Maximilian Filsinger
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Maximilian Filsinger has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Markus Freitag
Institute of Political Science University of Bern Bern Switzerland
11 shared publications Markus Freitag
Affiliations Multidisciplinary Center for Infectious Diseases, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland, Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland Markus Freitag
8 shared publications- Julian Erhardt
Institute of Political Science, University Bern, Bern, Switzerland
7 shared publications - Steffen Wamsler
Leibniz Institute for Educational Trajectories
6 shared publications - Aziz Mert Ipekci
Institute of Social and Preventive Medicine, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
2 shared publications - Eva Maria Hodel
Affiliations Institute of Social and Preventive Medicine, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland, Multidisciplinary Center for Infectious Diseases, University of Bern, Bern, Switzerland
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 21 (4) , e0346420
Who would take part in a pandemic preparedness cohort study? The role of vaccine-related affective polarisation: Cross-sectional survey
Cohort studies are an important tool for public health research about emerging infectious diseases. Willingness to participate in research is associated with multiple factors. Little is known about the role of people’s feelings, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Affective polarisation, an affinity for people with similar attitudes to oneself and hostility toward those with opposing views, is a measure of feelings about issues, including COVID-19 vaccination. The aim of this study was to investigate factors associated with willingness to participate in a future household-based cohort study on pandemic preparedness. We did a cross-sectional online survey in the Canton of Bern, Switzerland. We invited a random sample of persons aged 18 + years from 15,000 private households. We asked about willingness to take part and collected data about demographic, social and household characteristics, and affective polarisation related to COVID-19 vaccination. We performed univariable and multivariable analyses, weighted by household size to estimate odds ratios (with 95% confidence intervals, CI). Among responders, 49.8% (95% CI 47.9–51.8, weighted proportion) were willing to take part in a cohort study. In multivariable analysis, higher educational level (adjusted odds ratio 2.48, 95% CI 1.81–3.39) and higher monthly income (1.92, 1.39–2.65) were most strongly associated with higher willingness to participate. Opposition to COVID-19 vaccination was associated with lower willingness to participate (0.53, 0.39–0.72). Affective polarisation modified the relationship between vaccination attitudes and willingness to participate. Compared with non-polarised vaccination supporters, polarised supporters were more willing to participate (marginal adjusted odds ratio 1.51, 1.05–2.16), whereas willingness to participate was lower among both non-polarised (0.53, 0.32–0.86) and affectively polarised (0.26, 0.12–0.56) vaccination opposers. Willingness to participate in a cohort study was moderate. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, addressing affective polarisation, as well as socioeconomic factors, is needed to improve participation in pandemic preparedness research.
- 20 April 2026
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 21 (4) , e0346420
Open AccessWho would take part in a pandemic preparedness cohort study? The role of vaccine-related affective polarisation: Cross-sectional survey
Cohort studies are an important tool for public health research about emerging infectious diseases. Willingness to participate in research is associated with multiple factors. Little is known about the role of people’s feelings, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Affective polarisation, an affinity for people with similar attitudes to oneself and hostility toward those with opposing views, is a measure of feelings about issues, including COVID-19 vaccination. The aim of this study was to investigate factors associated with willingness to participate in a future household-based cohort study on pandemic preparedness. We did a cross-sectional online survey in the Canton of Bern, Switzerland. We invited a random sample of persons aged 18 + years from 15,000 private households. We asked about willingness to take part and collected data about demographic, social and household characteristics, and affective polarisation related to COVID-19 vaccination. We performed univariable and multivariable analyses, weighted by household size to estimate odds ratios (with 95% confidence intervals, CI). Among responders, 49.8% (95% CI 47.9–51.8, weighted proportion) were willing to take part in a cohort study. In multivariable analysis, higher educational level (adjusted odds ratio 2.48, 95% CI 1.81–3.39) and higher monthly income (1.92, 1.39–2.65) were most strongly associated with higher willingness to participate. Opposition to COVID-19 vaccination was associated with lower willingness to participate (0.53, 0.39–0.72). Affective polarisation modified the relationship between vaccination attitudes and willingness to participate. Compared with non-polarised vaccination supporters, polarised supporters were more willing to participate (marginal adjusted odds ratio 1.51, 1.05–2.16), whereas willingness to participate was lower among both non-polarised (0.53, 0.32–0.86) and affectively polarised (0.26, 0.12–0.56) vaccination opposers. Willingness to participate in a cohort study was moderate. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, addressing affective polarisation, as well as socioeconomic factors, is needed to improve participation in pandemic preparedness research.
