Hong Zou
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Hong Zou has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ronald W. Masulis
University of New South Wales
2 shared publications - Rui Wang
Lingnan University
2 shared publications - Sichen Shen
School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan 430072, China
2 shared publications - Bo Liu
School of Management and Economics, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, Chengdu, China
1 shared publication Cheng (Colin) Zeng
1 shared publicationFa-Liang Xu
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 6 May 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 40 (2) , 181-203
Directors' Service Horizon and Managerial Myopia: Evidence from Real Earnings Management
SYNOPSIS: This study investigates how directors’ service horizon affects real earnings management (REM). By exploiting mergers and acquisitions that terminate directors’ outside appointments on the acquired firms’ boards, we show that independent directors who lose outside board appointments extend their service horizon for remaining directorships and that a decrease in REM follows the extension of director service horizon. The effect of director horizon extension on REM is stronger for directors with more reputation concerns or power to influence financial reporting, for firms with weaker governance mechanisms, and for firms facing lower capital market benefits of meeting or beating earnings expectations. Consistent with enhanced long-term orientation as a result of extended service horizon, we also find a positive impact of director service horizon on firm innovation. Overall, this study sheds light on the important effect of director service horizon on board effectiveness. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; M40.
- 6 May 2026
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 40 (2) , 181-203
Directors' Service Horizon and Managerial Myopia: Evidence from Real Earnings Management
SYNOPSIS: This study investigates how directors’ service horizon affects real earnings management (REM). By exploiting mergers and acquisitions that terminate directors’ outside appointments on the acquired firms’ boards, we show that independent directors who lose outside board appointments extend their service horizon for remaining directorships and that a decrease in REM follows the extension of director service horizon. The effect of director horizon extension on REM is stronger for directors with more reputation concerns or power to influence financial reporting, for firms with weaker governance mechanisms, and for firms facing lower capital market benefits of meeting or beating earnings expectations. Consistent with enhanced long-term orientation as a result of extended service horizon, we also find a positive impact of director service horizon on firm innovation. Overall, this study sheds light on the important effect of director service horizon on board effectiveness. JEL Classifications: G30; G34; M40.
- 3 November 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 39 (4) , 189-208
Is Stakeholder Orientation Related to Corporate Tax Avoidance? New Evidence
SYNOPSIS: Our study examines how constituency statutes influence corporate tax avoidance. These state-level laws allow corporate boards to consider the interests of all stakeholders, not just shareholders, in their decisions. Using recent econometric advances in staggered difference-in-differences estimations, we find that after these laws are adopted, firms affected by these laws reduce their tax avoidance. This effect is stronger in firms that previously avoid more taxes or have lower corporate social responsibility ratings. Our study provides valuable insights into how stakeholder orientation influences tax behavior, offering practical implications for both corporate managers and policymakers. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: H26; K22; M14; M41.
- 3 November 2025
- Published by American Accounting Association in Accounting Horizons
- Vol. 39 (4) , 189-208
Is Stakeholder Orientation Related to Corporate Tax Avoidance? New Evidence
SYNOPSIS: Our study examines how constituency statutes influence corporate tax avoidance. These state-level laws allow corporate boards to consider the interests of all stakeholders, not just shareholders, in their decisions. Using recent econometric advances in staggered difference-in-differences estimations, we find that after these laws are adopted, firms affected by these laws reduce their tax avoidance. This effect is stronger in firms that previously avoid more taxes or have lower corporate social responsibility ratings. Our study provides valuable insights into how stakeholder orientation influences tax behavior, offering practical implications for both corporate managers and policymakers. Data Availability: Data are available from the public sources cited in the text. JEL Classifications: H26; K22; M14; M41.
- Open Access
- 25 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (2) , 874-909
Governance by One-Lot Shares
We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders.
- 25 November 2024
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 60 (2) , 874-909
Open AccessGovernance by One-Lot Shares
We use a novel experiment in China to examine the effects of having a quasi-official investor own a small number of shares on specific firm outcomes. We find that, relative to control firms, pilot firms experience an increase in dissenting votes from independent directors, a reduction in tunneling and earnings management activities, and an improvement in merger performance. Independent directors questioned by the quasi-official shareholder in activism events subsequently lose board seats in the director market. Overall, our results shed light on a new mechanism for enhancing the protection of minority shareholders.
