Dominic Lenzi

Although concerns about large-scale implementation of Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) are well known, the ethical implications of ‘nature-based’ forms remain underexplored. Depending upon their implementation, these projects may benefit or harm local communities and biodiversity, risks that may be obscured by framing them as ‘natural’. We examine ‘nature-based’ CDR by contrasting three conceptions of the capabilities approach that may be extended to nonhumans. While two of these conceptions face justificatory challenges arising from widespread environmental pluralism, we build upon Amartya Sen’s conception to propose a deliberative model of climate justice. This model calls for participatory processes to determine which nonhuman entities are recognized as subjects of justice, ensuring that CDR decisions reflect the full range of environmental values at stake in each context.

Technological innovation is a double-edged sword for the environment. While it can significantly reduce environmental and societal risks of harm, technological progress is often a major contributor to environmental degradation. This suggests the need for an anticipatory approach to research oversight which can mitigate the harmful and contradictory effects of research and innovation. In this article, we conduct a scoping review to identify cross-cutting concepts between environmental ethics, environmental justice, climate ethics, climate justice, and research ethics and integrity, focusing on literature on research and technological innovation. This article identifies an important gap between research ethics and these other topic areas. It also demonstrates the importance of updating existing research ethics frameworks to incorporate environmental concerns evident in environmental ethics and climate justice. Finally, it reveals an over-representation of studies focused upon climate change at the expense of other environmental issues, and of research on the ethics and governance of geoengineering, which we suggest is not a generalisable model for governance of research.

D ifferent worldviews shape how humans perceive, understand, inhabit, and value the world. Major efforts to achieve more inclusive conservation, such as the Kunming–Montreal Global Biodiversity Framework, seek to more fully reflect diverse worldviews in science, policy, and practice. Building on the Intergovernmental Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services Values Assessment ’s comprehensive review of academic publications, Indigenous and local knowledge sources, and policy documents, we characterize 4 human–nature worldviews: anthropocentrism, biocentrism, ecocentrism, and pluricentrism. This heuristic typology can help conservation scholars and practitioners navigate participatory decision‐making by providing conceptual clarity to distinguish particular worldviews and the fuzzy boundaries between them, and by addressing practical issues, particularly discursive and structural power dynamics, that affect worldview expression. Two case studies, protected area prioritization in India and payments for ecosystem services in Colombia, show that inclusive conservation depends on strategies and abilities to recognize and understand diverse worldviews and to articulate them in institutions. These examples highlight that engaging diverse human–nature worldviews applies not only to developing new policies but also to adapting mainstream instruments.

Can economics reflect climate justice? Although the scenario forecasts of climate economists are key inputs to IPCC assessments, their ethical assumptions fail to reflect important considerations of justice. This is clearest regarding sufficientarian justice, which requires that no person falls below a minimum level of well-being. This view is reflected in an important strand of climate diplomacy and activism that highlights the plight of those most vulnerable to climate harms. However, I show that sufficientarian justice is largely incompatible with predominant approaches to climate economic modelling. I then examine the prospects for a sufficientarian climate economics, considering dual discounting approaches, well-being ‘guardrails’ approaches and basic needs modelling. I find that the latter two are closest to sufficientarianism, although they reflect different interpretations of its core claims. Finally, I consider whether climate sufficientarianism requires economic ‘degrowth’, as some have claimed. I argue that sufficientarianism is compatible with periods of economic growth, but is likely to be incompatible with the indefinite pursuit of growth due to the ecological impacts this would entail. Since growth is a standard assumption in climate economics, this reiterates the need for new economic approaches in the pursuit of a just and sustainable future.

The concept of “irreversibility” and its counterpart “reversibility” have become prominent in environmental and ecological research on human-induced changes, thresholds, climate tipping points, ecosystem degradation, and losses in the cryosphere and biosphere. Through a systematic literature review, we show that in these research fields, these notions are not only descriptive terms, but can have different semantic functions and normative aspects. The results suggest that, in the context of environmental and ecological research the concepts of irreversibility and reversibility have taken on additional usages in comparison to their contexts in theoretical thermodynamics and mechanics. Irreversible as a classification of anthropogenic environmental change can be used categorically, in the sense of a finite end, or relatively, i.e. on time or spatial scales of interest. Surprisingly, most of the analyzed scientific articles that use the terminology of (ir)reversibility substantively do not provide an explicit conceptualization or definition (74.7%). The research on potential (ir)reversibility of environmental change may affect the social and political willingness to bear the costs of interventions to mitigate or prevent undesirable environmental change. In particular, classifying a change as reversible or irreversible and determining the timescale(s) and spatial scale(s) involved has implications for policy and ecosystem management decisions, as suggested by its use in several high-level scientific and policy reports on ecosystem and climate change. Therefore, it is important to explicitly present a clear definition of irreversibility or reversibility for the readers from other fields, even if it could be the case that within a specific community an implicit definition was considered to be sufficient. We propose further recommendations for inter- and transdisciplinary reflection and conceptual use in the context of environmental, ecological, and sustainability research.

