Todd G. Griffith
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Todd G. Griffith has a total of 24 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Benjamin M. Blau
Department of Economics and Finance, Jon M. Huntsman School of Business Utah State University Logan Utah USA
7 shared publications - Ryan J. Whitby
Department of Economics and Finance, Jon M. Huntsman School of Business Utah State University Logan Utah USA
6 shared publications Ahmed Baig
Department of Finance Boise State University Boise Idaho USA
2 shared publicationsBenjamin M. Blau
Department of Economics and Finance Jon M. Huntsman School of Business Utah State University Logan UT USA
2 shared publicationsBrian Roseman
Spears College of Business Oklahoma State University Stillwater Oklahoma USA
2 shared publications- Brian S. Roseman
California State University, Fullerton
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 24 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in Financial Management
The Effect of Tick Size on Price Clustering: Evidence From the 2016 US Tick Size Pilot Program
We examine the price clustering anomaly around the SEC's Tick Size Pilot Program (TSPP), which raised the minimum tick size from $0.01 to $0.05 for a group of small‐cap stocks. We find a significant decline in abnormal price clustering for treatment stocks relative to control stocks following the implementation of the TSPP. Importantly, upon the conclusion of the program, abnormal price clustering in treatment stocks rebounds to the levels observed in control stocks. Cross‐sectional tests show that the decline is most pronounced among tick‐unconstrained stocks (those with already wide pre‐TSPP spreads), as well as stocks with smaller market capitalization and limited analyst coverage. These patterns are broadly consistent with an attention‐based explanation and less supportive of liquidity‐based price uncertainty or negotiation mechanisms. Our findings inform ongoing debates on tick size policy and market design.
- 24 August 2026
- Published by Wiley in Financial Management
The Effect of Tick Size on Price Clustering: Evidence From the 2016 US Tick Size Pilot Program
We examine the price clustering anomaly around the SEC's Tick Size Pilot Program (TSPP), which raised the minimum tick size from $0.01 to $0.05 for a group of small‐cap stocks. We find a significant decline in abnormal price clustering for treatment stocks relative to control stocks following the implementation of the TSPP. Importantly, upon the conclusion of the program, abnormal price clustering in treatment stocks rebounds to the levels observed in control stocks. Cross‐sectional tests show that the decline is most pronounced among tick‐unconstrained stocks (those with already wide pre‐TSPP spreads), as well as stocks with smaller market capitalization and limited analyst coverage. These patterns are broadly consistent with an attention‐based explanation and less supportive of liquidity‐based price uncertainty or negotiation mechanisms. Our findings inform ongoing debates on tick size policy and market design.
- Open Access
- 17 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 207 (3-4) , 1-23
Corporate lobbying, political action committees, and market concentration
This study examines whether firms that engage in political activity have greater market concentration. Drawing on public choice theory, we argue that firms pursue political connections to obtain favorable policies that create barriers to entry and weaken competition. Using both univariate and multivariate tests, we find that lobbying firms exhibit market concentration levels that are 7.4% to 10.5% higher than those of non-lobbying firms. These results are robust to the inclusion of year and industry fixed effects, as well as a wide set of firm-specific controls. We further show that firms contributing to political action committees (PACs) display greater market concentration, regardless of party affiliation. The effect is strongest when contributions are directed toward winning candidates. To strengthen causal inference, we conduct a series of difference-in-difference tests around the guilty plea of lobbyist Jack Abramoff, which has been used in the literature as an exogenous negative shock to the pecuniary benefits associated with lobbying activity. We find that lobbying firms experience a significant decline in market concentration, relative to non-lobbying firms, around the event. Together, these findings provide evidence that political activity can causally shape competitive outcomes.
- 17 October 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 207 (3-4) , 1-23
Open AccessCorporate lobbying, political action committees, and market concentration
This study examines whether firms that engage in political activity have greater market concentration. Drawing on public choice theory, we argue that firms pursue political connections to obtain favorable policies that create barriers to entry and weaken competition. Using both univariate and multivariate tests, we find that lobbying firms exhibit market concentration levels that are 7.4% to 10.5% higher than those of non-lobbying firms. These results are robust to the inclusion of year and industry fixed effects, as well as a wide set of firm-specific controls. We further show that firms contributing to political action committees (PACs) display greater market concentration, regardless of party affiliation. The effect is strongest when contributions are directed toward winning candidates. To strengthen causal inference, we conduct a series of difference-in-difference tests around the guilty plea of lobbyist Jack Abramoff, which has been used in the literature as an exogenous negative shock to the pecuniary benefits associated with lobbying activity. We find that lobbying firms experience a significant decline in market concentration, relative to non-lobbying firms, around the event. Together, these findings provide evidence that political activity can causally shape competitive outcomes.
