Soojung An
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Soojung An has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- HanBit Kim
Graduate School of Information Security and Institute of Cyber Security & Privacy (ICSP), Korea University, Seoul 02841, Korea
1 shared publication - HeeSeok Kim
Korea University, Sejong, Republic of Korea
1 shared publication - Suhri Kim
School of Mathematics, Statistics and Data Science, Sungshin Womens University, Seoul, South Korea
1 shared publication - Sunghyun Jin
Samsung Electronics, Yongin, Republic of Korea
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 23 October 2018
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 8 (11) , 2014
Single Trace Side Channel Analysis on NTRU Implementation
As researches on the quantum computer have progressed immensely, interests in post-quantum cryptography have greatly increased. NTRU is one of the well-known algorithms due to its practical key sizes and fast performance along with the resistance against the quantum adversary. Although NTRU has withstood various algebraic attacks, its side-channel resistance must also be considered for secure implementation. In this paper, we proposed the first single trace attack on NTRU. Previous side-channel attacks on NTRU used numerous power traces, which increase the attack complexity and limit the target algorithm. There are two versions of NTRU implementation published in succession. We demonstrated our attack on both implementations using a single power consumption trace obtained in the decryption phase. Furthermore, we propose a countermeasure to prevent the proposed attacks. Our countermeasure does not degrade in terms of performance.
- 23 October 2018
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 8 (11) , 2014
Open AccessSingle Trace Side Channel Analysis on NTRU Implementation
As researches on the quantum computer have progressed immensely, interests in post-quantum cryptography have greatly increased. NTRU is one of the well-known algorithms due to its practical key sizes and fast performance along with the resistance against the quantum adversary. Although NTRU has withstood various algebraic attacks, its side-channel resistance must also be considered for secure implementation. In this paper, we proposed the first single trace attack on NTRU. Previous side-channel attacks on NTRU used numerous power traces, which increase the attack complexity and limit the target algorithm. There are two versions of NTRU implementation published in succession. We demonstrated our attack on both implementations using a single power consumption trace obtained in the decryption phase. Furthermore, we propose a countermeasure to prevent the proposed attacks. Our countermeasure does not degrade in terms of performance.