selection appeared to be stronger among unintegrated plans (which cover Medicare but not Medicaid benefits), although higher spending on long-term services and supports reduced enrollment in all plan types. These findings highlight the need for researchers to control for underlying health status when evaluating health or spending outcomes in private plans.
- 21 October 2024
- Published by Wiley in Health Services Research
- Vol. 60 (2)
Private Medicare plans' responses to benchmark changes and competition before and after the Affordable Care Act's payment cuts
Objective: To examine how private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans responded to slower growth in federal payments after the Affordable Care Act (ACA).Data Sources and Study Setting: We used publicly available data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services on MA plan subsidies (“benchmarks”), asking prices (“bids”), plan premiums, cost‐sharing, and covered benefits. Data covered all counties with MA plans between 2006 through 2019.Study Design: We examined plan responses to changes in benchmark subsidies by comparing changes in bids, rebates, and other outcomes between counties experiencing larger changes in benchmarks and counties with smaller changes, pre‐ and post‐ACA. We used longitudinal fixed effects regression models to assess heterogeneity in how plans adjusted premiums and benefits across more and less competitive markets.Data Collection: Analyses included all counties with at least one MA plan available to individual beneficiaries. Plans targeting special populations were excluded.Principal Findings: Average plan benchmarks fell by $89 per month post‐ACA, adjusted for inflation. Plans responded similarly to benchmark subsidy decreases and increases, increasing bids by 62 cents for every dollar increase in subsidies pre‐ACA (95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.56 to 0.67) and decreasing them by 57 cents for every dollar reduction in subsidies post‐ACA (95% CI: 0.49–0.65). However, post‐ACA, plans altered less salient benefits, such as cost‐sharing, by about twice as much as they had pre‐ACA. Premiums changed by similar amounts before and after the ACA (−$0.07, 95% CI: from −$0.09 to −$0.06). Plans in more competitive markets responded less to payment changes than plans did in less competitive markets, suggesting the former are operating closer to marginal costs. Finally, payments to plans declined far less than projected due in part to other changes in MA policy.Conclusions: Plans used partial pass‐through of benchmark subsidy decreases to shield beneficiaries from cuts and allocated benchmark decreases to benefits that were less salient to the average enrollee. These findings, combined with higher‐than‐projected payments post‐ACA, may explain the continued growth in MA enrollment.
- 21 October 2024
- Published by Wiley in Health Services Research
- Vol. 60 (2)
Private Medicare plans' responses to benchmark changes and competition before and after the Affordable Care Act's payment cuts
Objective: To examine how private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans responded to slower growth in federal payments after the Affordable Care Act (ACA).Data Sources and Study Setting: We used publicly available data from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services on MA plan subsidies (“benchmarks”), asking prices (“bids”), plan premiums, cost‐sharing, and covered benefits. Data covered all counties with MA plans between 2006 through 2019.Study Design: We examined plan responses to changes in benchmark subsidies by comparing changes in bids, rebates, and other outcomes between counties experiencing larger changes in benchmarks and counties with smaller changes, pre‐ and post‐ACA. We used longitudinal fixed effects regression models to assess heterogeneity in how plans adjusted premiums and benefits across more and less competitive markets.Data Collection: Analyses included all counties with at least one MA plan available to individual beneficiaries. Plans targeting special populations were excluded.Principal Findings: Average plan benchmarks fell by $89 per month post‐ACA, adjusted for inflation. Plans responded similarly to benchmark subsidy decreases and increases, increasing bids by 62 cents for every dollar increase in subsidies pre‐ACA (95% confidence interval [CI]: 0.56 to 0.67) and decreasing them by 57 cents for every dollar reduction in subsidies post‐ACA (95% CI: 0.49–0.65). However, post‐ACA, plans altered less salient benefits, such as cost‐sharing, by about twice as much as they had pre‐ACA. Premiums changed by similar amounts before and after the ACA (−$0.07, 95% CI: from −$0.09 to −$0.06). Plans in more competitive markets responded less to payment changes than plans did in less competitive markets, suggesting the former are operating closer to marginal costs. Finally, payments to plans declined far less than projected due in part to other changes in MA policy.Conclusions: Plans used partial pass‐through of benchmark subsidy decreases to shield beneficiaries from cuts and allocated benchmark decreases to benefits that were less salient to the average enrollee. These findings, combined with higher‐than‐projected payments post‐ACA, may explain the continued growth in MA enrollment.