- Open Access
- 30 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 65 (1) , 43-64
Democracy and disadvantage: How subjective group relative deprivation undermines democratic support
Subjective group relative deprivation (SGRD) is a powerful driver of political protest and support for radical parties. Yet, we lack insights into whether such subjective perceptions of disadvantage attack the very core of democratic legitimacy, that is, citizens’ support for democracy. Against this backdrop, we investigate how SGRD relates to diffuse democratic support. We argue that perceptions of being systematically disadvantaged fuel disaffection with and resentment against the prevailing democratic system, whereas authoritarian systems with their strongmen leadership appear appealing as they promise a stronger in-group protection and pursue more confrontational in-group-out-group relations, which both can be understood as coping strategies to overcome an unfair disadvantage. Employing original – cross-sectional and panel – survey data, we show that SGRD has the potential to undermine citizens’ support for democracy across six European countries in 2020–2022. Our study highlights the negative impact of subjective disadvantage on support for democracy by combining literature from political psychology and political economy.
- 30 September 2025
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Journal of Political Research
- Vol. 65 (1) , 43-64
Open AccessDemocracy and disadvantage: How subjective group relative deprivation undermines democratic support
Subjective group relative deprivation (SGRD) is a powerful driver of political protest and support for radical parties. Yet, we lack insights into whether such subjective perceptions of disadvantage attack the very core of democratic legitimacy, that is, citizens’ support for democracy. Against this backdrop, we investigate how SGRD relates to diffuse democratic support. We argue that perceptions of being systematically disadvantaged fuel disaffection with and resentment against the prevailing democratic system, whereas authoritarian systems with their strongmen leadership appear appealing as they promise a stronger in-group protection and pursue more confrontational in-group-out-group relations, which both can be understood as coping strategies to overcome an unfair disadvantage. Employing original – cross-sectional and panel – survey data, we show that SGRD has the potential to undermine citizens’ support for democracy across six European countries in 2020–2022. Our study highlights the negative impact of subjective disadvantage on support for democracy by combining literature from political psychology and political economy.
- Open Access
Who would take part in a pandemic preparedness cohort study? The role of vaccine-related affective polarisation: cross-sectional survey
Cohort studies are an important tool for public health research about emerging infectious diseases. Willingness to participate in research is associated with multiple factors. Little is known about the role of people’s feelings, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Affective polarisation, an affinity for people with similar attitudes to oneself and hostility toward those with opposing views, is a measure of feelings about issues, including COVID-19 vaccination. The aim of this study was to investigate factors associated with willingness to participate in a future household-based cohort study on pandemic preparedness. We did a cross-sectional online survey in the Canton of Bern, Switzerland. We invited a random sample of persons aged 18+ years from 15,000 private households. We asked about willingness to take part and collected data about demographic, social and household characteristics, and affective polarisation related to COVID-19 vaccination. We performed univariable and multivariable analyses, weighted by household size to estimate odds ratios (with 95% confidence intervals, CI). Among responders, 49.8% (95% CI 47.9-51.8, weighted proportion) were willing to take part in a cohort study. In multivariable analysis, higher educational level (adjusted odds ratio 2.48, 95% CI 1.81-3.39) and higher monthly income (1.92, 1.39-2.65) were most strongly associated with higher willingness to participate. Opposition to COVID-19 vaccination was associated with lower willingness to participate (0.53, 0.39-0.72). Affective polarisation modified the relationship between vaccination attitudes and willingness to participate. Compared with non-polarised vaccination supporters, polarised supporters were more willing to participate (marginal adjusted odds ratio 1.51, 1.05-2.16), whereas willingness to participate was lower among both non-polarised (0.53, 0.32-0.86) and affectively polarised (0.26, 0.12-0.56) vaccination opposers. Willingness to participate in a cohort study was moderate. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, addressing affective polarisation, as well as socioeconomic factors, is needed to improve participation in pandemic preparedness research.
