Rodrigo Zeidan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Rodrigo Zeidan has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Marcelo Resende
Instituto de Economia, Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, Urca, Rio de Janeiro-RJ, Brazil
5 shared publications Marcelo Resende
4 shared publications- Offer Moshe Shapir
Business Department New York University Shanghai Shanghai China
2 shared publications Angela Fleury
Fundação Dom Cabral, Nova Lima, Brazil
1 shared publicationBruno Rodrigues
Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES) , Av. República do Chile, 330 – Torre Oeste – 14° andar, 20031-170, Rio de Janeiro , RJ , Brazil
1 shared publicationClaudio Boechat
Fundação Dom Cabral, Nova Lima, Brazil
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 19 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Trade Credit Lerner Index
A supplier and a buyer bargain jointly over prices and payment terms. The negotiated price is the Trade Credit Lerner Index (TCLI), the product of three components: the marginal cost, the markup, and the compounding factor at the supplier's adjusted cost of funds. At the reference parameterization, the Lerner Index overstates the true markup by 0.79% over a thirty-day payment term, and by up to 16% at longer payment terms and high adjusted costs of funds. Correcting the index for trade credit requires only the supplier's adjusted cost of funds over the payment term, with no demand elasticity or bargaining weight. With flexible prices, the two firms set the payment term where their joint financing surplus is largest, while the price divides the gains from the exchange. All benchmark results are closed form at a given bargaining weight. The firm financing the transaction depends on the two borrowing rates and the expected loss on the receivable. Firms use payment terms to extract rents when prices are sticky and managing receivables incurs variable costs. A buyer without an alternative supplier pays 3.75% more for the same good on identical payment terms.
- 19 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Trade Credit Lerner Index
A supplier and a buyer bargain jointly over prices and payment terms. The negotiated price is the Trade Credit Lerner Index (TCLI), the product of three components: the marginal cost, the markup, and the compounding factor at the supplier's adjusted cost of funds. At the reference parameterization, the Lerner Index overstates the true markup by 0.79% over a thirty-day payment term, and by up to 16% at longer payment terms and high adjusted costs of funds. Correcting the index for trade credit requires only the supplier's adjusted cost of funds over the payment term, with no demand elasticity or bargaining weight. With flexible prices, the two firms set the payment term where their joint financing surplus is largest, while the price divides the gains from the exchange. All benchmark results are closed form at a given bargaining weight. The firm financing the transaction depends on the two borrowing rates and the expected loss on the receivable. Firms use payment terms to extract rents when prices are sticky and managing receivables incurs variable costs. A buyer without an alternative supplier pays 3.75% more for the same good on identical payment terms.
- Open Access
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
The Theory of Trade Credit
Three axioms, firm optimization, bilateral bundling, and liquidity response, suffice to decompose a supplier and buyer's total surplus into real gains from exchange and financial gains accumulated over the trade credit extended. We divide the trade credit basis, based on the valuations of the marginal deferred dollar, into three differentials: SDF, expected repayment and covariance. The sign of the supplier's covariance separates trade credit's role as insurance or contagion. Trade credit is self-limiting for financially constrained firms, which distinguishes it from bank lending. The basis vanishes in a Modigliani-Miller benchmark. The axioms classify the literature into three zones.
- 12 October 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessThe Theory of Trade Credit
Three axioms, firm optimization, bilateral bundling, and liquidity response, suffice to decompose a supplier and buyer's total surplus into real gains from exchange and financial gains accumulated over the trade credit extended. We divide the trade credit basis, based on the valuations of the marginal deferred dollar, into three differentials: SDF, expected repayment and covariance. The sign of the supplier's covariance separates trade credit's role as insurance or contagion. Trade credit is self-limiting for financially constrained firms, which distinguishes it from bank lending. The basis vanishes in a Modigliani-Miller benchmark. The axioms classify the literature into three zones.