- 20 September 2023
- Published by Massachusetts Medical Society in NEJM Catalyst
- Vol. 4 (10)
Potential Federal Policies to Reduce or Limit Commercial Plan Payments to Hospitals and Physicians
- 20 September 2023
- Published by Massachusetts Medical Society in NEJM Catalyst
- Vol. 4 (10)
Potential Federal Policies to Reduce or Limit Commercial Plan Payments to Hospitals and Physicians
- 15 March 2022
- Published by Wiley in Health Services Research
- Vol. 57 (3) , 624-633
How price and quantity factors drive spending in nongroup and employer health plans
Objectives: To describe how spending in private, nongroup health insurance plans compared to spending in employer plans and to attribute those spending differences to components related to provider prices and quantity of care.Data Sources: The 2016 commercial claims and enrollment data of three large, national insurers from the Health Care Cost Institute.Study Design: We compared per member per month spending across three employer and three nongroup market segments, including on‐exchange, off‐exchange, and short‐term plans, to average commercial spending. We constructed price indices in each market segment and then decomposed spending differences into those attributable to differences in prices, health risk, plan generosity, and other factors.Data Collection/Extraction Methods: We selected all medical claims for enrollees in commercial plans. We excluded enrollees with Medicare Advantage coverage or those for whom the majority of claims were covered by a secondary payer.Results: Provider prices were 4.1% lower in on‐exchange plans (p < 0.001) and 1.4% lower in off‐exchange plans (p < 0.001), compared to average prices in the same geographic area. In contrast, prices in employer plans were within roughly a percentage point of those averages. Differences in average spending were much larger than price differences. Off‐exchange enrollees spent 20% less than the sample average (p < 0.001), whereas on‐exchange enrollees spent 12% more (p < 0.001). Those differences were driven largely by variation in health risk, with variation in prices, plan generosity, and other factors contributing smaller amounts.Conclusions: Our results indicate that provider prices in nongroup plans are much closer to the prices paid by employer plans than to the substantially lower prices paid by public payers. In addition, health risk was the largest contributor to differences in spending. Lowering provider prices and attracting healthier enrollees in nongroup plans may be crucial for lowering premiums.
- 15 March 2022
- Published by Wiley in Health Services Research
- Vol. 57 (3) , 624-633
How price and quantity factors drive spending in nongroup and employer health plans
Objectives: To describe how spending in private, nongroup health insurance plans compared to spending in employer plans and to attribute those spending differences to components related to provider prices and quantity of care.Data Sources: The 2016 commercial claims and enrollment data of three large, national insurers from the Health Care Cost Institute.Study Design: We compared per member per month spending across three employer and three nongroup market segments, including on‐exchange, off‐exchange, and short‐term plans, to average commercial spending. We constructed price indices in each market segment and then decomposed spending differences into those attributable to differences in prices, health risk, plan generosity, and other factors.Data Collection/Extraction Methods: We selected all medical claims for enrollees in commercial plans. We excluded enrollees with Medicare Advantage coverage or those for whom the majority of claims were covered by a secondary payer.Results: Provider prices were 4.1% lower in on‐exchange plans (p < 0.001) and 1.4% lower in off‐exchange plans (p < 0.001), compared to average prices in the same geographic area. In contrast, prices in employer plans were within roughly a percentage point of those averages. Differences in average spending were much larger than price differences. Off‐exchange enrollees spent 20% less than the sample average (p < 0.001), whereas on‐exchange enrollees spent 12% more (p < 0.001). Those differences were driven largely by variation in health risk, with variation in prices, plan generosity, and other factors contributing smaller amounts.Conclusions: Our results indicate that provider prices in nongroup plans are much closer to the prices paid by employer plans than to the substantially lower prices paid by public payers. In addition, health risk was the largest contributor to differences in spending. Lowering provider prices and attracting healthier enrollees in nongroup plans may be crucial for lowering premiums.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 38 (2) , 262-267
Medicare Advantage And Commercial Prices For Mental Health Services
In 2014, insurers paid an average of 13–14 percent less for in-network mental health services in their commercial and Medicare Advantage plans than fee-for-service Medicare paid for identical services—despite paying up to 12 percent more than Medicare when the same services were provided by other physician specialties. However, patients went out of network more frequently for mental health services than for comparison services, which increased their average cost-sharing payments.