Open AccessWho would take part in a pandemic preparedness cohort study? The role of vaccine-related affective polarisation: cross-sectional survey
Cohort studies are an important tool for public health research about emerging infectious diseases. Willingness to participate in research is associated with multiple factors. Little is known about the role of people’s feelings, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic. Affective polarisation, an affinity for people with similar attitudes to oneself and hostility toward those with opposing views, is a measure of feelings about issues, including COVID-19 vaccination. The aim of this study was to investigate factors associated with willingness to participate in a future household-based cohort study on pandemic preparedness. We did a cross-sectional online survey in the Canton of Bern, Switzerland. We invited a random sample of persons aged 18+ years from 15,000 private households. We asked about willingness to take part and collected data about demographic, social and household characteristics, and affective polarisation related to COVID-19 vaccination. We performed univariable and multivariable analyses, weighted by household size to estimate odds ratios (with 95% confidence intervals, CI). Among responders, 49.8% (95% CI 47.9-51.8, weighted proportion) were willing to take part in a cohort study. In multivariable analysis, higher educational level (adjusted odds ratio 2.48, 95% CI 1.81-3.39) and higher monthly income (1.92, 1.39-2.65) were most strongly associated with higher willingness to participate. Opposition to COVID-19 vaccination was associated with lower willingness to participate (0.53, 0.39-0.72). Affective polarisation modified the relationship between vaccination attitudes and willingness to participate. Compared with non-polarised vaccination supporters, polarised supporters were more willing to participate (marginal adjusted odds ratio 1.51, 1.05-2.16), whereas willingness to participate was lower among both non-polarised (0.53, 0.32-0.86) and affectively polarised (0.26, 0.12-0.56) vaccination opposers. Willingness to participate in a cohort study was moderate. Following the COVID-19 pandemic, addressing affective polarisation, as well as socioeconomic factors, is needed to improve participation in pandemic preparedness research.
- Open Access
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-12
Divided by vaccination? Evaluating the intergroup conflict between pro- and anti-vaccination groups in the post-pandemic era
The vaccination against COVID-19 has torn societies apart. Against this background we evaluate three interrelated research questions: (1) does vaccination polarize citizens even after the COVID-19 pandemic has faded; (2) do opinions about vaccination correlate with group formation and identification, and (3) do we observe opinion-based affective polarization regarding vaccination in the post-pandemic era? Based on two original surveys from Switzerland in early 2022 and late 2023, our results highlight that respondents have distinct opinions about vaccination, but that only pro-vaccination respondents have formed an opinion identity. We also observe an asymmetric affective polarization: pro-vaccination respondents show higher levels of liking toward other pro-vaccination respondents but significant dislike toward anti-vaccination respondents, while the same does not hold true for anti-vaccination respondents. Overall, affective polarization toward vaccination is less pronounced in the aftermath of the health crisis than during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, at a time when globalization is boosting the threat of pandemics, caution is warranted, as an increasing salience of vaccination could widen the divide again.
- 25 February 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Humanities and Social Sciences Communications
- Vol. 12 (1) , 1-12
Open AccessDivided by vaccination? Evaluating the intergroup conflict between pro- and anti-vaccination groups in the post-pandemic era
The vaccination against COVID-19 has torn societies apart. Against this background we evaluate three interrelated research questions: (1) does vaccination polarize citizens even after the COVID-19 pandemic has faded; (2) do opinions about vaccination correlate with group formation and identification, and (3) do we observe opinion-based affective polarization regarding vaccination in the post-pandemic era? Based on two original surveys from Switzerland in early 2022 and late 2023, our results highlight that respondents have distinct opinions about vaccination, but that only pro-vaccination respondents have formed an opinion identity. We also observe an asymmetric affective polarization: pro-vaccination respondents show higher levels of liking toward other pro-vaccination respondents but significant dislike toward anti-vaccination respondents, while the same does not hold true for anti-vaccination respondents. Overall, affective polarization toward vaccination is less pronounced in the aftermath of the health crisis than during the COVID-19 pandemic. However, at a time when globalization is boosting the threat of pandemics, caution is warranted, as an increasing salience of vaccination could widen the divide again.
- 13 February 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Politics
- Vol. 45 (4) , 594-615
Divided by morality? Moral foundations of affective polarisation during hard times
In this article, we examine the deeper causes of a key group conflict during the COVID-19 pandemic: attitudes towards the COVID-19 vaccination. Extending research on affective polarisation beyond partisanship, we analyse how people perceive the external groups of vaccination supporters and opponents. Furthermore, we investigate how their own moral foundations influence these perceptions. Using six samples from six European countries, our analyses reveal an affective divide between supporters and opponents of COVID-19 vaccinations. Most interestingly and contrary to conventional expectations, we find that individualising rather than binding foundations intensify affective polarisation between pro- and anti-vaccination supporters in all countries. It seems that especially in times of pandemic threat, COVID-19 vaccination supporters and opponents alike feel that their core moral foundations, in particular, fairness are being challenged by their respective out-groups. Our findings could be used to develop depolarisation interventions involving moral framing.