Non-Technical Summary: Climate stabilization requires scaling-up technologies to capture and store carbon. Carbon removal could be very profitable, and some of the agents best placed to benefit are ‘carbon majors’, i.e. fossil fuel companies. We argue that in ordinary circumstances only agents without significant historical climate responsibilities would be entitled to the full benefits from carbon removal. Under non-ideal conditions, carbon majors might be entitled to benefit, provided that no other agent could remove similar quantities of carbon at similar costs. This burden of proof is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities. Technical Summary: Climate stabilization requires scaling up technologies to capture and store carbon. Some of the agents best placed to profit from carbon removal are ‘carbon majors’, especially fossil fuel companies. Yet incentivizing carbon majors to undertake carbon removal poses an ethical dilemma: carbon majors have made significant historical contributions to climate change and have significantly benefitted from such contributions without being made to compensate for resulting climate harm. This is why it seems unfair to reward them with additional economic benefits. However, carbon majors possess the technological skills and infrastructure to upscale carbon removal efficiently. We argue that in ordinary circumstances, only agents without significant climate responsibilities would be morally entitled to fully benefit from carbon removal. Yet under non-ideal conditions, it might be permissible to reward carbon majors if no other agent were capable of removing as much carbon at similar costs and on similar timeframes. We believe this argument faces an imposing burden of proof that is only likely to be met in countries with poor governance capacities. In more favorable circumstances, including those of most OECD countries, rewarding carbon majors without having them pay for their historical climate responsibilities remains impermissible. Social Media Summary: Rewarding carbon majors to undertake carbon dioxide removal is unjust due to their historical climate responsibilities. Where possible, governments should empower other agents to remove CO₂.

The urgency of climate change has never been greater, nor the moral case for responding to it more compelling. This review essay critically compares Darrel Moellendorf's Mobilizing Hope and Catriona McKinnon's Climate Change and Political Theory. Moellendorf's book defends the moral importance of poverty alleviation through sustainable economic growth and argues for a mass climate movement based on the promise of a more prosperous future. By contrast, McKinnon provides a political vocabulary to articulate the many faces of climate injustice, and to critically examine proposed policy solutions—notably including the indefinite pursuit of economic growth. While both find reasons to be hopeful, their wide-ranging accounts reflect different visions of what a just and sustainable future might look like. They reflect different understandings of sustainable development and the significance of environmental values; the scope of permissible climate activism; and the ethics of geoengineering. Building upon them, I argue in favor of a more pluralistic vision of a just climate future, one that is capable of speaking to the range of moral interests bearing upon the climate and biodiversity crises, and that supports sustainable development that is inclusive of diverse human-nature relationships.

This chapter discusses the societal and ethical challenges of climate engineering or large-scale intentional intervention in the climate system. Climate engineering is highly controversial, and raises many questions about the values of human societies and the desirability of technological visions of the future. Yet existing ethical theories and concepts may not be equipped to deal with the resulting ethical issues. To understand the potential social and political disruptiveness of climate engineering, we argue it must be placed in the context of global environmental changes caused by human activity. Yet climate engineering is also accompanied with a high degree of uncertainty and risk in terms of potential and actual unintended impacts on natural processes and society. An important challenge stems from epistemic and normative uncertainties about the reversibility and variability in spatial and temporal scales of deployment. Epistemic uncertainties arise in the methodological framework of climate science, while normative uncertainties arise faced with the challenge of reconciling a plurality of values. A key question is how forms of climate engineering enforce or hinder disruption in social practices and institutional settings in the direction of a sustainable future. Climate engineering technologies can affect and potentially disrupt existing conceptions of climate and environmental justice, due to the scale and scope of impacts upon people currently alive, future generations, and non-human species and ecosystems. The availability of climate engineering may also require rethinking the responsibility for mitigation, as well as applications of the precautionary principle. Climate engineering also raises the question of how the perspectives of affected communities can be adequately represented. While it remains unclear whether climate engineering techniques can genuinely assist in lessening the impacts of climate change, the question is whether and to what extent it should be used as a complementary approach to systemic changes in social, economic and political practices.