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Director Liability Protection and the Quality of Independent Directors
We study whether legal liability protection helps companies to recruit and retain high-quality independent directors. We conduct difference-in-differences analyses exploiting the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling on the Silicon Graphics case, which substantially raised the bar for filing securities class action (SCA) lawsuits as a shock. We document supporting evidence for the talent attraction hypothesis by showing improvements in newly recruited independent director quality following the ruling, but only for candidates who are previously not exposed to SCA litigation risk. The effects are stronger for firms facing greater litigation risk ex ante or smaller local supplies of director candidates. Results are more evident for experience-based quality dimensions. We also analyze a sample of voluntary independent director departures and find little support for the talent retention hypothesis, suggesting that more complex factors enter into a director’s continuation decision once a director is already exposed to SCA litigation risk. A policy implication is that liability protection can be useful in attracting more unexposed high-quality candidates to the pool of public boards but does little to attract high-quality candidates who are already in the pool of public firms. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. Funding: H. Zou acknowledges the financial support from a competitive General Research Fund (GRF) grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China [Project No. HKU 17513816]. S. Shen acknowledges the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72202164 and 72332003]. The work was partially carried out while R. W. Masulis visited the University of Hong Kong as an FBE visiting researcher, and he thanks the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of Hong Kong for its sponsorship. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03743 .
- 4 November 2024
- Published by Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS) in Management Science
Director Liability Protection and the Quality of Independent Directors
We study whether legal liability protection helps companies to recruit and retain high-quality independent directors. We conduct difference-in-differences analyses exploiting the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling on the Silicon Graphics case, which substantially raised the bar for filing securities class action (SCA) lawsuits as a shock. We document supporting evidence for the talent attraction hypothesis by showing improvements in newly recruited independent director quality following the ruling, but only for candidates who are previously not exposed to SCA litigation risk. The effects are stronger for firms facing greater litigation risk ex ante or smaller local supplies of director candidates. Results are more evident for experience-based quality dimensions. We also analyze a sample of voluntary independent director departures and find little support for the talent retention hypothesis, suggesting that more complex factors enter into a director’s continuation decision once a director is already exposed to SCA litigation risk. A policy implication is that liability protection can be useful in attracting more unexposed high-quality candidates to the pool of public boards but does little to attract high-quality candidates who are already in the pool of public firms. This paper was accepted by Gustavo Manso, finance. Funding: H. Zou acknowledges the financial support from a competitive General Research Fund (GRF) grant from the Research Grants Council of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, China [Project No. HKU 17513816]. S. Shen acknowledges the financial support from the National Natural Science Foundation of China [Grants 72202164 and 72332003]. The work was partially carried out while R. W. Masulis visited the University of Hong Kong as an FBE visiting researcher, and he thanks the Faculty of Business and Economics of the University of Hong Kong for its sponsorship. Supplemental Material: The online appendix and data files are available at https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2020.03743 .
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 199 (2) , 413-436
Quid Pro Quo in IPO Auctions
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Business Ethics
- Vol. 199 (2) , 413-436
Quid Pro Quo in IPO Auctions
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 122
What's in a name? The valuation effect of directors’ sharing of surnames
- 1 January 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Banking & Finance
- Vol. 122
What's in a name? The valuation effect of directors’ sharing of surnames
- Open Access
- 21 April 2020
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Director Liability Protection and the Quality of Independent Directors
We study whether legal liability protection helps companies to recruit and retain high-quality independent directors. We conduct difference-in-differences analyses exploiting the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling on the Silicon Graphics case, which substantially raised the bar for filing securities class action (SCA) lawsuits as a shock. We document supporting evidence for the talent attraction hypothesis by showing improvements in newly recruited independent director quality following the ruling, but only for candidates who are previously not exposed to SCA litigation risk. The effects are stronger for firms facing greater litigation risk ex ante or smaller local supplies of director candidates. Results are more evident for experience-based quality dimensions. We also analyze a sample of voluntary independent director departures and find little support for the talent retention hypothesis, suggesting that more complex factors enter into a director’s continuation decision once a director is already exposed to SCA litigation risk. A policy implication is that liability protection can be useful in attracting more unexposed high-quality candidates to the pool of public boards but do little to attract high-quality candidates who are already in the pool of public firms.
- 21 April 2020
- Published by European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Open AccessDirector Liability Protection and the Quality of Independent Directors
We study whether legal liability protection helps companies to recruit and retain high-quality independent directors. We conduct difference-in-differences analyses exploiting the 1999 Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals Ruling on the Silicon Graphics case, which substantially raised the bar for filing securities class action (SCA) lawsuits as a shock. We document supporting evidence for the talent attraction hypothesis by showing improvements in newly recruited independent director quality following the ruling, but only for candidates who are previously not exposed to SCA litigation risk. The effects are stronger for firms facing greater litigation risk ex ante or smaller local supplies of director candidates. Results are more evident for experience-based quality dimensions. We also analyze a sample of voluntary independent director departures and find little support for the talent retention hypothesis, suggesting that more complex factors enter into a director’s continuation decision once a director is already exposed to SCA litigation risk. A policy implication is that liability protection can be useful in attracting more unexposed high-quality candidates to the pool of public boards but do little to attract high-quality candidates who are already in the pool of public firms.