- 13 February 2025
- Published by SAGE Publications in Politics
- Vol. 45 (4) , 594-615
Divided by morality? Moral foundations of affective polarisation during hard times
In this article, we examine the deeper causes of a key group conflict during the COVID-19 pandemic: attitudes towards the COVID-19 vaccination. Extending research on affective polarisation beyond partisanship, we analyse how people perceive the external groups of vaccination supporters and opponents. Furthermore, we investigate how their own moral foundations influence these perceptions. Using six samples from six European countries, our analyses reveal an affective divide between supporters and opponents of COVID-19 vaccinations. Most interestingly and contrary to conventional expectations, we find that individualising rather than binding foundations intensify affective polarisation between pro- and anti-vaccination supporters in all countries. It seems that especially in times of pandemic threat, COVID-19 vaccination supporters and opponents alike feel that their core moral foundations, in particular, fairness are being challenged by their respective out-groups. Our findings could be used to develop depolarisation interventions involving moral framing.
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 173-186
Institutional foundations of social capital
Social capital is a central concept in the social sciences mostly stimulated by the works of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam. Social capital is understood as the value of interpersonal relationships and the norms that arise from them. Thus, next to individual-level explanations, scholars have emphasized the role of political institutions in shaping individuals’ levels of social capital. This chapter distinguishes between different institutional configurations and how these affect varieties of social capital. To create social capital, institutions have to possess three qualities: universalism, fairness, and power-sharing capabilities. Institutions that hold these qualities are capable of enhancing social capital while those that do not possess such qualities are likely to harm social capital development. Furthermore, the chapter examines how the fairness, universalism, and power-sharing capabilities of institutions counteract rising inequalities, thereby guaranteeing social cohesion through the consolidation of social capital.
- 29 October 2024
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 173-186
Institutional foundations of social capital
Social capital is a central concept in the social sciences mostly stimulated by the works of Bourdieu, Coleman and Putnam. Social capital is understood as the value of interpersonal relationships and the norms that arise from them. Thus, next to individual-level explanations, scholars have emphasized the role of political institutions in shaping individuals’ levels of social capital. This chapter distinguishes between different institutional configurations and how these affect varieties of social capital. To create social capital, institutions have to possess three qualities: universalism, fairness, and power-sharing capabilities. Institutions that hold these qualities are capable of enhancing social capital while those that do not possess such qualities are likely to harm social capital development. Furthermore, the chapter examines how the fairness, universalism, and power-sharing capabilities of institutions counteract rising inequalities, thereby guaranteeing social cohesion through the consolidation of social capital.
- Open Access
- 16 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 48 (7) , 1599-1628
A spectre of democracy: are populist citizens less supportive of democracy?
- 16 September 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 48 (7) , 1599-1628
Open AccessA spectre of democracy: are populist citizens less supportive of democracy?
- 2 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- Vol. 15 (4) , 523-541
The emotional fabric of populism during a public health crisis: How anger shapes the relationship between pandemic threat and populist attitudes
While conventional wisdom connects crises and external threats to increasing support for populism, several questions remain unanswered. Following insights of affective intelligence theory (AIT), we posit that anger and fear elicited by pandemic threat relate differently to populist attitudes. While such relations have already been explored in the context of other hazards (such as financial turmoil, terrorism, or immigration), our study allows us to evaluate the emotional bedrocks of populism in the context of a threat that is not apparently connected to the classical political grievances underlying populism. Expanding the literature on psychological underpinnings of populism and on the political consequences of the pandemic, our analyses of original survey data support our contentions that pandemic threat-induced anger is positively related to populist attitudes while fear is negatively linked to populist stances. This holds in particular for anti-elitism and the Manichean outlook inherent in populism. Altogether, we provide new comparative evidence to the puzzle about the emotional bedrocks of populism by illuminating a domain that has not been systematically explored before.