- 1 February 2019
- Published by Health Affairs Publishing, LLC in Health Affairs
- Vol. 38 (2) , 262-267
Medicare Advantage And Commercial Prices For Mental Health Services
In 2014, insurers paid an average of 13–14 percent less for in-network mental health services in their commercial and Medicare Advantage plans than fee-for-service Medicare paid for identical services—despite paying up to 12 percent more than Medicare when the same services were provided by other physician specialties. However, patients went out of network more frequently for mental health services than for comparison services, which increased their average cost-sharing payments.
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 61, 77-92
Paying more for less? Insurer competition and health plan generosity in the Medicare Advantage program
- 1 September 2018
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 61, 77-92
Paying more for less? Insurer competition and health plan generosity in the Medicare Advantage program
- 25 June 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Medical Care Research and Review
- Vol. 77 (3) , 236-248
Prices for Physicians’ Services in Medicare Advantage and Commercial Plans
The prices that insurers pay physicians ultimately affect beneficiaries’ health insurance premiums. Using 2014 claims data from three major insurers, we analyzed the prices insurers paid in their Medicare Advantage (MA) and commercial plans for 20 physician services, in and out of network, and compared those prices with estimated amounts that Medicare’s fee-for-service (FFS) program would pay for the same service. MA prices paid by those insurers were close to Medicare FFS prices, varied minimally, and were similar in and out of network. In contrast, commercial prices paid by the same insurers were substantially higher than FFS, varied widely, and were up to three times higher out of network than in network. Those results suggest that insurers can use statutory limits on out-of-network charges in MA to negotiate lower in-network prices in those plans. In contrast, without those limits on out-of-network prices, in-network prices in commercial plans are much higher.
- 25 June 2018
- Published by SAGE Publications in Medical Care Research and Review
- Vol. 77 (3) , 236-248
Prices for Physicians’ Services in Medicare Advantage and Commercial Plans
The prices that insurers pay physicians ultimately affect beneficiaries’ health insurance premiums. Using 2014 claims data from three major insurers, we analyzed the prices insurers paid in their Medicare Advantage (MA) and commercial plans for 20 physician services, in and out of network, and compared those prices with estimated amounts that Medicare’s fee-for-service (FFS) program would pay for the same service. MA prices paid by those insurers were close to Medicare FFS prices, varied minimally, and were similar in and out of network. In contrast, commercial prices paid by the same insurers were substantially higher than FFS, varied widely, and were up to three times higher out of network than in network. Those results suggest that insurers can use statutory limits on out-of-network charges in MA to negotiate lower in-network prices in those plans. In contrast, without those limits on out-of-network prices, in-network prices in commercial plans are much higher.
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 51, 98-112
Dropped out or pushed out? Insurance market exit and provider market power in Medicare Advantage
- 1 January 2017
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Health Economics
- Vol. 51, 98-112
Dropped out or pushed out? Insurance market exit and provider market power in Medicare Advantage