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Financial Research
- Vol. 49 (3) , 914-937
Price clustering and the informational efficiency of stock prices
We examine whether stock price clustering on round pricing increments leads to less efficient stock prices. In panel data tests, we find a positive association between price clustering and market inefficiency. To draw stronger causal inferences, we use the 2016 US Securities and Exchange Tick Size Pilot Program, which exogenously imposed price clustering on a group of treatment stocks. A difference‐in‐differences analysis shows that relative to control stocks, treatment stocks became less efficient during the Pilot period. We also find a reversal effect upon the conclusion of the Pilot. These results suggest that causality flows from price clustering to market inefficiency.
- 8 September 2025
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Financial Research
- Vol. 49 (3) , 914-937
Price clustering and the informational efficiency of stock prices
We examine whether stock price clustering on round pricing increments leads to less efficient stock prices. In panel data tests, we find a positive association between price clustering and market inefficiency. To draw stronger causal inferences, we use the 2016 US Securities and Exchange Tick Size Pilot Program, which exogenously imposed price clustering on a group of treatment stocks. A difference‐in‐differences analysis shows that relative to control stocks, treatment stocks became less efficient during the Pilot period. We also find a reversal effect upon the conclusion of the Pilot. These results suggest that causality flows from price clustering to market inefficiency.
- 22 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Financial Research
- Vol. 47 (3) , 767-787
Market structure and price clustering: Maker‐taker versus taker‐maker
We examine whether the different fee structures on equity exchanges, maker‐taker or taker‐maker, affects the frequency with which security prices cluster on round increments. We find higher price clustering on traditional maker‐taker venues relative to inverted taker‐maker venues. These results generally hold at the individual exchange level and across transaction‐ and quotation‐level clustering measures. Furthermore, we document that quoted depth, both inside and outside the best prices, is significantly greater on maker‐taker venues than on taker‐maker venues. We show that liquidity supply is the main economic driver behind the difference in price clustering between market structures. Our findings indicate that fees and rebates alter order‐routing strategies, which affect the precision of asset prices.
- 22 January 2024
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Financial Research
- Vol. 47 (3) , 767-787
Market structure and price clustering: Maker‐taker versus taker‐maker
We examine whether the different fee structures on equity exchanges, maker‐taker or taker‐maker, affects the frequency with which security prices cluster on round increments. We find higher price clustering on traditional maker‐taker venues relative to inverted taker‐maker venues. These results generally hold at the individual exchange level and across transaction‐ and quotation‐level clustering measures. Furthermore, we document that quoted depth, both inside and outside the best prices, is significantly greater on maker‐taker venues than on taker‐maker venues. We show that liquidity supply is the main economic driver behind the difference in price clustering between market structures. Our findings indicate that fees and rebates alter order‐routing strategies, which affect the precision of asset prices.
- 28 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Empirical Finance
- Vol. 73, 206-219
Industry regulation and the comovement of stock returns
- 28 June 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Empirical Finance
- Vol. 73, 206-219
Industry regulation and the comovement of stock returns
- 4 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 192 (3-4) , 377-397
Lobbying and lending by banks around the financial crisis by
Despite the unprecedented levels of liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve to banks during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, lending by banks slowed dramatically during and after that global episode. In this study, we propose that, given capital constraints, the lobbying expenditures by banks to combat Dodd-Frank might have crowded out lending activity. A variety of univariate and multivariate tests show that while lending by banks fell significantly around the financial crisis, lobbying rose dramatically. Our results also show that bank lobbying and lending are imperfect substitutes during non-crisis periods. Such substitutability likely is explained by the value perceived in the political connections gained through lobbying, such as the ability to influence regulation, preferential treatment on supervisory or enforcement decisions, and protection against adverse shocks in the form of government bailouts.
- 4 September 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 192 (3-4) , 377-397
Lobbying and lending by banks around the financial crisis by
Despite the unprecedented levels of liquidity provided by the Federal Reserve to banks during the 2007–2008 financial crisis, lending by banks slowed dramatically during and after that global episode. In this study, we propose that, given capital constraints, the lobbying expenditures by banks to combat Dodd-Frank might have crowded out lending activity. A variety of univariate and multivariate tests show that while lending by banks fell significantly around the financial crisis, lobbying rose dramatically. Our results also show that bank lobbying and lending are imperfect substitutes during non-crisis periods. Such substitutability likely is explained by the value perceived in the political connections gained through lobbying, such as the ability to influence regulation, preferential treatment on supervisory or enforcement decisions, and protection against adverse shocks in the form of government bailouts.