- 2 March 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in European Political Science Review
- Vol. 15 (4) , 523-541
The emotional fabric of populism during a public health crisis: How anger shapes the relationship between pandemic threat and populist attitudes
While conventional wisdom connects crises and external threats to increasing support for populism, several questions remain unanswered. Following insights of affective intelligence theory (AIT), we posit that anger and fear elicited by pandemic threat relate differently to populist attitudes. While such relations have already been explored in the context of other hazards (such as financial turmoil, terrorism, or immigration), our study allows us to evaluate the emotional bedrocks of populism in the context of a threat that is not apparently connected to the classical political grievances underlying populism. Expanding the literature on psychological underpinnings of populism and on the political consequences of the pandemic, our analyses of original survey data support our contentions that pandemic threat-induced anger is positively related to populist attitudes while fear is negatively linked to populist stances. This holds in particular for anti-elitism and the Manichean outlook inherent in populism. Altogether, we provide new comparative evidence to the puzzle about the emotional bedrocks of populism by illuminating a domain that has not been systematically explored before.
- 30 August 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Research Quarterly
- Vol. 76 (3) , 1043-1057
Perceived Exclusionary Disadvantages and Populist Attitudes: Evidence from Comparative and Longitudinal Survey Data in Six European Countries
Recent ethnographic research has argued that subjective impressions of disadvantage are important to explain support for radical populist parties. Yet, the question of how such perceived disadvantages relate to populist attitudes as an expression of populist ideas has received less attention. In this regard, this study sets out to investigate the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes. I argue that subjective group relative deprivation is positively related to populist attitudes. Going beyond previous research, I account for the possibility that populist attitudes also positively affect feelings of disadvantage, resulting in a vicious circle of disadvantage and populism. Results from three original cross-sectional surveys in six European countries show that subjective group relative deprivation is positively related to populist attitudes. More importantly, analyses of original panel data show that fully understanding the relationship between populism and disadvantage requires taking both directions of causality into account.
- 30 August 2022
- Published by SAGE Publications in Political Research Quarterly
- Vol. 76 (3) , 1043-1057
Perceived Exclusionary Disadvantages and Populist Attitudes: Evidence from Comparative and Longitudinal Survey Data in Six European Countries
Recent ethnographic research has argued that subjective impressions of disadvantage are important to explain support for radical populist parties. Yet, the question of how such perceived disadvantages relate to populist attitudes as an expression of populist ideas has received less attention. In this regard, this study sets out to investigate the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes. I argue that subjective group relative deprivation is positively related to populist attitudes. Going beyond previous research, I account for the possibility that populist attitudes also positively affect feelings of disadvantage, resulting in a vicious circle of disadvantage and populism. Results from three original cross-sectional surveys in six European countries show that subjective group relative deprivation is positively related to populist attitudes. More importantly, analyses of original panel data show that fully understanding the relationship between populism and disadvantage requires taking both directions of causality into account.
- 19 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 46 (3) , 477-499
Leaving democracy? Pandemic threat, emotional accounts and regime support in comparative perspective
As a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments even in consolidated democracies have adopted drastic measures, temporarily constraining individual freedoms and expanding executive political decision making. In light of this trade-off between public health measures and democratic norms, it becomes crucial to assess the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on public support for democratic versus authoritarian regimes. Following insights of the affective intelligence theory, emotions, and not only rational considerations, are key to understanding behavioural and attitudinal responses to crises. In the article it is argued that the pandemic threat of COVID-19 affects regime preferences by evoking distinct negative emotions, in particular anger and fear. Using original survey data in six European countries, it is shown that COVID-19-induced anger and fear have divergent effects on regime preferences. While democratic regime preference has declined for angry respondents, there is also a message of hope: fearful respondents display increased support for a democratic regime.
- 19 July 2022
- Published by Taylor & Francis in West European Politics
- Vol. 46 (3) , 477-499
Leaving democracy? Pandemic threat, emotional accounts and regime support in comparative perspective
As a response to the COVID-19 pandemic, governments even in consolidated democracies have adopted drastic measures, temporarily constraining individual freedoms and expanding executive political decision making. In light of this trade-off between public health measures and democratic norms, it becomes crucial to assess the consequences of the COVID-19 pandemic on public support for democratic versus authoritarian regimes. Following insights of the affective intelligence theory, emotions, and not only rational considerations, are key to understanding behavioural and attitudinal responses to crises. In the article it is argued that the pandemic threat of COVID-19 affects regime preferences by evoking distinct negative emotions, in particular anger and fear. Using original survey data in six European countries, it is shown that COVID-19-induced anger and fear have divergent effects on regime preferences. While democratic regime preference has declined for angry respondents, there is also a message of hope: fearful respondents display increased support for a democratic regime.