- 7 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 96
Cash conversion cycle and bargaining power in the product market:A global perspective
- 7 March 2026
- Published by Elsevier in Finance Research Letters
- Vol. 96
Cash conversion cycle and bargaining power in the product market:A global perspective
- Open Access
- 8 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
A non-parsimonious integration of trade credit with moral hazard, supply chain networks, and financial intermediation
This paper develops a comprehensive yet non-exhaustive dynamic theory of trade credit within a fully axiomatic framework that generates empirical results consistent with the extensive empirical literature on trade credit. We establish a continuous-time model in which all results, from upstreamness and centrality effects to monetary policy transmission, are systematically derived from a non-parsimonious model that refers to a firm’s operations, market power, financing decisions, position in the supply chain, and currency arbitrage opportunities. Our framework endogenizes the components of working capital while accounting for input illiquidity, asymmetric adjustment costs, and strategic interactions within production networks. The model’s non-parsimonious nature is compensated by allowing us to integrate stylized facts and empirical results from the literature on trade credit under one umbrella: (1) upstream and central firms provide more net trade credit even when facing strong financial constraints; (2) trade credit serves as a buffer during currency crises and monetary policy shocks; (3) firms engage in financial intermediation by borrowing in foreign currency to fund trade credit in local currency; and (4) operating shocks trigger increased trade credit flows to preserve supply chain stability. It also allows us to develop new predictions not yet been tested in the scientific literature.
- 8 February 2026
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessA non-parsimonious integration of trade credit with moral hazard, supply chain networks, and financial intermediation
This paper develops a comprehensive yet non-exhaustive dynamic theory of trade credit within a fully axiomatic framework that generates empirical results consistent with the extensive empirical literature on trade credit. We establish a continuous-time model in which all results, from upstreamness and centrality effects to monetary policy transmission, are systematically derived from a non-parsimonious model that refers to a firm’s operations, market power, financing decisions, position in the supply chain, and currency arbitrage opportunities. Our framework endogenizes the components of working capital while accounting for input illiquidity, asymmetric adjustment costs, and strategic interactions within production networks. The model’s non-parsimonious nature is compensated by allowing us to integrate stylized facts and empirical results from the literature on trade credit under one umbrella: (1) upstream and central firms provide more net trade credit even when facing strong financial constraints; (2) trade credit serves as a buffer during currency crises and monetary policy shocks; (3) firms engage in financial intermediation by borrowing in foreign currency to fund trade credit in local currency; and (4) operating shocks trigger increased trade credit flows to preserve supply chain stability. It also allows us to develop new predictions not yet been tested in the scientific literature.
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 7-123
Financial Statements, Banks’ Operations, and Systemic Risk
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 7-123
Financial Statements, Banks’ Operations, and Systemic Risk
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 257-328
“Green” Central Banking, from Stress Test Models to Beyond
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 257-328
“Green” Central Banking, from Stress Test Models to Beyond
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 175-255
ESG Investing
- 14 March 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 1-5
Introduction
- 14 May 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economic Surveys
- Vol. 38 (3) , 956-972
Racial and income‐based affirmative action in higher education admissions: Lessons from the Brazilian experience
This survey article provides insights regarding the future of affirmative action by analyzing the implementation methods and the empirical evidence on the use of placement quotas in the Brazilian higher education system. All federal universities have required income and racial‐based quotas in Brazil since 2012. Affirmative action in federal universities is uniformly applied across the country, which makes evaluating its effects particularly valuable. Affirmative action improves the outcomes of targeted students. Specifically, race‐based quotas raise the share of Black students in federal universities, an effect not observed with income‐based quotas alone. Affirmative action has downstream positive consequences for labor market outcomes. The results suggest that income and race‐based quotas beneficiaries experience substantial long‐term welfare benefits. There is no evidence of mismatching or negative consequences for targeted students' peers.
- 14 May 2023
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economic Surveys
- Vol. 38 (3) , 956-972
Racial and income‐based affirmative action in higher education admissions: Lessons from the Brazilian experience
This survey article provides insights regarding the future of affirmative action by analyzing the implementation methods and the empirical evidence on the use of placement quotas in the Brazilian higher education system. All federal universities have required income and racial‐based quotas in Brazil since 2012. Affirmative action in federal universities is uniformly applied across the country, which makes evaluating its effects particularly valuable. Affirmative action improves the outcomes of targeted students. Specifically, race‐based quotas raise the share of Black students in federal universities, an effect not observed with income‐based quotas alone. Affirmative action has downstream positive consequences for labor market outcomes. The results suggest that income and race‐based quotas beneficiaries experience substantial long‐term welfare benefits. There is no evidence of mismatching or negative consequences for targeted students' peers.
- 19 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 161-187
Building a Comprehensive Working Capital Strategy
- 19 August 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 161-187
Building a Comprehensive Working Capital Strategy