- 18 November 2021
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 28 (5) , 1260-1282
Settling down: T+2 settlement cycle and liquidity
We examine the effects of a shortened settlement cycle on liquidity. Our difference‐in‐difference results show that securities listed on US stock exchanges become more liquid, relative to similarly matched securities listed on the London Stock Exchange, after the standard settlement cycle in the United States was reduced from T+3 to T+2. These results hold across various low‐ and high‐frequency measures of liquidity and empirical model specifications. Furthermore, we find that securities that are more difficult‐to‐borrow experience the greatest gains in liquidity. Our findings might provide insights to regulators and exchange officials considering the adoption of a shortened settlement cycle.
- 18 November 2021
- Published by Wiley in European Financial Management
- Vol. 28 (5) , 1260-1282
Settling down: T+2 settlement cycle and liquidity
We examine the effects of a shortened settlement cycle on liquidity. Our difference‐in‐difference results show that securities listed on US stock exchanges become more liquid, relative to similarly matched securities listed on the London Stock Exchange, after the standard settlement cycle in the United States was reduced from T+3 to T+2. These results hold across various low‐ and high‐frequency measures of liquidity and empirical model specifications. Furthermore, we find that securities that are more difficult‐to‐borrow experience the greatest gains in liquidity. Our findings might provide insights to regulators and exchange officials considering the adoption of a shortened settlement cycle.
- 14 April 2021
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 56 (4) , 645-669
The effects of exchange listing on market quality: Evidence from over‐the‐counter uplistings
We study the effects of exchange uplisting from the modern over‐the‐counter (OTC) markets on liquidity, volatility, and price discovery. In a series of difference‐in‐differences tests, we find that for a sample of OTC treatment firms that uplist to the NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), or NYSE MKT, relative to matched control firms, liquidity improves dramatically after listing. We also show that price discovery improves for treatment firms vis‐à‐vis control firms after listing. The results contribute to the discussion surrounding the facilitation of capital formation and offer important insights to investors, managers, and exchange officials.
- 14 April 2021
- Published by Wiley in Financial Review
- Vol. 56 (4) , 645-669
The effects of exchange listing on market quality: Evidence from over‐the‐counter uplistings
We study the effects of exchange uplisting from the modern over‐the‐counter (OTC) markets on liquidity, volatility, and price discovery. In a series of difference‐in‐differences tests, we find that for a sample of OTC treatment firms that uplist to the NASDAQ, New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), or NYSE MKT, relative to matched control firms, liquidity improves dramatically after listing. We also show that price discovery improves for treatment firms vis‐à‐vis control firms after listing. The results contribute to the discussion surrounding the facilitation of capital formation and offer important insights to investors, managers, and exchange officials.
- 17 February 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 177 (1) , 79-93
On the Ethics of “Non-Corporate” Insider Trading
The ethical considerations of insider trading have been widely debated in the academic literature (see e.g., Moore in J Bus Ethics 9(3):171–182, 1990). In 2013, the STOCK Act, which was initially passed to mitigate insider trading by government officials, was quickly and unexpectedly amended to allow certain government employees to withhold their financial information. To identify and quantify the potential costs placed on investors by non-corporate insider traders, we use the unusual circumstances surrounding this amendment. For a sample of stocks most held by members of Congress, we find that, relative to control stocks, liquidity significantly worsens and volatility increases during the post-amendment period. Our results highlight the costs that are incurred by investors in the presence of non-corporate insider trading. These findings call for a stronger development of an ethical framework that justifies the restriction of all types of insider trading.
- 17 February 2021
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 177 (1) , 79-93
On the Ethics of “Non-Corporate” Insider Trading
The ethical considerations of insider trading have been widely debated in the academic literature (see e.g., Moore in J Bus Ethics 9(3):171–182, 1990). In 2013, the STOCK Act, which was initially passed to mitigate insider trading by government officials, was quickly and unexpectedly amended to allow certain government employees to withhold their financial information. To identify and quantify the potential costs placed on investors by non-corporate insider traders, we use the unusual circumstances surrounding this amendment. For a sample of stocks most held by members of Congress, we find that, relative to control stocks, liquidity significantly worsens and volatility increases during the post-amendment period. Our results highlight the costs that are incurred by investors in the presence of non-corporate insider trading. These findings call for a stronger development of an ethical framework that justifies the restriction of all types of insider trading.
- 15 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 60 (2-3) , 187-206
Firm Opacity and the Clustering of Stock Prices: the Case of Financial Intermediaries
- 15 August 2020
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Financial Services Research
- Vol. 60 (2-3) , 187-206
Firm Opacity and the Clustering of Stock Prices: the Case of Financial Intermediaries