José Antonio García-Martínez
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
José Antonio García-Martínez has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ascensión Andina-Díaz
Dpto. Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga, Málaga, Spain
4 shared publications - Ana Meca
I. U. Centro de Investigación Operativa, Universidad Miguel Hernández de Elche, Elche, Spain
2 shared publications - Antonio J. Mayor-Serra1 shared publication
- Antonio Parravano
Affiliations Dpto. Teoría e Historia Económica, Universidad de Málaga, Málaga, Spain, Centro de Física Fundamental, Universidad de Los Andes, Mérida, Venezuela
1 shared publication - Carlos Gutiérrez-Hita
Miguel Hernandez University of Elche: Universidad Miguel Hernandez de Elche
1 shared publication Fernando Vega-Redondo
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 6 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Rejected: Career concerns in the refereeing process
We analyze the effect of career concerns on the refereeing process. We consider a journal editor and two referees who may differ in reputation and ability. A referee’s reputation is public information, while a referee’s ability is private information. We identify an incentive for low-ability referees to reject good papers —a phenomenon we call over-rejection— and find that this incentive increases with the referee’s reputation. We show that over-rejection decreases with competition, referee homogeneity, and the anonymity of the refereeing process. In contrast to low-ability experts, high-ability referees are sincere in equilibrium. This difference in behavior, along with the fact that referees of low reputation are more likely to be low-ability, produces an inverted U-shaped curve between referee recommendations and reputation that we empirically test. To this, we use data from Card and DellaVigna (2020) for submissions to four top economic journals in the period 2003-2013 and use the referee’s publication record as a proxy for the referee’s reputation. We find that the strictness of referee recommendation increases with the referee’s reputation for referees with a lower publication record and decreases thereafter, suggesting an inverted U-shaped form in line with our theoretical results. We also find empirical support for the result that competition reduces over-rejection. Our results are robust to different model specifications and account for potential concerns about selection bias.
- 6 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessRejected: Career concerns in the refereeing process
We analyze the effect of career concerns on the refereeing process. We consider a journal editor and two referees who may differ in reputation and ability. A referee’s reputation is public information, while a referee’s ability is private information. We identify an incentive for low-ability referees to reject good papers —a phenomenon we call over-rejection— and find that this incentive increases with the referee’s reputation. We show that over-rejection decreases with competition, referee homogeneity, and the anonymity of the refereeing process. In contrast to low-ability experts, high-ability referees are sincere in equilibrium. This difference in behavior, along with the fact that referees of low reputation are more likely to be low-ability, produces an inverted U-shaped curve between referee recommendations and reputation that we empirically test. To this, we use data from Card and DellaVigna (2020) for submissions to four top economic journals in the period 2003-2013 and use the referee’s publication record as a proxy for the referee’s reputation. We find that the strictness of referee recommendation increases with the referee’s reputation for referees with a lower publication record and decreases thereafter, suggesting an inverted U-shaped form in line with our theoretical results. We also find empirical support for the result that competition reduces over-rejection. Our results are robust to different model specifications and account for potential concerns about selection bias.
- Open Access
- 4 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 172
Garbling an evaluation to retain an advantage
- 4 January 2025
- Published by Elsevier in European Economic Review
- Vol. 172
Open AccessGarbling an evaluation to retain an advantage
- Open Access
- 9 November 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 10 (22) , 4195
Cooperative Purchasing with General Discount: A Game Theoretical Approach
In some situations, sellers of certain commodities usually provide price discounts for large orders according to a decreasing unit price function. Buyers of such commodities can cooperate and form purchasing groups to benefit from these price discounts. A natural way to allocate the corresponding cost reductions is the equal price rule. We analyze this situation as a cooperative game. We show that when the decreasing unit price function is linear, the equal price rule coincides with the Shapley value and the nucleolus of the cooperative game. However, some buyers may argue that the equal price rule is not acceptable because it favors those who buy just a few units of the product. This can be more problematic when the decreasing unit price function is nonlinear: In that case, the equal price rule loses some of its good properties and it no longer matches the Shapley value or the nucleolus. Unlike the linear case, in this nonlinear case, the Shapley value and nucleolus do not assign the same price to all agents, so there are different price rules. However, they have a computability problem, as both are very laborious to calculate for a large number of agents. To find a suitable alternative, we first study the properties that a different price rule should have in this situation. Second, we propose a family of different price rules that hold those properties and are easy to calculate for a large number of agents. This family of different price rules provides buyers (companies, institutions, consumers, etc.) with an easy-to-implement method which ensures stability in cooperative purchasing.
- 9 November 2022
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 10 (22) , 4195
Open AccessCooperative Purchasing with General Discount: A Game Theoretical Approach
In some situations, sellers of certain commodities usually provide price discounts for large orders according to a decreasing unit price function. Buyers of such commodities can cooperate and form purchasing groups to benefit from these price discounts. A natural way to allocate the corresponding cost reductions is the equal price rule. We analyze this situation as a cooperative game. We show that when the decreasing unit price function is linear, the equal price rule coincides with the Shapley value and the nucleolus of the cooperative game. However, some buyers may argue that the equal price rule is not acceptable because it favors those who buy just a few units of the product. This can be more problematic when the decreasing unit price function is nonlinear: In that case, the equal price rule loses some of its good properties and it no longer matches the Shapley value or the nucleolus. Unlike the linear case, in this nonlinear case, the Shapley value and nucleolus do not assign the same price to all agents, so there are different price rules. However, they have a computability problem, as both are very laborious to calculate for a large number of agents. To find a suitable alternative, we first study the properties that a different price rule should have in this situation. Second, we propose a family of different price rules that hold those properties and are easy to calculate for a large number of agents. This family of different price rules provides buyers (companies, institutions, consumers, etc.) with an easy-to-implement method which ensures stability in cooperative purchasing.
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 123, 240-271
Reputation and news suppression in the media industry
- 1 September 2020
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 123, 240-271
Reputation and news suppression in the media industry
- Open Access
- 6 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 10 (2) , 175-206
The market for scoops: a dynamic approach
- 6 April 2019
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 10 (2) , 175-206
Open AccessThe market for scoops: a dynamic approach
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Economics Education
- Vol. 30, 100148
Microeconomic education, strategic incentives, and gender: An oligopoly classroom experiment with social interaction
- 1 January 2019
- Published by Elsevier in International Review of Economics Education
- Vol. 30, 100148
Microeconomic education, strategic incentives, and gender: An oligopoly classroom experiment with social interaction
- Open Access
- 18 July 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 9 (3) , 305-332
A simple dynamic contest with a parameterized strength of competition
- 18 July 2018
- Published by Springer Nature in SERIEs
- Vol. 9 (3) , 305-332
Open AccessA simple dynamic contest with a parameterized strength of competition
- 1 July 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 92, 74-105
Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism
- 1 July 2015
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 92, 74-105
Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism
- 1 November 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 145 (6) , 2471-2482
Selectivity in hierarchical social systems
- 1 November 2010
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 145 (6) , 2471-2482
Selectivity in hierarchical social systems