- 7 September 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 54 (2) , 481-512
Covenants, Creditors’ Simultaneous Equity Holdings, and Firm Investment Policies
This article analyzes how creditors’ simultaneous debt and equity holdings affect firm investment policies. We find that firms with dual ownership are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in loan contracts, and the relation varies in predicted ways with the monitoring needs of borrowers and the monitoring capacity of dual owners. A less frequent use of capital expenditure restrictions, however, does not result in borrowers’ risk-shifting. Dual ownership firms are also more likely to be granted an unconditional waiver and do not significantly reduce debt issuance or investment expenditures after a financial covenant violation. Our results highlight how dual ownership can help mitigate shareholder–creditor conflicts.
- 7 September 2018
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
- Vol. 54 (2) , 481-512
Covenants, Creditors’ Simultaneous Equity Holdings, and Firm Investment Policies
This article analyzes how creditors’ simultaneous debt and equity holdings affect firm investment policies. We find that firms with dual ownership are less likely to have capital expenditure restrictions in loan contracts, and the relation varies in predicted ways with the monitoring needs of borrowers and the monitoring capacity of dual owners. A less frequent use of capital expenditure restrictions, however, does not result in borrowers’ risk-shifting. Dual ownership firms are also more likely to be granted an unconditional waiver and do not significantly reduce debt issuance or investment expenditures after a financial covenant violation. Our results highlight how dual ownership can help mitigate shareholder–creditor conflicts.
- 1 November 2015
- Vol. 17 (11) , 1221-7
[Mutation analysis of the PAH gene in children with phenylketonuria from the Qinghai area of China].
To study the mutation characteristics of the phenylalanine hydroxylase (PAH) gene in children with phenylketonuria (PKU) from the Qinghai area of China, in order to provide basic information for genetic counseling and prenatal diagnosis. Mutations of the PAH gene were detected in the promoter and exons 1-13 and their flanking intronic sequences of PAH gene by PCR and DNA sequencing in 49 children with PKU and their parents from the Qinghai area of China. A total of 30 different mutations were detected in 80 out of 98 mutant alleles (82%), including 19 missense (63%), 5 nonsense (17%), 3 splice-site (10%) and 3 deletions (10%). Most mutations were detected in exons 3, 6, 7, 11 and intron 4 of PAH gene. The most frequent mutations were p.R243Q (19%), IVS4-1G>A (9%), p.Y356X (7%) and p.EX6-96A>G(5%). Two novel mutations p.N93fsX5 (c.279-282delCATC) and p.G171E (c.512G>A) were found. p.H64fsX9(c.190delC) was documented for the second time in Chinese PAH gene. The mutation spectrum of the gene PAH in the Qinghai population was similar to that in other populations in North China while significantly different from that in the populations from some provinces in southern China, Japan and Europe. The mutations of PAH gene in the Qinghai area of China demonstrate a unique diversity, complexity and specificity.
- 1 November 2015
- Vol. 17 (11) , 1221-7
[Mutation analysis of the PAH gene in children with phenylketonuria from the Qinghai area of China].
To study the mutation characteristics of the phenylalanine hydroxylase (PAH) gene in children with phenylketonuria (PKU) from the Qinghai area of China, in order to provide basic information for genetic counseling and prenatal diagnosis. Mutations of the PAH gene were detected in the promoter and exons 1-13 and their flanking intronic sequences of PAH gene by PCR and DNA sequencing in 49 children with PKU and their parents from the Qinghai area of China. A total of 30 different mutations were detected in 80 out of 98 mutant alleles (82%), including 19 missense (63%), 5 nonsense (17%), 3 splice-site (10%) and 3 deletions (10%). Most mutations were detected in exons 3, 6, 7, 11 and intron 4 of PAH gene. The most frequent mutations were p.R243Q (19%), IVS4-1G>A (9%), p.Y356X (7%) and p.EX6-96A>G(5%). Two novel mutations p.N93fsX5 (c.279-282delCATC) and p.G171E (c.512G>A) were found. p.H64fsX9(c.190delC) was documented for the second time in Chinese PAH gene. The mutation spectrum of the gene PAH in the Qinghai population was similar to that in other populations in North China while significantly different from that in the populations from some provinces in southern China, Japan and Europe. The mutations of PAH gene in the Qinghai area of China demonstrate a unique diversity, complexity and specificity.